

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

BOBBY SINGLETON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WES ALLEN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-1291-AMM
Three-Judge Court

***SINGLETON* PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY**

Plaintiffs Bobby Singleton et al., through undersigned counsel, respond as follows to Defendants' notice, Doc. 243, of the Supreme Court's decision on May 23, 2024, in *Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP*, 144 S. Ct. 1221 (2024).

Alexander provides additional support for the Singleton Plaintiffs' claims, not for their dismissal. As Defendants acknowledge, Doc. 243 at 4, a plaintiff asserting a racial gerrymander claim bears the burdens of overcoming a partisan gerrymandering defense when the plaintiff must rely *solely* on circumstantial evidence. *Alexander*, 144 S. Ct. at 1235 ("A circumstantial-evidence-only case is especially difficult when the State raises a partisan-gerrymandering defense."). If

there is direct evidence of race as the predominant factor, and “if the State cannot satisfy strict scrutiny, direct evidence of this sort amounts to a confession of error.” *Id.* at 1234.

The Court’s specific example of “direct evidence of this sort” is exactly the kind of evidence the Singleton Plaintiffs rely on. “Direct evidence often comes in the form of a relevant state actor’s express acknowledgment that race played a role in the drawing of district lines. Such concessions are not uncommon because States often admit to considering race for the purpose of satisfying our precedent interpreting the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” 144 S. Ct. at 1234 (citing *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama*, 575 U.S. 254, 259–260 (2015)). That is the allegation in the Singleton Second Amended Complaint:

District 7 has been designed to perpetuate the racial gerrymander first created in 1992, by preserving the core of District 7 in the 2011 plan, retaining zero population deviation, and expanding the racially divisive split in Jefferson County, while maintaining one majority-Black voting-age district in an alleged attempt to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Doc. 229 at ¶ 68. Complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may have provided a compelling state interest for the racial gerrymander of CD 7 in 1992. But that does not relieve the State from the burden of showing its continued use in 2023 can satisfy strict scrutiny. See *Allen v. Milligan*, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1531 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Absent core retention, there is no apparent race-neutral reason to insist

that District 7 remain a majority-black district uniting Birmingham’s majority-black neighborhoods with majority-black rural areas in the Black Belt.”).

Core retention is, indeed, an issue here. Defendants contend they are no longer required to satisfy strict scrutiny in retaining the racial gerrymander of Jefferson County; Defendants contend they need only show that “the 2023 Plan preserves the core of District 7 from preceding plans.” Doc. 243 at 7. But, according to established Supreme Court precedent, core retention cannot change a gerrymandered district into one that is not gerrymandered:

The defendants misunderstand the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims. ... [I]t is the *segregation* of the plaintiffs—not the legislature’s line-drawing as such—that gives rise to their claims. ... [T]hey argued in the District Court that some of the new districts were mere continuations of the old, gerrymandered districts. Because the plaintiffs asserted that they remained segregated on the basis of race, their claims remained the subject of a live dispute, and the District Court properly retained jurisdiction.

North Carolina v. Covington, 585 U.S. 969, 975–76 (2018) (emphasis added). See *Allen v. Milligan*, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1505 (2023) (majority opinion) (“But this Court has never held that a State’s adherence to a previously used districting plan can defeat a § 2 claim. If that were the rule, a State could immunize from challenge a new racially discriminatory redistricting plan simply by claiming that it resembled an old racially discriminatory plan.”); *id.* at 1528 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The District Court disregarded the ‘finger’ because it has been present in every districting

plan since 1992, including the State’s latest enacted plan. *Singleton v. Merrill*, 582 F.Supp.3d 924, 1011 (ND Ala. 2022) (per curiam). But that reasoning would allow plaintiffs to bootstrap one racial gerrymander as a reason for permitting a second.”).

When the starting point for redistricting is a map admittedly drawn for a predominantly racial purpose, preserving district cores and protecting incumbent interests is evidence that the line-drawers intended to separate voters by race. *Jacksonville Branch of the NAACP v. Jacksonville*, 635 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1286 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (“Moreover, as other courts have recognized, by invoking core retention and incumbency protection as the predominant motive behind the shape of the Challenged Districts, the City makes the historical foundation for these districts particularly relevant.”); *Jacksonville Branch of the NAACP v. City of Jacksonville*, 2022 WL 16754389, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2022) (an intent “to maintain the race-based lines created in the previous redistricting cycle” is “not a legitimate objective”); *GRACE, Inc. v. City of Miami*, 2023 WL 4942064, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2023) (“The Court’s analysis of core retention was therefore appropriately limited to an evaluation of whether the Remedial Plan perpetuated the harms of racial gerrymandering, which the Court found it did.”); *GRACE, Inc. v. City of Miami*, 2023 WL 4853635, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla., July 30, 2023) (finding of racial gerrymandering was buttressed where the city’s “intent was, as expressed, to

preserve previously-drawn race-based lines of the Commission Districts in the 2022 redistricting process”) (citation omitted); *Covington v. North Carolina*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (“[E]fforts to protect incumbents by seeking to preserve the ‘cores’ of unconstitutional districts ... have the potential to embed, rather than remedy, the effects of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander”), *aff’d in relevant part and reversed in part on other grounds*, 585 U.S. 969 (2018); *Personhuballah v. Alcorn*, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 561 n.8 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“In any event, maintaining district cores is the type of political consideration that must give way to the need to remedy a *Shaw* violation.”); *Easley v. Cromartie*, 532 U.S. 234, 262 n.3 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating on behalf of four Justices that “the goal of protecting incumbents is legitimate, even where ... individuals are incumbents by virtue of their election in an unconstitutional racially gerrymandered district ... is a questionable proposition,” but noting that the question was not presented to the Supreme Court or district court and, therefore, that the Court had not addressed it); *Vera v. Richards*, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1336 (S.D. Tex. 1994), *aff’d sub nom. Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (“Incumbent protection is a valid state interest only to the extent that it is not a pretext for unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.”).

Alexander also reaffirms that a plaintiff can establish racial predominance by

showing that the Legislature used race as a proxy for partisan politics. 144 S. Ct. at 1234 n.1 (citing *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995); *Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285, 291 (2017)). Defendants did not raise a partisan gerrymandering defense until they moved to dismiss Count II in the Singleton Second Amended Complaint. Doc. 233 at 2–3. Party politics did not come up in the legislative debates over the Singleton and Smitherman plans, and it is not listed in the enacting statute as a redistricting criterion. In this respect, the instant case is the opposite of *Alexander*, where “the Republican-controlled legislature ... made it clear that it would aim to create a stronger Republican tilt in District 1.” 144 S. Ct. at 1237. In contrast, Alabama’s criteria included race (keeping Mobile and Baldwin counties together based on their “Spanish and French colonial heritage”) but not partisan advantage.

A question in the Legislature always was whether the Singleton crossover districts would perform as opportunity districts for Black voters. Only after the Second Amended Complaint pointed out how the Singleton Plan did a better job of meeting the standards set out in the statute enacting the 2023 plan did Defendants concede, as they do in their *Alexander* notice, that the Singleton Plaintiffs’ “alternative plans contain two reliably Democratic ‘crossover districts.’” Doc. 243 at 7.

Of course, any crossover opportunity district in today’s Alabama will be a

Democratic district. So Defendants’ assertion of a partisan defense is a categorical attack on crossover districts that, as Plaintiffs allege in Count II of their Second Amended Complaint and in their brief opposing the motion to dismiss, is a continuation of “Alabama’s unbroken policy of suppressing efforts of Black voters to form electoral coalitions with White voters and the use of political parties as the main instrument for maintaining White solidarity.” Doc. 236 at 13.

Since the Civil War, race has always been used as a proxy for gaining partisan power in Alabama. In support of that allegation, on May 17, 2024, Plaintiffs exchanged with Defendants’ counsel the attached reports of Alabama historians Dr. R. Volney Riser, and Dr. Kari Frederickson. These expert history reports are important additions to the evidence of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering and intentional racial discrimination. They also support the Singleton Plaintiffs’ claim in Count III of their Second Amended Complaint that the 2023 plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; in particular, the Senate Report factors of a “history of voting-related discrimination,” official actions that promote racially polarized voting, the exclusion of Black citizens from candidate slating processes, “the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns,” and a “tenuous” policy underlying the 2023 Congressional redistricting plan. *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 44–45 (1986).

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that *Alexander* was about weighing competing inferences after a trial, while here this Court is addressing Defendants' motion to dismiss. *Alexander* did not purport to change the bedrock rule that the plaintiffs get all reasonable inferences in their favor on a motion to dismiss.

Conclusion

The motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint should be denied.

Dated: June 4, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

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EXHIBIT A

EXPERT REPORT OF R. VOLNEY RISER

CONTOURS OF INTERRACIAL POLITICAL COALITION-BUILDING IN LATE-NINETEENTH CENTURY ALABAMA

May 17, 2024

INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS

1. My name is R. Volney Riser, and my residence is Livingston, Alabama. I appear in this matter in a private expert capacity, and plaintiffs' attorneys have retained me to research and describe historical efforts in Alabama to discourage or inhibit interracial political coalition building through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

2. My methodological approach reflects standard professional norms for qualitative historical research. I derive my conclusions from close analysis and reading of manuscript sources buttressed by my authoritative background in the relevant secondary literature. I am compensated at the rate of \$200 per hour. My fee is not contingent upon either my opinions or the outcome of this matter.

3. I am a historian of U.S. political and constitutional history, and I am a Professor of History at the University of West Alabama ("UWA"). I have taught at UWA since 2005. From 2012–2017, I was Editor-in-Chief of a historical journal, the *Alabama Review*, the official academic outlet of the Alabama Historical Association. I hold bachelor's degrees from Florida State University (1995 and 1998), and I hold an M.A. (2000) and a Ph.D. in American History (2005) from the University of Alabama. My formal historical training concentrated on U.S. Constitutional History and Southern History, and I completed both a master's thesis and doctoral dissertation that examined Alabama's 1901 Constitutional Convention. Regarding the latter, I was selected for the College of Arts & Sciences' "Outstanding Dissertation" award for 2005, and I was subsequently also announced as the university's "Outstanding Dissertation" award winner for that calendar year. At UWA, I teach or have taught courses in U.S. Constitutional History, African American History, the Gilded Age & Progressive Era, the Jazz Age and Great Depression, and the History of the American South.

4. I have published two books: *Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Jim Crow South, 1890–1908* (Louisiana State University Press, 2010; 2nd ed. 2013) and *A Goodly Heritage: Judges and Historically Significant Decisions of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama* (Occasional Papers of the Bounds Law Library, University of Alabama School of Law, 2010). I have also published articles in the *Alabama Law Review*, the *American Journal of Legal History*, and *Southern Historian*.¹ I have additionally contributed numerous entries to reference volumes, including essays on disfranchisement and various landmark episodes in U.S. legal, constitutional, and political history.² The unifying theme of my scholarship is the development and practical operation of political and constitutional systems in the Jim Crow-era South. I am frequently called upon as an expert reviewer, chiefly for work treating southern states’ legal and constitutional histories, and for work assessing broader national legal and constitutional developments as related to the American South.

5. I have provided expert witness services in two other cases within the past five years, *McLemore v. Hosemann*, 3:2019-CV-00383 (S. D. Miss, 2019) and *Thompson v. Merrill*, 2:16-cv-783-ECM-SMD (M. D. Ala., 2020). In 2022, I joined an amicus brief in *Milligan v. Allen*,

¹ R. Volney Riser, “Disfranchisement, the U.S. Constitution, and the Federal Courts: Alabama’s 1901 Constitutional Convention Debates the Grandfather Clause,” *American Journal of Legal History* 48, no. 3, 237–79 (Fall 2006) (evaluating the Alabama Constitution framers’ concerns that their disfranchisement provisions might trigger judicial intervention or punitive congressional responses); Riser, “‘The Milk in the Cocoanut’: Booker T. Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Fear of Conspiracy in Alabama’s 1901 Constitutional Ratification Referendum,” *Southern Historian* 26, 30–54 (Spring 2005) (discussing prominent conspiracy theories that helped drive ratification of Alabama’s “disfranchising” constitution); Riser, “The Burdens of Being White: Empire and Disfranchisement,” *Alabama Law Review* 53, no.1, 243–72 (Fall 2001) (addressing the concurrent public and policy-makers’ debates over the relationship between disfranchisement and territorial expansion).

² Riser, “Disfranchisement,” in *The World of Jim Crow America: A Daily Life Encyclopedia* (ABC–Clio, July 2019); Riser, “NAACP” and “*Powell v. Alabama*,” in the *Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States* (Gale Group, 2008); Riser, “Convict Leasing” in the *Encyclopedia of Anti-Slavery and Abolition* (Greenwood Press, 2007); Riser, “Joseph Philo Bradley,” “William Rufus Day,” and “Sanford Ballard Dole” in the *Historical Dictionary of the Gilded Age* (M. E. Sharpe Publishers, 2003); Riser, “*Saenz v. Roe*,” “*U.S. v. Butler*,” “*Missouri v. Holland*,” “*Craig v. Boren*,” “Balanced Budget Amendment,” “*American Tobacco Case*,” “*Granger Cases*,” “*Ex parte Garland*,” and “*Collector v. Day*” in the *Dictionary of American History* (Scribner’s, 2002).

599 U.S. ____ (2023). Though I am a scholar of constitutional and legal matters, I am not an attorney.

SUMMARY

6. Various tropes occur within late-nineteenth century southern political culture, and some of the most durable are ones concerning various manipulations of African Americans' votes. Theft, fraud, steal, destroy—these terms are casually cast about in debates about disfranchisement, as are discussions about “qualification” and “intelligence.” The root of all this, however, the impulse behind statutory suffrage restriction and later disfranchisement, was white men's voting behavior. Disfranchisement happened when and how it did because white men were leaving the Democratic fold. When white men broke away from the party, even in relatively small numbers, that effectively put African American voters back in play.

7. Examples are sadly rare where with respect to African American voting Alabama political leaders expanded their vocabulary beyond crude anecdotes about ballot box stuffing and alleged vote fraud schemes. From Emancipation forward, Whites struggled to either believe or accept that African Americans could make political decisions for themselves, denigrating them as a “bloc” to be manipulated rather than as a class of voters qualified to act in their own interest in partnerships or coalitions of their own design or choosing. White men were said to selflessly and bravely “stand together” to support the Democratic ticket out of patriotic devotion; Black men were described as thoughtless and venal, consumed by avarice and ignorance. As for white men who broke with the Democratic party, they were either scalawag Republicans or they were

alleged to have voted the Populist ticket because they were duped by charlatans.³ Conservative Democratic leaders denounced those white dissidents who tolerated any degree of interracial cooperation as “race traitors.” Interracial coalitions thus were discussed as fears or threats and never as mere political arrangements of mutual agreement entered into freely.

8. Democrats were not alone in their hostility toward African Americans. A significant faction within the Republican party was just as committed to limiting African Americans’ political opportunities, both on the ballot and at the ballot box. This manifested first in the Liberal Republican movement of the early 1870s and then was reenergized at the turn of the century. The “Lily White” initiative of the early twentieth century sought to capitalize upon Democrats’ successful disfranchisement campaign, and its leaders moved to purge African Americans from their ranks, presenting a new white man’s party to Alabama voters.

RECONSTRUCTION AS AN EXPERIMENT IN INTERRACIAL COALITION BUILDING

9. The first important political coalition in U.S. history was the antebellum abolition movement, and, after the Civil War and Emancipation, Congressional Reconstruction was the United States government’s first attempt to support and encourage interracial democracy by official means.

Alabama’s experience in Reconstruction confirmed the broader regional pattern.⁴ Emancipation

³ “Scalawag” is a term peculiar to the Reconstruction era South, and it refers to southern-born whites who joined the Republican Party or otherwise cooperated with the occupation governments during Congressional Reconstruction. Scalawags are usually lumped together with “carpetbaggers,” who were northerners (whether Black or White) who came to the South in search of state or federal office and who participated in or otherwise supported the Reconstruction governments. Though in the political context carpetbaggers are officeholders, the term applied to all northerners who moved South and participated in the Republican Party. These are not terms partisans would take for themselves—they were always epithets, in this case epithets applied by Democrats to their opponents.

⁴ The two longstanding authoritative histories of the Reconstruction era are Eric Foner’s *America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (Harper’s, 1988) and W. E. B. DuBois’s *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880* (Harcourt, 1935).

of itself was not enough to bring African Americans into the political system. The Freedmen required protection and needed encouragement, and they found both in the Republican Party-affiliated Union Leagues.⁵ With the implementation of Congressional Reconstruction, Freedmen's gains were sustained with federal civil and military authorities ensuring (or attempting to do so) their physical safety and the fair conduct of voter registration and elections.⁶ White Democrats, meanwhile, initially boycotted state politics, participation in which required swearing loyalty oaths to the United States as well as accepting the fact that African American men now could register and vote. This boycott gave rise to two of the more durable lies told of Reconstruction, that white southerners had been "disfranchised," and that Reconstruction-era politics were forcefully dominated and controlled by Black voters and Black officeholders.

REPUBLICAN HOSTILITY TOWARD AFRICAN AMERICANS

10. Republicans were often just as hostile as Democrats toward African American political participation. Republicans agreed with maintaining the Union, and beyond that, their attitudes sharply diverged. For present purposes, it is enough to understand they were divided on the question of whether Blacks should have a voice in the party and in affairs of state. That may at first glance seem surprising, which reflects southern Democrats' success in flattening Republicans' image into a two-dimensional caricature. It obscured any appreciation of internal

⁵The Union Leagues originated in border states and large cities during the Civil War as secret men's clubs of Union supporters who worked semi-covertly to combat Copperhead (pro-Southern) Democrats' activities. These were effectively Republican Party auxiliaries and after the War, northern interests sponsored their activities in the occupied South, encouraging and supporting the Freedmen's entry into the political process. Regarding both the Union League, see Michael W. Fitzgerald, *The Union League Movement in the Deep South: Politics and Agricultural Change During Reconstruction* (LSU Press, 1989).

⁶ For up-to-date studies of Alabama more generally in the Reconstruction Era, see, e.g.: William Warren Rogers Jr., *Reconstruction Politics in a Deep South State: Alabama, 1865-1874* (Alabama, 2021); Michael W. Fitzgerald, *Reconstruction in Alabama: From Civil War to Redemption in the Cotton South* (LSU Press, 2017); Margaret Storey, *Loyalty and Loss: Alabama's Unionists in the Civil War and Reconstruction* (LSU Press, 2004).

Republican Party debates and internecine public squabbles about both (1) whether African Americans should be encouraged to participate fully in the political process and (2) the particular aims of Reconstruction, especially regarding the Grant Administration's aggressive pursuit of an Emancipationist vision for the postbellum U.S., one focused on racial justice and federal support for the same.⁷

11. The contours of Republicans' internal debates about the direction of Reconstruction are well-documented, and they are every bit as complex and tortured as was the broader national experience of the War and its aftermath. Even a trained specialist can get lost in its thicket of characters and conflicts. It is helpful, then, to follow particular biographical examples, in this case the prominent Mobile attorney, politician, and commentator Frederick G. Bromberg.

Bromberg's career and recollections offer a useful window into the true state of Reconstruction era Alabama politics, and the arc of his political career bears out Alabama's development of (or failure to do so) a healthy, durable interracial democracy.⁸

12. Frederick Bromberg was by the early twentieth century recognized as a prominent Mobile attorney, and in his spare time published historical reminiscences in the *Papers of the Iberville Historical Society* and dabbled in editorial commentary for the *Mobile Unionist*, a progressive Republican newspaper. Bromberg was conspicuous, and for some suspicious, because of that latter distinction, but he was no mere curiosity. He was one of the last survivors of Alabama's

⁷ See, e.g.: Loren Schweninger, Black Citizenship and the Republican Party in Reconstruction Alabama. *Alabama Review* 19, no. 2 (April 1976): 83-103; Schweninger, *James T. Rapier and Reconstruction* (Chicago, 1978); Richard Bailey, *Neither Carpetbaggers nor Scalawags: Black Officeholders During the Reconstruction of Alabama, 1867-1878* (NewSouth Books, 2010); Michael W. Fitzgerald, *Urban Emancipation: Popular Politics in Reconstruction Mobile, 1860-1890* (LSU Press, 2002); William Warren Rogers, Jr., *Reconstruction Politics in a Deep South State: Alabama, 1865-1974* (Alabama, 2021); Peter Kolchin, *First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and Reconstruction* (Praeger, 1972); Sarah Woolfolk Wiggins, *The Scalawag in Alabama Politics, 1865-1881* (Alabama, 1977).

⁸ Margaret Davidson Sizemore published the only lengthy biography of Bromberg. See, "Frederick G. Bromberg of Mobile: An Illustrious Character, 1837-1928." *Alabama Review* 19, no 2 (April 1976): 104-112.

Reconstruction governments. Bromberg was a Harvard undergraduate when Alabama seceded, and he remained in Cambridge for the duration of the War working as Prof. Charles Eliot's laboratory assistant and as a mathematics instructor. He returned home after the war to begin a teaching career, and he immediately allied himself with the Republican party, thus becoming a scalawag. Bromberg held a number of municipal offices in the early years of Reconstruction before being elected to the state senate in 1868 and to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1872.⁹

13. Offended by the then-current “Lost Cause” myths of Reconstruction, Bromberg took it as his duty to try and correct Democratic lies, starting with the claim of carpetbag rule—“...a most gross error, which an honest inquiry would easily have demonstrated..”¹⁰ Working through the details of his political career, Bromberg showed that at all levels and at all times, native white southerners held the upper hand. African Americans and mixed-race “creoles” participated in government, but, again, only as part of a broader, white-dominated coalition. In the legislature, he recollected that two of Mobile county's Representatives were of African American descent. In the thirty-two member Senate, he knew “one white Democrat...and one negro.”¹¹ Among the other thirty members, only nine were carpetbaggers. The governor, Winston Smith, was an Alabamian, though the lieutenant governor was a carpetbagger. And, regarding the 100-member

⁹ See, generally: Sizemore, “Frederick Bromberg of Mobile.”

¹⁰ Frederick Bromberg, “Reconstruction Period in Alabama, part I.” *Papers of the Iberville Historical Society*, no. 3 (1911): 2. The work that immediately prompted Bromberg's essays was William Garrot Brown's *A History of Alabama, for Use in Schools* (University Publishing Company, 1900), and Brown reflected the developing historiographic trends that originated in the work and teaching of William Archibald Dunning, chiefly his *The Constitution of the United States in Civil War and Reconstruction: 1860-1867* (1897), *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics* (1897), and *Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 1865-1877* (1905). Dunning trained directly scores of historians attending Columbia University, and through his broader professional influence shaped an entire generation of American scholars and commentators. Among those was Walter Lynwood Fleming, whose *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (MacMillan, 1905) dominated scholarship on the state until the mid-twentieth century. For a broad overview of the entire Dunning School and its legacy see John David Smith and J. Vincent Lowery, eds., *The Dunning School: Historians, Race, and the Meaning of Reconstruction* (Kentucky, 2013).

¹¹ Bromberg, “Reconstruction, pt I,” 4.

House, he was “certain the number of negroes did not exceed thirteen.”¹² Bromberg felt unable to state exactly how many Representatives were carpetbaggers, but “I think...it is safe to say that all of the representatives who came from the counties which had a majority of white registered voters...sent natives, or old ante-bellum citizens.”¹³

14. Bromberg was writing in 1910-1911, some forty years after the fact, by which time Democratic mythmaking had firmly cemented in the broader public’s mind the notion of Black domination and heavy-handed carpetbag rule. Disputing that myth was Bromberg’s purpose. What he devoted less attention to, or, rather, what your average conservative white Democrat would perhaps not apprehend, was a broader truth about Republican-ruled Alabama: white Democrats were not Black Alabamians only enemy, for even within Republican ranks, they were attacked and undermined not because of policy, but because of their color. Bromberg cared about correcting the record because he took offense at being classed himself as party to any Black domination or carpetbag rule. Carpetbaggers, Bromberg explained, were Northerners who followed or participated in the U.S. Army’s occupation of the South “whose chief purpose was to secure the offices required to be filled under the reconstruction measures, and who generally allied themselves with the negroes, as an ignorant, pliable class of voter, in opposition to the better element of the Republican party.”¹⁴

15. Republicans, nationally and at the state-level, split into “Regular” and “Liberal” factions, with the former championing interracial democracy and an Emancipationist vision of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Liberal Republicans, on the other hand, emerged as critics of the Grant Administration’s many corruption scandals but also and more significantly as opponents of

¹² Bromberg, “Reconstruction, pt I,” 5.

¹³ Bromberg, “Reconstruction, pt I,” 6.

¹⁴ Bromberg, “Reconstruction, pt I,” 1.

Grant's efforts at a wholesale reconstruction of southern society. They fiercely objected, for example, to the Ku Klux Klan Acts and Grant's enforcement of the same. Frederick Bromberg was a Liberal, and his 1872 election reflected that faction's national strategy of seeking alliances with Democrats. Indeed, the Republican Bromberg was elected as the Democratic Party nominee, running against the "Regular" Republican nominee, Jeremiah Haralson, a well-known African American political activist. Rejected in 1874 by both Democrats and Republicans, Bromberg sought reelection as a fringe party nominee, but this time Jeremiah Haralson handily won the seat. Thus Bromberg's electoral career came to an end, and he devoted himself professionally to the law.

16. As a private citizen, as a civic leader and political commentator, and as a committed Republican, Bromberg also was a lifelong critic of African American political involvement and a champion of the disfranchisement movement. Bromberg's personal papers contain relatively few documents pertaining to his personal or political affairs, but what does survive is telling. Washington, D.C., attorney Luther Smith wrote in 1896 concerning a legal matter and added commentary on Bromberg's prior suggestion "that the colored electors ought to be taken off of the republican [sic] ticket and white men put in their stead."¹⁵ Bromberg wanted Blacks out of the political arena. Writing in 1901 to Harvard President Charles Eliot, under whom Bromberg had worked as a research assistant, he noted with satisfaction that "with the removal of the negro out of politics in the south [sic], as a voting and office-holding factor, the prevailing threa[t] of social equality between whites and blacks will be removed."¹⁶ And Bromberg was no mere spectator to the disfranchisement campaign in Alabama, recalling proudly in a 1925 *Alabama*

¹⁵ Luther Smith to Frederick Bromberg, August 3, 1896. Frederick Bromberg Papers, Southern Historical Collection, UNC-Chapel Hill.

¹⁶ Frederic Bromberg to Charles Eliot, December 27, 1901, Bromberg Papers.

Law Journal article that he had suggested to the President of Alabama's 1901 constitutional convention a prohibition on Black office-holding, and that he continued to press the suggestion to state officials well into the new century.¹⁷

17. Bromberg's recollections are the late-in-life reminiscences of a single retired politician, but his example bears out the well-documented if broadly underappreciated truth that even during Reconstruction, that one brief attempt at interracial democracy, white partisans sought to undermine, exclude, and isolate Black voters and prospective office-holders. Bromberg recognized that Blacks could have no influence or voice in elections absent interracial coalition building, and he resented that they had been able to do so. This only underscores the fact that for Blacks to hold any ground in the political arena required that they fight a two-front battle against white Democrats and hostile Republicans, one that carried on well into the twentieth century.

REDEMPTION AND BOURBON CONTROL

18. The Reconstruction Era never saw any effective threat to white control, but white men divided between the Republican and Democratic parties, and the former cemented their majorities with Black men's support and votes. Though Democrats gained significant electoral purchase through their condemnation of white Republicans who "demeaned" themselves by their association with African American voters, Democrats ultimately regained control of state politics through threats, intimidation and violence. While Republicans had *sought* African American

¹⁷ Frederick Bromberg, "The Right to Vote—The Right to Hold Office." *Alabama Law Journal*, 1925, reprinted in "Frederick George Bromberg," in *History of Alabama and Her People*, vol. II (Chicago: American Historical Society, Inc., 1927). 682-84; 683.

votes, Democrats *took* them. Having thus “redeemed” the state, Democrats governed more or less unchallenged through the so-called Bourbon Era.¹⁸

19. Though Alabama’s conservative white majority definitely (and, again, openly) manipulated, threatened, and cajoled African American voters, they did not through either registration or apportionment devote significant energies to addressing white division. This is not because Whites never divided politically, but because there was for decades no chance of any meaningful inter-racial cooperation, which would have been the only means to threaten Democratic control. Alabama Democrats thus saw no need to refresh their toolbox until the early 1890s, when various agrarian-based protest movements peeled away significant numbers of previously reliable Democratic votes. White men were leaving the conservative Democrat fold in significant enough numbers to give Black voters new relevance, and thus began a decade of furious efforts to first control and then disfranchise both Blacks *and* those Whites who displayed any willingness to form or participate in inter-racial political coalitions.

¹⁸ “Bourbon” was an epithet applied by opponents and critics of the Democrats who “redeemed” their states from Republican rule. The term itself derived from critics of the French royal house, of whom it had been said that the Bourbons “learned nothing and forgot nothing.” In the early- to mid-nineteenth century, “Bourbon” was an epithet any political faction might apply to their opponents, but by the 1880s, it settled upon the conservative Democratic redeemers. Democrats never would have called themselves “Bourbons.” Instead, southern party regulars called their organization “the Democracy,” and disaffected agrarians in different settings called themselves “Jeffersonians” or, once silver emerged as a political issue, “Silver Democrats.” The father of Southern history, C. Vann Woodward, wished historians would abandon the term, but his proposal proved unpersuasive. (C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913* [LSU Press, 1951] 75 n. 1). William Allen Going’s *Bourbon Democracy in Alabama, 1874-1890* (Alabama, 1951) remains the best standalone study of Alabama from Redemption through the Bourbon era. The best-known treatment of Redemption at present is Nicholas Lemann’s *Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006). Lemann’s study focuses on Mississippi, but it is applicable to the whole of the Deep South. George Rable’s *But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction* (Georgia, 1984), Michael Perman’s *The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869-1879* (North Carolina, 1984), and Dan Carter’s *When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1867* (LSU Press, 1985) are useful as well.

GROWING THREAT OF INTERRACIAL COOPERATION

20. There has for generations in academic circles been a battle of French phrases concerning whether disfranchisement amounted to a *fait accompli* or a Bourbon *coup d'etat*. With respect strictly to African American ballot access, the difference is effectively null. Their votes were routinely miscounted and manipulated in the two decades before disfranchisement; afterward, they had no votes that could be manipulated. Likewise, before disfranchisement came to Alabama, Bourbon Democrats ran the state, and Democrats ran it afterwards. So why do it all? The answer is white division, or, rather, to deny any other white-dominated faction the ability to either benefit from African American votes or to form any effective interracial electoral coalition.¹⁹

21. Disfranchisement came to Alabama following the tumultuous 1890s, when conservative, “Bourbon” Democrats and agrarians warred for control of the state’s government. White men had since Emancipation overwhelmingly voted Democratic, but 1880s agrarian discontent and an early 1890s national economic depression attracted wage laborers and small farmers into a new “People’s Party” (a.k.a. the Populist Party), portending doom for the state’s conservative Democratic rulers. Eighteen-ninety was the year agrarianism blossomed fully across Alabama’s political landscape, but agrarians were not conservatives’ only worry that year. It was also the year of Blair’s Education Bill and Lodge’s Elections Bill, the latter of which proposed to

¹⁹ For an overview of the disfranchisement movement, see, e.g., R. Volney Riser, *Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Jim Crow South, 1890–1908* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010); Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888–1908* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); J. Morgan Kousser, *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); Sheldon Hackney, *Populism to Progressivism in Alabama* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877–1913* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951); V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Vintage, 1949).

establish broad federal statutory authority over state elections, which would have guaranteed African Americans could act freely in the political arena.²⁰

22. With the political and social order they had nurtured since Reconstruction seeming to crumble, besieged conservatives maintained their grip on government through brazen frauds. This was not new. Political hacks had bought, sold, stolen, and destroyed Black men's votes ever since Black men first had votes for them to buy, sell, steal, and destroy. From Redemption through the 1890s, Alabama's conservative Democrats used these practices to settle intra-party disputes. But in the 1890s, interracial coalitions of Populists and Republicans threatened to unseat Democrats.

23. Alabama's Democratic leaders recognized that their actions were their own greatest problem. Yet they stopped short of blaming themselves. Instead, the Democracy laid blame for the 1890's political turmoil at its *white* opponents' feet. Interracial political coalitions were illegitimate factions; Populists and white Republicans thus were social deviants. If not for Black voters, they reasoned, those factions could gain no purchase. The threat was not actually that Black men would vote and attain office, rather that with white men's votes divided, Black men's votes could be sought, won (or just taken) by rival white parties. The Democratic party had lost its monopoly over white voters, and uncertain of their ability to manipulate and control the count of Black ballots, they acted to eliminate any threat of interracial electoral cooperation.

²⁰ The authoritative treatment of this period in Alabama remains William Warren Rogers, Sr.'s *One-Gallused Rebellion: Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896* (LSU, 1970).

**ALABAMA'S 1899 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
AND THE 1900 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PRIMARY**

24. Treatments of the disfranchisement movement in Alabama typically began with a discussion of the Sayre Bill and then continue on to the 1901 Constitutional Convention.²¹ Relatively little attention, though, has been paid to the 1898 legislative session and its consideration of the 1898 constitutional convention enabling act, and what treatments do exist imbue that legislation with an air of inevitability. Securing its passage had not been easy or simple, and a significant campaign had been launched through the state press pushing for its adoption.²²

25. Anniston attorney Sidney J. Bowie was a leader in the public campaign supporting the legislation, and would be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1900. A circular authored by Bowie appeared around the state in February 1898. In an ocean of comment, Bowie's stood out for its precise dissection of the threat facing conservative Democrats and for its detailed accounting of how that attack might unfold. Conversations about disfranchisement tend to focus on what happened to Black voters in Black-majority counties, but White counties were Bowie's real concern. Using Talladega County as his example, "it is a matter of arithmetic merely to demonstrate that if the solid negro vote be added to 251 whites they can elect whomever they please, though the 251 whites be opposed by 2,945 of their own race, or more than thirteen to one."

26. For Bowie and his fellow Democrats, African American voters could only be presumed to act as an unthinking bloc, and, unless they agreed with the mass of White voters, an illegitimate one.

²¹ The Sayre Bill is discussed in all histories of Alabama published in the last half-century or so, but the only standalone work on the subject is David Ashley Bagwell's article "The 'Magical Process': The Sayre Election Law of 1893." *Alabama Review* 25, no 2 (April 1972): 83-104.

²² The most accessible and well-known published study on Alabama politics specifically in this period is Sheldon Hackney's *Populism to Progressivism in Alabama* (Princeton, 1969).

And, the potential for this African American “bloc” to win the day was an unparalleled danger. Bowie denounced men who emphasized voting frauds from the Black Belt counties and who denied their contra-Democratic stance was at odds with white supremacy. White dissent coupled with African American votes, i.e. interracial coalition-building, was intolerable. “We are opposed,” he continued, “to the rule of a minority of white men...as odious to every principle of free government, and of the whole essence of democracy, which is not in the least mitigated by the fact that minority is supplemented by a sufficient number of blacks to turn the scales.” White politicians’ appeals for African American votes meant that “the negro...is the arbitrator and his vote changes the result... *Negro arbitration in principle is not distinguishable from Negro rule...*”(emphasis added).²³

27. Bowie would not consider anything less than the wholesale disfranchisement of African Americans. Anything else was a waster of time and an effort to “keep obscure the purpose to cut this running sore from the body politic of the state for fear the time has not yet arrived for speaking plain words about unquestioned evils.” Bowie cast his call as a cry for salvation: “Under existing conditions white division is fraught with great perils,” and “where all things are subordinate to one party,” by which he meant African American voters, “white men themselves are only half free.” Bowie likened interracial coalitions and the influence Blacks derived from them to something demonic, insisting it must be exorcised to secure white men’s futures: “*Relief from the incubus of negro suffrage is essential to the full freedom of the white man*” (emphasis added).²⁴

²³ “Proposed Constitutional Convention,” *Birmingham Age-Herald*, 20 February 1898, p 10. The *Age-Herald* did not attach Bowie’s name to this in the February 20 edition, but it did so when it re-ran it the next day.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

28. The 1898 legislature approved the enabling legislation and Governor Joseph Forney Johnston signed the “Constitutional Convention Act” into law. However, the progressive wing of the Alabama Democratic party that Governor Johnston represented, and intended to court in his upcoming senatorial campaign, was less than enthusiastic about the convention. With the opposite “Bourbon” wing of the party looking to dominate that assembly, Governor Johnston feared the direction a Bourbon-led constitutional convention would take. Less than a year after he signed the convention bill, Johnston brought the legislature into a special session and asked them to repeal the enabling act.²⁵ The legislature gave the governor what he wanted. Johnston explained to Mobile’s *Daily Register* that had he failed to intervene, Alabama’s 1899 constitutional convention would have “been in the hands of the representatives of the corporations, the gold standard men, and the Palmer and Buckner bolters,” by which he meant Bourbon Democrats committed equally to disfranchisement and the destruction of the Progressive and agrarian reform-minded movements whose support he hoped to enjoy in his 1900 campaign for the U.S. Senate.²⁶

29. Joseph Johnston never opposed disfranchisement, and he was no champion of African American voting rights, but he understood just how unpopular the initiative was, and knew it would disproportionately affect renegade white voters who had broken with the party.²⁷ Race was the cornerstone issue in the 1900 Democratic senatorial preference primary.²⁸ Johnston and Morgan each advocated disfranchisement, but the Governor warned that the Bourbons intended to disfranchise lower and working-class whites along with Blacks. Morgan, for his part,

²⁵ Hackney, *Populism to Progressivism in Alabama*, 148-151; 163-167.

²⁶ *Mobile Daily Register*, 19 November 1899.

²⁷ Joseph F. Johnston, “Negro Suffrage in Alabama,” *The Independent* 51 (8 June 1899): 1535-1537.

²⁸ Official party nominations came from local and state Democratic conventions, but there was an open primary where voters could express a preference.

subordinated every real issue to white supremacy. He and his supporters advocated wholesale Black disfranchisement at every turn and alleged that Johnston opposed the same. Morgan's campaign strategy had not been the least bit creative, but it was effective. Sydney Bowie rode Morgan's coattails to a Democratic congressional nomination, and now, as the effective U.S. Representative-elect, he wrote to salute Morgan, declaring that "political morality and decency have been signally vindicated."²⁹

1901: AFRICAN AMERICANS ARE DISFRANCHISED

30. The pro-disfranchisement legislature swept into office by the 1900 primary in short order approved an enabling act, setting the stage for the 1901 constitutional convention. The story of the 1901 convention is well-known at this point, and, dominated as it was by the Democratic Party, there is little use here in recounting its internal deliberations. It is the subsequent ratification referendum that matters for present purposes. Joseph Johnston, now the former governor, led the Anti-Ratification campaign. In this, as was true when he successfully fought to call off the 1899 constitutional convention, Johnston was driven primarily by his senatorial ambitions, calculating that leading the Anti effort would (1) make sure his Populist-leaning voting base would not lose their right to vote and (2) have no ill effect upon his political future. Johnston and his allies operated separately from African American leaders, though Pro-Constitution forces of course attempted to link Johnston with the cause of Black voters, and the charge seemed to gain little ground. In the end, the 1901 Constitution was ratified only through

²⁹ Sydney Bowie to John Tyler Morgan, 17 April 1900, John Tyler Morgan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (microfilm copy, Auburn University) reel 3; Andrew L. Williams to John Tyler Morgan, 1 May 1900, Morgan Papers, reel 4.

the curious “support” of the state’s African American population, who provided the final 108,613 to 81,734 victory.³⁰

31. In the immediate aftermath of ratification, rumors and whispers swirled that various combinations of Populists, Republicans, and otherwise disaffected Democrats would secret themselves onto county Boards of Registrars to sabotage the 1902 registration. The seriousness of those is hard to judge.³¹ While all this unfolded, and while conservatives basked in victory, following the referendum the Anti-Ratificationists launched a push for control of the Alabama Democratic Party. This movement was the natural result, a *Washington Post* editorial observed, of an “intestinal quarrel” in Alabama, the manifestation of “the long-pending clash between the Bourbon and the progressive elements of the white population.”³² Bourbons had controlled the Democratic party (and the state) via the voting apparatuses of the Black majority counties. That is how through theft and intimidation they could “count in” Black votes as they saw fit. But, with upwards of ninety-eight percent of the state’s Black men disfranchised, power shifted toward white population centers where a majority of voters had opposed ratification. From this shift was born the direct “White” primary movement in Alabama. After a failed 1902 attempt to regain the governorship, in 1906, with conservatives unable to “count in” Black votes against him, Joseph Johnston emerged as one of two victors (U.S. Representative John Hollis Bankhead Sr. was the other) in the Alabama Democratic Party’s peculiar “Dead Shoe” U.S. senatorial primary of that same year.³³

³⁰ Riser, *Defying Disfranchisement*, 134-37.

³¹ See, e.g. regarding the implementation of the 1901 Constitution’s suffrage provisions, Riser, *Defying Disfranchisement*, 138-53.

³² *Washington Post*, 18 November 1901.

³³ Johnston claimed that incumbent governor William Dorsey Jelks had benefitted from misconduct in the 1902 Democratic primary, though this is debatable. The 1906 “Dead Shoe” primary was staged to designate “alternate” U.S. Senators in the event of the death or resignation of either of the elderly incumbents, John Tyler Morgan and Edmund Winston Pettus. The intention was to direct the legislature when it voted to appoint a new Senator (Congress submitted the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the states six years later). Seven

THE LILY WHITES

32. Even as Democrats maneuvered to inoculate themselves from the threat of interracial coalition-building, they maneuvered as well to exploit Republicans' own well-documented internal hostility toward African Americans, flirting and teasing them with the idea that in an all-white game, Republicans would attain a new measure of respectability among white voters generally. U.S. Representative John Hollis Bankhead Sr. told a *Washington Star* reporter in late May that "many men of wealth and social and business prominence" voted Democratic "under protest." Alabama's industrial leaders were among them and were Republicans at heart and "if conditions were such as to admit of it would vote with the Republican party. As long as the negro is in politics, however, they cannot do so. They have to ignore every other consideration in politics when confronted with the danger of negro domination."³⁴

33. Bankhead's comment could be dismissed as a mere gambit if not for the fact that a sizeable faction of Alabama Republicans was as keen as Democrats to cast out Blacks from state politics, eager to reassure white voters there was nothing interracial about the GOP. Forty years earlier, these would have been Liberal Republicans such as Frederick Bromberg. Now, though, they were "Lily Whites," and as soon as Alabama ratified the 1901 constitution, they moved aggressively to seize control of the Republican party apparatus.

34. What happened inside Alabama's Republican Party reflected a broader regional trend. The new constitutions "which made it impossible for a negro to vote," Henry Litchfield West wrote

candidates entered the race, including John Barnett Knox, President of the 1901 Constitutional Convention, and former governor William C. Oates. U.S. Representative John Hollis Bankhead Sr. finished first and Johnston second. The legislature confirmed Bankhead's appointment in July 1907 following Morgan's death in June. Pettus died in July 1907, just days after Bankhead entered the Senate, and Johnston succeeded him in short order. See, e.g.: Grace Hooten Gates, "The Dead Shoe Primary," *Huntsville Historical Review* 2, no 1 (January 1972): 3-17 and Kari Frederickson, *Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama* (Alabama, 2021).

³⁴ "The Negro Question," *Washington (D.C.) Evening Star*, 2 May 1901, p 1.

in the October 1902 *Forum*, “have resulted in the creation of a White Republican party.” The Democracy’s dominance over southern politics would not soon abate, but “the seed of disintegration has been sown in the disfranchisement of the negro and the consequent possibility of a Republican party without a black attachment.”³⁵ West’s assertion is questionable. Simply eliminating Blacks from the party could not really help southern Republicans. First, disfranchisement did not (and nor was it ever likely to) weaken “the Democracy.” Democratic party machines dictated the southern states’ disfranchisement campaigns, and Democrats dominated every state afterward. Second, even if white Democrats *had* been tempted to switch their party affiliation, President Roosevelt, like President Grant before, was doing his best to preserve Blacks’ standing within the Republican Party, and that was something that no self-respecting southern Democrat could or would abide.

35. Black Republicans and the interracial “Black-and-Tan” faction they belonged to did not take the Lily White movement lightly or passively.³⁶ They refused to go without a fight and announced a campaign against their G.O.P. assailants. “They will raise \$10,000,” the *Daily Ledger* reported, “to wage a war on the lily whites.”³⁷ It helped that they had Booker T. Washington on their side, and Washington wasted no time in alerting the President as to what was afoot. But Roosevelt required no coaxing. He responded quickly and harshly to Alabama’s Lily White movement and started to remove Republican appointees who had cast their lot with it.³⁸ Alabama’s Lily Whites remained publicly defiant, convinced that purging Blacks was a necessary step towards building a “respectable” white man’s Republican Party.

³⁵ Henry Litchfield West, “American Politics,” *Forum* 34, no. 2 (October 1902): 173-176, 174-175.

³⁶ Southern Republicans were divided into Lily White and Black-and-Tan factions until the Lily Whites’ final triumph in the 1960s, which coincided with a broader realignment of southern party politics in the 1960s and 1970s.

³⁷ *Birmingham Daily Ledger*, 19 September 1902.

³⁸ Louis R. Harlan, *Booker T. Washington: The Wizard of Tuskegee, 1901-1915* (Oxford, 1983) 7-10. This began in September 1902, when he fired Birmingham U.S. Attorney William Vaughan, a former state party chairman who had aided the Lily Whites. Roosevelt replaced Vaughan (who had obtained his position by the grace of Mark Hanna)


36. While Republicans argued through late 1902 and early 1903, concerns began to emerge that the debate was encouraging Blacks to feel that they mattered. Joseph Johnston, anticipating another future senatorial run, complained to an interviewer that Roosevelt's approach had caused "unrest . . . among the Negroes, who are being led to believe that they are a factor in the politics of the country and must insist upon their rights."³⁹

CONCLUSION

37. From Emancipation onward, the overwhelming majority of Alabama's white political class, irrespective of party affiliation, rejected the premise of interracial democracy and fought to obstruct and undermine any interracial political coalitions. From a remove of more than 150 years, this has in the popular mind flattened into a simple White/Black dichotomy, where Democrats are the former and Republicans are the latter. That, however, only proves how successfully Democrats had twisted Alabama's political vocabulary, for it carefully elides away Alabama Republicans' own pronounced unease toward African American voters.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 16th day of

May 2024, at Livingston, Alabama.



with a Democrat---Judge Thomas R. Roulhac. (*New York Times*, 8 October 1902, 20 October 1902, 25 October 1902, and 26 October 1902; *Birmingham Daily Ledger*, 12 September 1902) In November 1902, Roosevelt struck again, firing Lily White collaborationist Julian Bingham from the post of Collector of Internal Revenue for Alabama. Bingham was also succeeded by a Democrat---Tuskegee Postmaster Joseph Thompson, brother of Alabama U.S. Representative Charles Thompson, whose district included Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute. (*Baltimore (Md.) Afro-American Ledger*, 15 November 1902; *New York Times*, 11 November 1902; *Washington Post*, 11 November 1902). Three more Alabama Lily White officeholders were "marked for decapitation by rumor," the *New York Times* reported. Birmingham Postmaster J. W. Hughes, Montgomery U.S. Attorney W. S. Reese, and Mobile U.S. Marshall Frank Simmons expected to be Roosevelt's next victims. (*New York Times*, 13 November 1902).

³⁹ *Chicago Broad Ax*, 11 July 1903.

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TEACHING & PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Professor of History, August 2019-
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Assistant Professor of History, 2007–2014
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Lecturer in History, 2005–2007
The University of West Alabama

Editor, 2012–2017
The Alabama Review

TEACHING, RESEARCH, & ADVISING INTERESTS

U.S. Constitutional History
American Legal History
Voting Rights and Elections

American Political History
Gilded Age & Progressive Era
Southern History

PUBLICATIONS

Published Books

Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Jim Crow South, 1890–1908
(Louisiana State University Press, May 2010; paperback edition, January 2013).

A Goodly Heritage: Judges and Historically Significant Decisions of the United States Court for the Middle District of Alabama, 1804–1955 (Bounds Library Occasional Papers Series, no. 7, University of Alabama School of Law, May 2010).

Books in Progress

Retribution in History: Politics, Anti-Democracy, and Jim Crow Constitutionalism, 1890–1915

The Litigious Mr. Washington: Booker T. Washington and the Courts.

2 | R. VOLNEY RISER

Published Peer-reviewed Articles

(co-authored with Tony A. Freyer and Paul M. Pruitt, Jr.) “Clement Clay Torbert and Alabama Law Reform.” *Alabama Law Review* 63, no. 4 (2012): 867–94.

“Disfranchisement, the U.S. Constitution, and the Courts: Alabama’s 1901 Constitutional Convention Debates the Grandfather Clause.” *American Journal of Legal History* 48, no. 3 (2006): 237–79.

“‘The Milk in the Coconut’: Booker T. Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Fear of Conspiracy in Alabama’s 1901 Constitutional Ratification Referendum.” *Southern Historian* 26 (Spring 2005): 30–54.

“The Burdens of Being White: Empire and Disfranchisement.” *Alabama Law Review* 53, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 243–72.

Articles in Progress

“Empire’s Ladder: African American Emigration to Hawai’i, 1899–1901.”

“Jim Crow’s Unexpected Influence upon Hawaii: Southern Disfranchisement, Northern Imperialists, and the 1900 Hawaiian Organic Act.”

“Ua Mau ke Ea o ka ‘Āina i ka Pono: Hawai’i’s 1900 Territorial Delegate Election and the Fight to Redeem the 1900 Organic Act.”

PRESENTATIONS

Selected Academic Presentations

“Jim Crow’s Unexpected Influence upon Hawaii: Southern Disfranchisement, Northern Imperialists, and the 1900 Hawaiian Organic Act.” Policy History Association Biennial Meeting, Nashville, June 1–3, 2016.

“The Genius of Wilford Smith.” Association of the Study of African American Life and History Annual Meeting, Jacksonville, Florida, October 2–6, 2013 (delivered in absentia).

“Introducing Wilford H. Smith.” American Historical Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, January 3–6, 2013.

“The ‘Fightin’ Granddaddy’ Clause: Voting, and Military Service as Proxies for Race in the Disfranchisement Era.” American Historical Association, Boston, January 6–9, 2011.

3 | R. VOLNEY RISER

“Whence Came *Williams*: Voting Rights Activism in 1890s Mississippi.” Centennial Celebration of Civil Rights Conference, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, October 21–23, 2010.

“The Lost Promise of Collaboration: Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, and the Implications of Their (Failed) Joint Fight Against Jim Crow.” Southern Historical Association Annual Meeting, Louisville, November 5–8, 2009.

“How Long was the Long Civil Rights Movement?: The Example of African American Voting Rights Claims in the Disfranchisement Era.” San Francisco State University Rights Conference, San Francisco State University, September 17–18, 2009.

“Who Was Henry Williams?: Disfranchisement, Black Protest, and the Case of *Williams v. Mississippi*.” Race and Place in the American South Conference, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, 2008.

“Black Voting Rights Activism in Disfranchisement Era Alabama.” Southern Historical Association Annual Meeting, Birmingham, 2006.

“The Cases of Jackson Giles: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Progressive Era.” Social Science History Association Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, November 2–5, 2006.

“The Anti-Disfranchisement Cases of 1890–1915.” Association for the Study of African American Life and History Annual Meeting, Atlanta, September 27–30, 2006.

AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS & GRANTS

- 2022 Global South Research Grant, New Orleans Center for the Gulf South, Tulane University
- 2020 Joel Williamson Research Fund Summer Fellowship, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
- 2019 Loraine McIlwain Bell Trust Professor Award, University of West Alabama
- U.S.-Norway Fulbright Foundation, Fulbright Roving Scholars Program 2019–2020 (Alternate).
- National Science Foundation EPSCOR RII grant, “Bamboo: An Integrated Model Using Natural and Human Systems Sustainability for Adoption.” Social Science Team Co-PI. (unfunded)
- University Research Grant, University of West Alabama, 2011–2012
- University Research Grant, University of West Alabama, 2007–2008
- University Research Grant, University of West Alabama, 2006–2007
- Phi Kappa Phi
- Phi Theta Kappa
- University of Alabama Outstanding Dissertation Award, 2005 (sole winner across all colleges and disciplines)
- University of Alabama, College of Arts and Sciences Outstanding Dissertation Award, 2005

4 | R. VOLNEY RISER

- Charles G. Summersell "Best Article" Prize, 2005, *Southern Historian*
- Artemas Killian Callahan Sr. Scholarship, 2004–2005, University of Alabama School of Law
- Judge Henry H. Mize Scholarship, 2004–2005, University of Alabama School of Law
- History Department Dissertation Fellowship, Fall 2003, University of Alabama
- Graduate Council Dissertation Fellowship, 2002–2003, University of Alabama Graduate Council

UNIVERSITY & DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

- Chair, Department of History and Social Sciences, 2008–14
- Founding Director, *UWA in Ireland*, 2017–
- Adviser-at-Large and Academic Credentials Coordinator, UWA International Programs, 2014–
- Team Academic Adviser, Varsity Men's & Women's Soccer, 2013–
- Faculty Mentor, UWA Athletic Department, 2011–15.
- Tutwiler Scholars Committee, 2016–2019.
- University T&P Review Group, 2020–
- Faculty Senate Departmental Representative, 2020–
- Chair, McIlwain-Bell Trustee Professor Award Committee, 2020–21
- T&P College Review Group, College of Liberal Arts, 2008–14
- T&P College Review Group, College of Education, 2014–15
- T&P College Review Group, College of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, 2016–19
- Ed.D. in Rural Education, Advisory Group, 2017
- University Charter School, Curriculum Committee, 2017
- University Athletic Committee, 2010–
- University Honors Program Committee, 2008–11
- University Honors Council, 2011–15
- University Academic Council, 2008–14
- University Graduate Council, 2008–14
- University Council on Teacher Education, 2008–14
- Campus Parking and Transportation Committee, 2010–
- SACS Accreditation Team, Editorial Committee, 2011–12
- SACS Response Special Committee, 2014
- Search Committee, Assistant Director of International Programs, 2019
- Search Committee, Assistant Professor of Political Science, 2017–18
- Search Committee, Assistant Professor Psychology, 2014
- Search Committee, Director of Admissions, 2011
- Search Committee, Archival Records Management Coordinator, Center for the Study of the Black
- Search Committee, UWA Campus School Director, 2010
- Search Committee, Assistant Professor of Educational Research, 2009–10
- UWA Constitution Day Committee, 2005–14
- History Department Curriculum Review Committee, 2009–14
- Judge, Alabama History Day, 2019
- Judge, Behavioral Sciences Division, West Alabama Regional Science Fair, 2010–16
- Judge, Humanities Division, Alabama Junior Academy of Science, 2009

5 | R. VOLNEY RISER

- College of Liberal Arts Representative, Academic Integrity Committee, 2008-14
- College of Liberal Arts Representative, Faculty Information Committee, 2008-13
- Co-chair, College of Liberal Arts Homecoming Planning Committee, 2008
- Search Committee Chair, Assistant Professor of U.S. History, 2008-2009
- Search Committee, Director of Educational Programming and Assistant Professor of Anthropology,
- Search Committee, Assistant Professor of Inorganic Chemistry, 2008
- Focus Group on Town-Gown Relations, 2008
- Search Committee, Director of the Center for the Study of the Black Belt
and Assistant Professor of History, 2007-2008
- University Research Grants Committee, 2007-2008
- Sucarnoochee Review* Authors' Reading, Reception Committee, 2006
- UWA Constitution Day Speaker, 2005

COURSES REGULARLY TAUGHT

HY 211 – U.S. History I
HY 212 – U.S. History II
HY 300 – Historical Methodologies
HY 400 – Senior Seminar
HY 314/514 – Civil War Era
HY 498/598 – The Novel as History

SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION

Editorial

Editor-in-Chief, *The Alabama Review*, 2012-17
Assistant Editor and Business Manager, *Southern Historian*, 2001-02

Published Interviews

"R. Volney Riser Discusses Disfranchisement and Anti-Democracy." *The Docket* 1, no. 4 (December 2018), available online: <https://lawandhistoryreview.org/issue/december-2018/>

Public Commissions

Fort Tombeché Advisory Commission, 2008-14
State of Alabama WWI Advisory Commission, 2015-17

Manuscript Referee

Agricultural History
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Panel Chair/Commenter

Panel Chair and Commenter, “Government, Work, and Murder.” University of Alabama Graduate Student Conference on Power and Struggle. Tuscaloosa, October 10, 2019.

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CONSULTING

Amici

“Historians’ Brief,” *Allen v. Milligan*, 2023, No. 21-1086, United States Supreme Court

Expert Witness Testimony/Litigation Support

Expert witness in *McLemore v. Hoseman*, 2019-, No. 3:19-cv-00383, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Expert witness in *Thompson v. Merrill*, 2018-, No. 2:16-cv-00783, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Academic Tutor and Student Athlete Personal Monitor, 2003–2004
Athletic Department, The University of Alabama

Benefits Specialist, March 1997–August 1997
Florida Retirement System
Tallahassee, Florida

Uniform Commercial Code Examiner, May 1995–March 1997; August 1997–May 1998
Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations
Tallahassee, Florida

Editor, 1993–1995
Florida Division of Administrative Hearings
Tallahassee, Florida

EDUCATION

Doctor of Philosophy, U.S. History, 2005
The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama
-University of Alabama Outstanding Dissertation Award, 2005
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- College of Arts and Sciences Outstanding Dissertation Award, 2005
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Master of Arts, History, 2000

The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama

Bachelor of Arts, History, 1998, Cum Laude

The Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida

Bachelor of Arts, Humanities, 1995

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EXHIBIT B

Race and Politics in Twentieth-Century Alabama

Report Prepared By:

Kari Frederickson, PhD
University of Alabama
May 17, 2024

My qualifications

I am a Professor of History at the University of Alabama. My area of expertise is twentieth century American history with a particular focus on the history of the South. I earned my Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 1996. I began my career at the University of Central Florida and have been at the University of Alabama since 1999. Since becoming a professional historian I have taught undergraduate and graduate courses on U.S. history, the history of the American South, the Civil Rights Movement, American political history since the 1960s, and Alabama history. I have supervised more than 30 Masters students and 15 doctoral students. I have conducted research at the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, and at state and university archives across the South. I currently serve on the Board of Directors of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute and am chairperson of the Institute's Research Grants Committee.

To date I have published four books with highly regarded academic presses. My scholarship focuses on the political, social, and cultural history of the twentieth-century South. *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968*, was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2001 and won the Harry S. Truman Book Award in 2002. *Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American South* was published by the University of Georgia Press in 2013 and won the Southern Historical Association's Bennett H. Wall Prize for the Best Book in Southern Economic History in 2014. My latest book, *Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama*, was published by the University of Alabama Press in 2022 and won the Gulf South Historical Association's Michael V. R. Thomason Award for the Best Book on the Gulf South. I have published an additional 19 scholarly articles and essays in peer-reviewed publications. I have served as a consultant and on-camera expert for six documentaries, most

recently for *The Blinding of Isaac Woodard*, part of PBS's prestigious American Experience series. I was awarded a research grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities and have served as a member of the NEH's grants review committee.

Method of Report

The following report is based on research in a wide range of primary and secondary sources in the political history of Alabama and the South. I have conducted research in relevant gubernatorial papers and in the State Democratic Executive Committee Papers held at the Alabama Department of Archives and History, as well as relevant state and local newspapers. I have consulted more than forty scholarly books and articles on political development in Alabama and the South.

Summary of My Opinion

Race has served as a dividing line in political allegiance and activity since the period of Reconstruction. In particular, the ability of first the Democratic Party and later, the Republican Party, to achieve viability and dominance has depended on each party's ability to secure the support of white voters through racial appeals. The Democratic Party succeeded in establishing itself as the defender of white supremacy following the disfranchisement campaign of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, and through the leveraging of cultural symbols and historical memory. From the 1920s through roughly the 1960s, southern Democrats achieved seniority in the national party, which allowed them to protect white racial customs and made them almost impossible to challenge. The Republican Party overcame considerable hostility and gained relevancy, competitiveness, and ultimately dominance in Alabama by branding itself the "white party" as the Civil Rights Movement gained traction locally and garnered support from the

National Democratic Party. The Republican Party's ability to exploit white racial anxiety beginning in the early 1960s and later, in the 1980s, by developing conservative policy positions with race at the center, allowed it to attract a growing number of white voters, first at the presidential level, and later in down-ballot races. It also successfully appropriated cultural symbols and utilized historical memory that at one time had been the sole possession of the Democrats. Today, the parties are racially polarized; most whites are Republicans and most Blacks are Democrats. With white identity politics occupying the center of Republican politics, creating effective and enduring bi-racial coalitions is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Introduction

For the breadth of the twentieth century, political party identity in the State of Alabama has been largely defined by race. The Democratic Party's disfranchisement campaign at the turn of the century and its dedication to the maintenance of white supremacy through a variety of means secured its dominance in Alabama for much of the twentieth century. The resurgence and competitiveness of the Republican Party in national and state elections beginning in the mid-1960s depended heavily on the party's ability to define itself as the "white man's" party. With race as the primary political dividing line throughout much of the century, creating bi-racial coalitions – whether overtly political or not -- was nearly impossible and actively resisted.

Disfranchisement

Democratic Party dominance in Alabama was achieved at the turn of the twentieth century through the promotion of a political message that emphasized the protection of white supremacy and through a new constitution that eliminated political competition from the

Republican Party and from disgruntled white Democrats unhappy with the state party by disfranchising the mass of Black voters and many poor white voters.

White voters' hostility toward the Republican Party began prior to the Civil War but really took root during the period known as Radical Reconstruction, roughly 1868-1874. The Republican Party held majority power in Congress from 1868 to 1872, and was responsible for passage of the 14th amendment, which established citizenship rights for all persons born in the United States, and the 15th amendment, which forbade states from denying citizens the right to vote based on race. During the period of Radical Reconstruction, freedmen in Alabama became registered voters, participated in a biracial Republican Party, and held political office. The Democratic Party became identified with the return of white supremacy, and Democrats used a variety of means – primarily fraud and violence – to intimidate Republican voters and regain control of state government in 1874. Despite the continuation of these intimidation methods, Republican voters, both Black and white, continued to participate in state and national politics, posing a persistent threat to the Democratic Party.¹

The 1901 constitution incorporated multiple suffrage obstacles that were devastatingly effective, particularly in the state's majority Black counties. In 1900, before the new requirements went into effect, and despite decades of fraud and intimidation, some 79,311 Black voters appeared on the rolls in fourteen Black Belt counties. Once the constitution went into effect, barely over a thousand remained. Statewide, by 1908, Alabama counted a mere 3,742 registered Black voters. Although not quite as dramatic as the losses incurred by Black voters, voter registration among poor white Alabamians suffered a decline that increased with the passage of time. By 1942, Alabama had only 440,291 registered voters but some six hundred thousand disfranchised white people.² The strongest deterrent to white registration was the poll

tax. With these voters essentially silenced, the threat of political rebellion grounded in shared economic grievance was eliminated. The era of ballot stuffing came to an end, and any hope of a political coalition made up of Black and poor white voters grounded in economic concerns was dealt a severe blow.

As a consequence of disfranchisement, the State of Alabama and much of the South became a one-party region. Unchallenged by Republicans, Democratic officeholders easily won re-election, gaining seniority in the House of Representatives and the Senate. During periods in which Democrats were in the majority, especially beginning in 1932, seniority brought committee chairmanships and extraordinary power to kill any legislation that threatened white supremacy. Although southern congressmen and senators might disagree on matters of economic or foreign policy, on issues of race, they voted as a block and maintained extraordinary unanimity. The Democratic Party, whose official symbol from 1904 to 1966 featured a rooster and the slogan “White Supremacy, For the Right,” reigned supreme in Alabama for the next eighty years.

Democratic Party and Culture

Achieving political hegemony was as much a cultural as a political battle. Having established their political hegemony through disfranchisement, white Democrats had to legitimize their continued control. The dominance and legitimacy of the Democratic Party drew strength from historical memory, giving the party a cultural power that exceeded that of a typical political party and made creating anything resembling a coalition to challenge its rule nearly impossible. In addition to creating constitutional barriers to electoral participation, white Democrats crafted a strong cultural narrative about the superiority of the Democratic Party and the corresponding illegitimacy of the Republican Party.

Democrats established their legitimacy as the ruling party by creating a particular interpretation of the southern past and the southern present that made a virtue of white elite Democratic rule, denigrated Black culture, perpetuated a fear and hatred of Black political participation and the Republican Party, and taught reverence for the antebellum South and the Confederacy. The antebellum South and Confederacy, and the Democratic Party, were commemorated through the erection of monuments; through public lectures and celebrations; through the publication, circulation, and adoption in public schools of approved works of fiction and history; and through the creation of state cultural institutions such as the Alabama Department of Archives and History. Thomas McAdory Owen and Marie Bankhead Owen, directors of the archives for over fifty years and both children of Confederate veterans, made it their mission to erase Republican contributions from history. Tom Owen refused to collect or subsequently destroyed any Reconstruction-era manuscript collections that documented Republican contributions.³

Marie Bankhead Owen's greatest victory in her quest to purge any hint of Republicanism from Alabama's public face came in her campaign to change the state seal and the state motto in the 1930s. In 1868, the Republican legislature elected during Radical Reconstruction created a state seal. This particular legislature was dominated by the Republican Party, which was comprised of white and Black lawmakers. For Bankhead Owen, this 1868 seal was a "monstrosity"; the Radical Reconstruction legislature that created it was politically illegitimate, having been created by "the Carpetbag Legislature, made up of men who were strangers to our traditions, and in the main of local renegades and negroes." She also created a new state motto: "We Dare Defend Our Rights," a declaration of the rights of states to defend themselves against the tyranny of federal power.⁴ Given her antipathy for the period of Radical Reconstruction, and

in particular that era's biracial legislatures' support for the 14th and 15th amendments, the "rights" she sought to "defend" were the right of whites to police race relations without federal interference. In 1939, the state legislature adopted the new seal and motto designed by Bankhead Owen. They remain Alabama state symbols more than eighty years later.

Redistricting in 1916

Disfranchisement, although devastating, still did not completely eliminate Republican voting. In counties such as Walker, Fayette, and Winston, the Republican Party maintained a pesky presence. A persistent minority was not to be tolerated, and the Democrats sought other means to further eviscerate Republican power. Congressional redistricting provided another tool through which to further undermine Republican Party viability. Democrats found their opportunity following the 1910 census; Alabama's population growth had earned it an additional congressional representative. For the 1912 and 1914 legislative sessions, a stopgap measure had been instituted, and the seat had been filled by election of a congressman-at-large. A permanent redistricting of the state needed to be undertaken. John Bankhead Jr. of Jasper, son of a United States congressman and author of the enabling legislation that activated the voting obstacles in the 1901 Constitution, drafted the initial legislation creating the new Tenth District. Comprising Fayette, Franklin, Lamar, Marion, Pickens, Walker, and Winston, the Tenth would take four counties from the Sixth, two from the Seventh, and one from the Ninth. Bankhead and the bill's supporters in the state legislature were transparent about their partisan goals: the creation of the new district would help Democratic candidates in the Seventh Congressional District by siphoning off some Republican voters. The bill to create the new Tenth District would dilute this Republican strength and thus make all Alabama congressional districts safely Democratic. Doing so would protect white supremacy. This was something upon which all Democrats could agree.

The bill passed by a razor thin margin on the last day of the legislative session in September 1915.⁵

1928 Bolt and Heflin

The Democratic Party not only implemented measures by which to dilute and eliminate competition from Republicans. It sought to punish individual Democrats who supported Republican candidates. Any deviation from Democratic Party allegiance was deemed a threat to the maintenance of white supremacy. White Democrats who abandoned the Democratic Party to support a Republican candidate during any given election could expect punishment regardless of the individual's white supremacist credentials.

The greatest threat to Democratic party hegemony came in 1928, when the National Democratic Party nominated New York Governor Alfred E. Smith as its presidential candidate. Smith was an Irish Catholic and a foe of prohibition and supported repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Protestant leaders across the South expressed fear of Smith's candidacy; many wondered whether cultural and religious concerns might trump race in this campaign, leading some white southern voters to abandon the Democratic candidate to support the hated Republicans and their popular candidate Herbert Hoover.

The anti-Smith forces in Alabama were led by United States Senator J. Thomas Heflin. Nicknamed "Cotton Tom" for his advocacy on behalf of the state's cotton farmers, Heflin was one of the more colorful politicians of that or any time. Elected to Congress in 1904, Heflin served eight terms in the House and won election to the U.S. Senate in 1920. Heflin was best known for his strident anti-Catholicism, his support of prohibition, and his virulent white supremacy. Repulsed by Democratic presidential candidate Al Smith, Heflin embarked on a full-

fledged political revolt, determined to swing the state to Republican nominee Herbert Hoover, calling Smith a “Negro bootlicker” who favored interracial marriage. Heflin further charged that the New York governor had appointed African Americans to government jobs, giving them supervisory power over white female employees. Speaking in the city of Dothan in October 1928, Heflin painted Smith as the harbinger of a racial apocalypse, claiming that Smith “is in favor of appointing negroes to office where they will be in authority over white people” and declaring that “there are now dance halls in New York City...where every night negro men dance with white women and white men dance with negro women.” Alarmed by Heflin’s bolt, the state Democratic Party countered with an attack of their own, depicting Hoover as a supporter of racial equality and reminding white Democratic voters of the tragedy of Reconstruction, when carpetbaggers invaded the South and freedmen served in the legislature. A vote for Herbert Hoover, they cried, meant a return to Black domination.

The turnout for the 1928 presidential election was one of the largest in Alabama history. Ultimately, party loyalty, cultural antipathy towards the Republican Party, and the Democrats’ history of protecting white supremacy trumped religious bigotry and fear of revocation of the Eighteenth Amendment, but just barely. Al Smith carried Alabama by a mere seven thousand votes; roughly one hundred thousand Alabama Democrats voted for Herbert Hoover. For many white voters, it was their first time supporting a Republican. Despite the fact that Hoover had lost, Senator Tom Heflin, whose support for white supremacy was nearly unparalleled, paid a political price for abandoning the Democrats and making common cause with the Republicans. Party loyalty was a serious matter. Up for re-election in 1930, Heflin was barred by the State Democratic Executive Committee from running as a Democrat. Denied the powerful Democratic Party affiliation, Heflin attempted to create a coalition of disgruntled Democrats and

Republicans but ultimately lost the election to John Bankhead Jr. His political career never recovered.

Biracial coalitions, Part I: Organized Labor

The severe prohibition against political coalitions that threatened white supremacy extended beyond politics to broader Alabama society. Difficult economic conditions that hit both white and Black at times precipitated the creation of biracial coalitions to address challenging circumstances. Time after time, these coalitions were attacked by the political and economic elite who saw in such coalitions a threat to white supremacy as well as to profits.

The growth of industry in Alabama in the postbellum era was predicated upon a racially stratified labor force. An industrial workforce divided by race gave owners a powerful tool to keep wages low. The often-violent backlash against the organizing of Black and white laborers in particular into labor unions made the potential for a political coalition based on shared economic grievance highly unlikely. The defense of white supremacist ideology, politics, and social practices undermined and outright sought to destroy interracial coalitions.

The rise of the steel industry, and the mining of the coal and iron ore on which it depended, brought waves of black and white migrants to the area around Birmingham in search of better wages and relief from rural poverty. Early on, a mixed workforce began to emerge in the Birmingham District. By 1900, more than half of the mining workforce in the Birmingham coal fields was Black. Alabama's competitive edge hinged on coal operators' ability to keep wages low. Despite deep cleavages between white and black miners, the history of the industry illustrates moments when the two groups made nearly heroic attempts to unify to address extremely harsh working conditions and low pay, only to be undermined and destroyed by the

power of capital, often assisted by the military power of the state. The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) made repeated efforts in the Alabama coalfields to galvanize interracial unity in pursuit of better working conditions and higher pay. Alabama's miners affiliated with the UMWA in April 1890, becoming known as UMW District 20.

By 1903, the UMWA had more than 95 locals and 14,000 members in District 20. After coal operators cut their wages in 1908, UMWA miners – Black and white -- went on strike. The two-month strike was marked by armed confrontations between striking miners and guards employed by the coal companies. Prominent mine owners excoriated the union's biracial composition, encouraged white citizens to take vigilante action against the members of the union, and appealed to Governor Braxton Bragg Comer to lend military assistance to the owners in putting down the strike. After two months of violent labor confrontations, Governor Comer mobilized the Alabama National Guard to break the strike. Coal miners went on strike again, this time to protest the rollback of wage and other gains achieved during World War I. Once again, the governor (this time, Thomas Kilby) used troops to break the strike.⁶

Biracial coalitions, Part II: Great Depression: Southern Conference for Human Welfare

The conditions that befell white and Black Alabamians during the Great Depression once again provided a context within which some sought to create coalitions to address the state's and region's needs. One such coalition was the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW). Founded in 1938, the SCHW was a coalition of groups and individuals interested in expanding New Deal-style reforms in the South to accelerate economic recovery while also opening the door to democratic reforms. Drawing support from organized labor, civil rights organizations, and a few traditional Democratic political leaders, the SCHW held its inaugural meeting in Birmingham in 1938. Roughly one-quarter of the delegates who attended the three-day meeting

were Black. The organization's support for interracial labor organizing, such as that undertaken by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), as well as its opposition to the poll tax made the SCHW a target of mainstream politicians in Alabama and throughout the South. Although members of the Communist Party participated in the SCHW, the organization was by no means a communist organization. Nevertheless, the organization's refusal to take a staunch anti-communist stance in the post-war era made it vulnerable to anti-communist attacks. The organization folded in 1948.

Turning point: World War II

The onset of World War II precipitated changes in Alabama and across the region that put increasing pressure on those dedicated to maintaining white supremacy. Massive numbers of Black southerners migrated north and west in search of wartime employment. Once settled in their new communities, these new residents became registered voters. The Great Depression and the Democratic Party's New Deal had prompted Black voters (even those few in the South) to support the Democratic Party after decades of support for the party of Lincoln. "The switch was abrupt. In 1932 Roosevelt received only 23 percent of the Black vote; in 1936 he received 71 percent."⁷ Now, with significant growth of Black voters in the North, for the first time in the twentieth century, civil rights moved onto the agendas of both national political parties eager to win these new voters, and African American veterans returned home determined to fight for democracy in their communities.

The most direct assault on the region's anti-democratic political machinery came from the United States Supreme Court in its 1944 decision in the Texas case of Smith v. Allwright. The court ruled that the Texas white primary law violated the Fifteenth Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. While the states of the Upper South acquiesced in the ruling, the

decision was a political bombshell in the Deep South, where white Democrats scrambled to shore up the political barriers to Black voting. Alabama's governor, Frank Dixon, wrote of his concern to the head of the state Democratic Party. "It is obvious that the only thing that has held the Democratic Party together in the South for many years past has been the thing which caused its strength in the first place, namely, white supremacy." If the national Democratic Party followed the Supreme Court's lead "through forced registration of negroes in the State, the Democratic Party will become anathema to the white people in the South."⁸ State senator and U.S. Senate candidate James Simpson regarded the *Smith* decision as "the gravest threat to white supremacy since Reconstruction"⁹ The *Smith* decision and service in the war for democracy galvanized groups of Black voters in Alabama. Determined to stifle Black political participation, in 1946 the Alabama legislature passed, and voters approved, the Boswell Amendment to the state constitution. This amendment introduced new suffrage standards that required potential voters to "read and write, understand and explain any article of the Constitution of the United States" and granted local boards the power to administer registration requirements "in as discriminatory a fashion as they saw fit."¹⁰

Southern Democrats' unanimity on issues of race and their immense power in Congress allowed them to kill any legislation that threatened white supremacy.¹¹ But that stranglehold was starting to loosen ever so slightly in the late 1940s. The recent war for democracy, the growth of an increasingly vocal Black citizenry in northern cities, the mobilization of Black southern voters, and a rash of violence against Black veterans across the South in the postwar era emboldened President Harry Truman to challenge the power of Southern Democrats to dictate the party's allegiance to white supremacy. In February 1948, during an election year, Truman submitted a civil rights package to Congress that included anti-poll tax and anti-lynching

legislation, as well as a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission that would make employment discrimination illegal. Truman expected an outcry from southern white Democrats but predicted that white southerners' historic allegiance to the party would win out, and that they would ultimately support him in the presidential election in November.

He was wrong. A group of southern Democrats – apoplectic at the thought that the party that had for so long served as the protector of white supremacy was now pursuing Black voters -- staged a political revolt. Unsuccessful in preventing a civil rights plank in the Democratic party platform and in denying Truman the Democratic party's nomination, this group of disgruntled white Democrats created their own party to challenge the Democrats and Republicans in November and to protect white supremacy. Its official name was the States' Rights Democratic Party, but it was more popularly known as the Dixiecrats. Alabama was among the strongest Dixiecrat states, with former Governor Frank Dixon, state party chair Gessner McCorvey, and attorney and political insider Horace Wilkinson as its most vocal leaders. McCorvey pledged to defeat Truman's "damnable, obnoxious, and unthinkable" civil rights program.¹² Others compared Truman's program to the dark days of Reconstruction, when "federal bayonets...[forced] the negro down our throats." Horace Wilkinson was more blunt: if southern Democrats submitted to Truman's wishes, they might as well "haul down the Democratic flag [and] submit to nigger rule."¹³ The Dixiecrats succeeded in hijacking the state party and running the Dixiecrat presidential and vice-presidential candidates under the "Democratic Party" label. The Dixiecrats also appropriated "the most powerful cultural symbols associated with" the Confederacy, including the Confederate battle flag and portraits of Confederate heroes.¹⁴ Democrats were forced to list President Truman and his running mate on the ballot as the nominees of the "National Democratic Party." Alabama's governor, James Folsom, its two

Senators, and its entire Congressional delegation remained loyal to the president; but that loyalty did not mean they supported Truman's civil rights program. Rather, they supported the national nominee because they believed Alabama (and the South's) continued allegiance to the Democratic Party remained the surest way to defeat any civil rights proposals. Although the Dixiecrat effort was defeated, the 1948 political bolt was a turning point for some white southerners as they began to question their historic allegiance to the Democratic Party as the best vehicle through which to preserve white supremacy.

Following the 1948 presidential election, politics in Alabama and across the South entered into a long transitional period in which the right to claim the mantle of the defender of white supremacy shifted slowly from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. This shift occurred first at the presidential election level, and voters – particularly white voters – in Alabama adhered to this shift primarily in national elections over the next thirty years. Although it had been possible to support the economic liberalism of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal while maintaining support for segregation and white supremacy, Truman's civil rights program (although ultimately defeated in Congress) incorporated racial liberalism into the national party's profile that only grew more intertwined in the coming decades; by the 1980s, "liberalism" had become anathema to southern white voters. According to one historian, "the word could not be uttered in an economic sense without also conjuring the culturally fatal albatross of racial inclusion."¹⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the 1948 election, the Democratic Party in Alabama sought to reclaim its reputation as the best vehicle through which to protect white supremacy.¹⁶ Hence it sought to eliminate the possibility of a future Dixiecrat-like bolt. In 1951, the state Party passed a loyalty oath that effectively made a repeat of the Dixiecrat Revolt in 1952 an impossibility. With

another hijacking of the Democratic Party machinery now off the table. prominent Dixiecrats in the state looked for other party options. among them, the dreaded Republican Party. Birmingham columnist and Dixiecrat supporter John Temple Graves told a gathering of former Democrats. “Let us not wince anymore when we hear the word Republican.”¹⁷ Abandoning the Democratic Party, with its historic allegiance to the defense of white supremacy, would take some time.

The 1950s: A Period of Transition

Despite President Truman’s embrace of civil rights, the majority of white southern voters remained in the Democratic column. As of 1950, not a single Senator from the South was a Republican. and only 2 out of 105 southern members of Congress were Republicans. The party’s prospects for the South improved when, after 1948, the Republican party began to lose favor with Black voters. This realization prompted some Republicans to look to the South, which the national party had neglected for generations.¹⁸ Aware of a potentially significant independent white southern vote, the national Republican Party welcomed the disgruntled Dixiecrats. At a Lincoln Day rally of Alabama Republicans in Birmingham in early February, Republican National Chairman Guy Gabrielson made a strong pitch to win Alabama Dixiecrats over to the GOP. Gabrielson declared, “We want the Dixiecrats to vote for our candidate. The Dixiecrat movement is an anti-Truman movement. The Dixiecrat party believes in states’ rights. That’s what the Republican party believes in.”¹⁹

In 1952, the national Democratic Party nominated Illinois senator Adlai Stevenson and U.S. Senator from Alabama John Sparkman as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates in 1952. The party’s platform contained a much weaker civil rights platform than it had in 1948; furthermore, many Alabama Dixiecrats recognized the futility of opposing a Democratic ticket that carried the state’s own Senator. Still, having made the break in 1948, many former

Dixiecrats could not go back. Several threw their lot in with Republicans. Tom Abernethy of Talladega, a 1948 Dixiecrat elector and 1950 States' Rights campaign chairperson, resigned his position on the State Democratic Executive Committee in July and stumped the state for Republican candidate Eisenhower. A number of other influential Dixiecrats eventually threw their support to the general, including state chairman Gessner McCorvey, textile magnate Donald Comer, Dothan banker Wallace Malone, and Montgomery construction king Winton M. Blount, who would later serve as Richard Nixon's postmaster general. Despite the desire to create new in-roads into Alabama and the other southern states, the national Republican Party reflected Eisenhower's relatively moderate position on civil rights during the 1950s. Eisenhower captured several upper South states and did well with middle- and upper-class white voters in the region's metropolitan areas in 1952 and 1956, but his victories did not have much in the way of coattails.²⁰

During Eisenhower's presidency, the Republican Party focused more intently on forging inroads into the South. It created a "Southern Division" to begin the long process of party-building in the region. Prior to the 1950s, the Republican Party was simply a patronage machine with very little institutional presence in Alabama or elsewhere. According to one observer, prior to the 1960s, the Republican Party in the South "operated from briefcases and transient filing cabinets..."²² With a slightly more robust party machinery, 1960 Republican Party presidential candidate Richard Nixon hoped to build upon Eisenhower's toehold in the region. Nixon possessed a stronger commitment to racial equality than had Eisenhower, but he kept it relatively muted during the campaign and the party adopted a civil rights plank that was weaker than its Democratic counterpart. The shedding of Black voters that had begun in 1948 accelerated. Nixon adopted rhetoric that was familiar to white southerners, affirming that the Republican Party stood

for states' rights; he also mostly avoided mentioning the most famous of Republicans. Abraham Lincoln. Nixon hoped to expand upon Eisenhower's gains in southern metropolitan areas among what were referred to as "country-club Republicans," and was aided in his quest for white southern votes by southern middlemen like Birmingham newspaperman John Temple Graves, who now saw the Republican Party as the best vehicle through which to preserve segregation and white political control.

Despite a stronger party apparatus, Nixon was unable to build upon Eisenhower's record in the South. He carried Florida, Tennessee and Virginia. He was not racially conservative enough to convince a sufficient number of southern white voters in the Deep South to abandon their historic conceptions of the parties. The Republicans also failed to add any additional House seats. Nixon did worse with Black voters than did Eisenhower, winning 32% to Eisenhower's 39%, further convincing some in the party that its future lay with white southern voters. Alabama voters stuck with the Democratic Party in part because of the presence of Texan Lyndon Johnson on the ticket; still, a sufficient number of voters were unhappy with the party's position on civil rights to choose six unpledged presidential electors.²³

The Republican Party's Right Turn: Becoming the White Party

Following Nixon's defeat, conservative Republicans, a small but increasingly vocal and determined group, argued that the party needed to focus more aggressively on white voters in the South. United States Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, champion of this emerging conservative wing of the party, argued that Nixon's moderate approach to civil rights would continue to be a losing approach. The party's future, Goldwater argued, lay with white voters in the South. At a meeting of southern Republicans shortly following Nixon's defeat, Goldwater famously declared, "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we

ought to go hunting where the ducks are.”²⁴ Following Goldwater’s advice, the RNC devoted roughly a third of its annual budget to southern organizing. Within a few years, the party had a presence in 87 percent of southern counties, and many of these new Republicans were staunch segregationists.²⁵ The Republican Party had made a deliberate decision to brand itself as a “white party,” focusing its publicity activities on white voters in the South.²⁶

1962 Hill-Martin Race: A Response to Civil Rights

The Republican Party began making in-roads with white voters in Alabama and the South in the early 1960s as the Civil Rights Movement began gaining traction. The Kennedy administration proved more willing than the previous administration to aid the burgeoning movement, supporting the anti-poll tax amendment, helping to protect the Freedom Riders in Alabama, and aiding in the integration of the University of Mississippi. In 1962, the Republican Party fielded candidates in 7 US Senate races and 113 House races in the South.²⁷

The first serious challenge from a Republican candidate in Alabama came in 1962 when Gadsden businessman James D. Martin challenged incumbent United States Senator Lister Hill.²⁸ Elected to the House of Representatives in 1923 and to the United States Senate in 1938, Hill distinguished himself first as a staunch New Deal Democrat and later as an advocate for expanded access to health care. Hill was a pro-segregationist Democratic loyalist who opposed the Dixiecrat revolt, viewing the seniority of southern senators and representatives within the Democratic Party as the surest way to defeat civil rights legislation. Martin was a political unknown, a free-enterprise Dixiecrat-turned-“Goldwater Republican” who was an economic and racial conservative. He opposed federal civil rights initiatives and regarded programs such as national aid to education and social security as programs indicative of “dangerous socialistic trends.”²⁹ He regarded Democratic Party leaders as “anti-South” in their attitudes.³⁰ In accepting

the state party's nomination for the right to challenge Hill, Martin co-opted and embraced the powerful historical memory that had been the sole property of Democrats for a century. He called for "a return to the spirit of '61 – 1861, when our fathers formed a new nation" to support their principles. "God willing," Martin concluded, "we will not again be forced to take up rifle and bayonet to preserve these principles...Make no mistake, my friends, this will be a fight. The bugle call is loud and clear! The South has risen!"

Martin's attacks on Hill grew more aggressive when he turned to the issue of civil rights. Despite Hill's opposition to federal intervention into what he believed to be the rights of the states, Martin compared Hill's record to that of African American Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of New York.³¹ On the campaign trail, he referred to President Kennedy's use of federal marshals during the Freedom Riders episode as a "federal invasion of Montgomery."³² He accused Attorney General Bobby Kennedy of "tearing like a predator...at the [voter] registration laws in Alabama..."³³ In the fall, President Kennedy sent federal troops to Oxford, Mississippi, to quell the violence that had erupted when James Meredith integrated the University of Mississippi. Martin called Kennedy's actions "another Reconstruction."³⁴ Martin sent a letter of support to Mississippi governor Ross Barnett, praising what he called the governor's "gallant defense of the sovereign state of Mississippi and its institutions" and pledged his support "in your fight against federal pressure and the intervention of your state's rights..."³⁵ The *Birmingham News* carried the story of Martin's defense of Barnett accompanied by a photo of Martin in front of a Confederate battle flag.³⁶ Martin declared that he was running to "keep the Kennedys from doing to Alabama what they're doing to Mississippi..."³⁷

When the votes were tallied, observers were shocked that veteran Senator and anti-civil rights Democrat Lister Hill had barely survived, eeking by with a 6,803-vote margin of victory.

Hill's support was greatest among the state's few black voters and rural whites in northern Alabama. Martin's biggest gains over totals achieved by Eisenhower in 1956 occurred in counties with large Black majorities. A majority of Alabama's white voters supported Martin.³⁸

Presidential Election of 1964: Five States for Goldwater

Martin's near-toppling of a sitting senator gave hope to the Republican Party that it was on the right track. As the decade progressed, the Democratic Party increasingly aligned itself with the goals of the Civil Rights Movement. Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency upon Kennedy's assassination and declared his determination to become the "civil rights president." He made good on his promise. In July 1964, the president signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a broad desegregation bill.

The year 1964 promised a continuation of Republican inroads as well as a further distancing between the state Democratic Party and the National Democratic Party on the issue of civil rights. President Lyndon Johnson had become anathema to many southern white voters. Many searched for an alternative and found it in Republican Party nominee Barry Goldwater. Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act because he did not believe federal enforcement was possible and state and local enforcement was preferable. He insisted that "the more the Federal government has attempted to legislate morality, the more it actually has incited hatred and violence."³⁹ Goldwater received a warm welcome from white voters in Alabama and was even endorsed by the Grand Dragon of the state chapter of the Ku Klux Klan.⁴⁰ George Wallace, the state's segregationist governor, had temporarily tested the waters during the Democratic primary but eventually withdrew; recognizing Goldwater's appeal to white voters in Alabama and across the Deep South, Wallace offered himself as a possible running mate for the Arizona Senator, who politely declined. During the campaign, Goldwater embraced former Dixiecrat candidate Strom

Thurmond (now a United States Senator), who switched his party identification to Republican. On election day, Goldwater had flipped five southern states, including Alabama, where he garnered nearly 70 percent of the vote. Unlike Eisenhower, whose southern strength lay in the Upper South and in the region's metropolitan areas, Goldwater's greatest margins of victory came from counties with Black majorities, places "where any change to the racial pecking order proved the most alarming."⁴¹

Republicans expanded their activity in southern congressional races in 1964, contesting 70 of 106 congressional districts in the South, "the largest number of Republican challenges in the post-World War II period."⁴² Seven of the ten new seats won by the Republican congressional party in the nation were from the Deep South: five from Alabama alone, where Republicans captured a majority of the state's congressional delegation for the first time since the era of Reconstruction. The role of race and civil rights in this election was clear. Upon switching to the Republican Party, candidate Bill Dickinson declared, "I have joined the white man's party." He continued, "It behooves us to support those who support us and our way of life."⁴³ The other four Republican congressmen from Alabama were similarly outspoken opponents of civil rights. One said that the Civil Rights Act "paved the way for the destruction of our liberties"; another called the day that it passed "Black Friday." Goldwater's victory in the South in 1964 initiated what political scientists Earl and Merle Black call part one of the "Great White Switch," in which southern white voters began to show greater preference for Republican presidential candidates.⁴⁴

Johnson followed up his 1964 landslide victory by signing the Voting Rights Act of 1965. He had accomplished the passage of these two watershed pieces of legislation with almost no support from southern Democrats. "[T]he southern Democrats' traditional strategy of legislative

obstruction on civil rights legislation was finally and convincingly repudiated.” A united and bipartisan northern coalition had triumphed over southern obstruction.⁴⁵ Following passage of the Voting Rights Act, Black voter registration swelled, with the new voters overwhelmingly registering as Democrats. Alabama’s first Black state legislators since Reconstruction assumed office in 1971.⁴⁶

Richard Nixon, George Wallace, and the Southern Strategy

Southern white votes were up for grabs in the 1968 presidential election as these voters turned their backs on the national Democratic Party. The passage that year of the Fair Housing Act and a U.S. Supreme Court decision that paved the way for the use of busing to achieve racial balance in public schools kept racial integration at the forefront of American politics. With staunch segregationist and American Independent Party candidate George Wallace in the race and sure to win the Deep South states, including his own, Republican candidate Richard Nixon took a more subtle, and ultimately enduring, rhetorical route to win white southern voters. Unlike Wallace, Nixon avoided supporting segregation openly. He developed what came to be known as a “southern strategy,” which encompassed promises that appealed to white southerners (and many northerners as well) while avoiding the loss of moderate Republicans in the North. Nixon established a politically safe terrain by simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles of equality while opposing the use of federal intervention to enforce compliance. A majority of white Americans had come to believe that denial of basic citizenship rights was wrong, but they were opposed to the prospect of substantial residential and educational integration imposed by the courts and by the federal regulatory bureaucracy through involuntary mechanisms, especially busing.⁴⁷ Nixon likewise adopted language that originated with Wallace, embracing a tougher

“law and order” attitude that appealed to a “silent majority” that had grown weary of civil rights demands, urban uprisings, and anti-Vietnam War protests.

Nixon carried much of the upper South, taking five states back from the Democrats. George Wallace’s independent candidacy netted five southern states (including Alabama) and stymied Nixon’s effort to replicate Goldwater’s success in the Deep South. Nixon carried through on his promises of conservative judicial appointments, relaxed enforcement of school desegregation, and opposition to busing to achieve racial balance in public schools. He also sought to weaken provisions of the Voting Rights Act.⁴⁸ Although Alabama had gone for Wallace, *The Montgomery Advertiser* appeared satisfied with the Nixon agenda, telling its readers, “Nixon Keeps His Word.”⁴⁹ In 1972, with George Wallace out of the race, Nixon won the South with 60.7 percent of vote. This election represented the first time a Republican had won the South. Voters who had supported Wallace in 1968 overwhelmingly went to Nixon.⁵⁰

Stymied in the 1970s

The success of the Republican Party at the presidential level did not immediately translate down ballot. Despite Nixon’s success in 1972, and despite the fact that the National Democratic Party by 1972 had become increasingly fractured and defined by its liberal-reform wing that was dedicated to using federal machinery to expand and secure rights for those at society’s margins, southern Democrats in the House and the Senate withstood the Goldwater and Nixon challenges, successfully asserting their independence from the national party while establishing their conservative credentials. The Democrats continued to hold majorities in both houses, so southern senators in particular, who had cultivated party and senatorial seniority, continued to secure plum committee chairmanships. Strom Thurmond’s party switching remained a singular act; most senators and representatives were unwilling to give up their power

and influence to join the minority party on a matter of political principal. As long as they could keep some distance from the increasingly liberal national party, southern Democrats were safe. In 1972, Nixon's Postmaster General, Winton "Red" Blount, challenged incumbent Senator John Sparkman, but lost badly, garnering only 33 percent of the vote. Despite having been a member of the president's cabinet, the Republican Blount received tepid support from the president, who recognized Sparkman's relatively conservative voting record as more useful to his legislative program.⁵¹

The Watergate scandal, Richard Nixon's resignation, and the Democratic Party's nomination of white southern Baptist former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, slowed Republican gains down ballot. In Alabama specifically, the dominance and longevity of George Wallace retarded Republican development in the state. Wallace's strident racial appeals secured a base of support among white voters that Republicans found impossible to break.⁵² At the Congressional level, Alabama's delegation remained split during the 1970s and 1980s; two districts remained in Republican hands while a third, the Sixth District, went Republican in 1964 but returned to the Democratic column in 1983. The Democratic Party maintained in control of the state's two senate seats throughout the decade.

Black voters entered the political process as Democrats. Democrats remained competitive into the 1980s and 1990s because of their ability to create biracial coalitions. In order to grow, the Republican Party continued to lean into its appeals to white voters. Republican state house members broke into double digits only in the early 1980s and in the state senate in the 1990s. As the parties became more racially polarized in the 1980s and 1990s, and as more white voters migrated to the Republican Party, creating coalitions became increasingly difficult.

Ronald Reagan and the Great White Switch, Part II

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 secured the second part of the “Great White Switch.” in which a majority of the South’s white voters not only *voted* Republican for the presidency, but also *identified* as Republicans. By 1992, 43 percent of white voters in the South regarded themselves as Republican, while 42 percent considered themselves Democrats. The Republicans had become competitive by relying almost exclusively on white southern voters.

The Republican Party in the 1980s did not shy away from racial messaging. Reagan kicked off his presidential campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi, site of a horrific 1964 triple murder of civil rights activists that happened with the complicity of law enforcement. His declaration of his support for states’ rights was a not-so-subtle dog whistle to white southerners generally that his administration would not aggressively pursue remedies for racial discrimination. He promised the white voters in attendance that he intended to “restore to states and local governments the power that properly belongs to them.”⁵³ Republican strategist Lee Atwater in 1981 admitted that “The whole strategy was...based on coded racism. The whole thing.” Reagan’s vice president, George H.W. Bush, followed suit in his own presidential campaign in 1988. The infamous Willie Horton advertisement inextricably linked blackness, criminality, and liberalism – a linkage that originated with Nixon -- and hung it around the neck of Democratic Party candidate Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts.⁵⁴

Under Reagan’s leadership, the Republican Party in the 1980s pursued a conservative agenda that, while not explicitly racist, had race at its center. Republicans pursued a range of policy prescriptions that relied on the belief that the Black community is marked by higher rates of crime and illegitimacy, a weakened family structure, low achievement in educational levels, and greater demands on the welfare system. Racial attitudes among southern Republicans in

particular reflected a resistance to government assistance to Blacks as a group and applying individualistic notions and standards to the situation of Black people in this country. Republicans asserted that inequality was not the result of the legacy of slavery or the long history of racial discrimination but rather is “a matter of effort, and if Blacks worked harder...they would achieve equal status in society.”⁵⁵ Poverty and incarceration, for example, were not the result of discrimination or over-policing of communities of color, but rather the result of poor choices. Government-led redistribution of resources to address inequality was, in the minds of Republicans, an example of anti-egalitarian special preference.

The racial polarization of the parties continued. Throughout the 1980s, southern Black Democratic support ranged between 76 and 94 percent, while the percentage of Blacks identifying themselves as Republican throughout the 1980s at no time was greater than 12 percent.⁵⁶ Race remained the political dividing line between the parties. By the 1980s, southern Democratic and Republican members of congress were voting differently on civil rights issues.⁵⁷ By the end of Reagan’s presidency, approximately 70 percent of all white southern voters were supporting Republican presidential candidates. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Republicans incorporated additional conservative themes of anti-feminism and religious fundamentalism that were interwoven with racial resentment. As one scholar has noted, “even when not directly on the surface, [race] lurks beneath nearly every issue in state politics.”⁵⁸ Polls have shown that white evangelicals are disproportionately more likely to voice support for policies and politicians that have racially conservative implications. In Alabama, Republican Jeremiah Denton, a religious conservative, captured a U.S. Senate seat in 1984 but through ineptitude lost it to conservative Democrat Richard Shelby in 1986. Shelby switched his party affiliation to Republican in 1994.

Building on the position that Nixon had pioneered and Reagan had expanded, by the end of the twentieth century, race and white anxiety formed the bedrock of conservative political ideology and was embedded in conflicts surrounding taxes, spending, education, crime, and welfare, as well as the promotion of what came to be known as “family values” issues. Racial attitudes became a central characteristic of both ideology and party identification, integral to voters’ choices between Democrats and Republicans.

Summary: The Late 20th Century and the Continuing Salience of Race

By the late twentieth century, the Republican Party’s electoral base resided solidly in the southern states. This remarkable political transformation was completed over the course of half a century. Since 1980, every Republican presidential candidate has carried a majority of ex-Confederate states, and in three elections (1984, 1988, and 2004) swept the region entirely. In Congress, the GOP has won a majority of southern seats in both the House and Senate since the 1994 midterm elections. The ability to attract a large majority of white voters in southern states has become pivotal to the party’s ability to win presidential elections and electoral majorities. In order to compete, beginning in the early 1960s, the Republican Party rebranded itself as a “white party” and adopted a host of conservative policy positions that had race at their core and which allowed it to compete effectively for white southern votes.⁵⁹ Since the 1970s, Democrats have lost seats in almost every legislative election cycle, due largely to their loss of support among rural white voters. Alabama elected its last Democratic governor in 1998. Today, nearly every Democratic lawmaker is Black and every Republican lawmaker is White.⁶⁰ Only 17 percent of white voters identify as Democrats, and only 15 percent of Black voters identify as Republicans.⁶¹ As Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields argue in their recent book, *The Long Southern Strategy*, “the decision to chase white southern voters in order to build a new

Republican coalition was not only intentional, strategic, and effective. but it was also unabating.”⁶² The consequence for Alabama is a politics that have become, in the words of one political scientist, “polarized and uncompetitive.”⁶³

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
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 17th day of May 2024, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kari Frederickson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "K" and a long, sweeping underline.

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Courses Taught

Graduate:

Teaching History
Proseminar/Seminar, U.S. History Since 1865

Proseminar/Seminar, History of the South
New Left, New Right: U.S. Politics since 1960

Undergraduate:

American Civilization Since 1865
History of the American South, 1607 to the Civil War
History of the American South Since Reconstruction
United States History, 1914-1945
History of Florida to 1865
History of Florida Since 1865
History of Alabama Since 1865
History of the Civil Rights Movement
United States Political History Since 1865
Twentieth-Century American Political Movements
New Left, New Right: U.S. Politics since 1960

Publications

Books

Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2022)

Winner, 2022 Michael V. R. Thomason Award for Best Book in the History of the Gulf South, Gulf South Historical Association

Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American South, 1945-1980 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013)

Winner, Bennett H. Wall Award for Best Book in Southern Economic and Business History Published Over a Two-Year Period (2014), Southern Historical Association

The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

Winner, Harry S. Truman National Book Award for 2002, Harry S. Truman Library Institute

Edited Books

Making Waves: Female Activists in Twentieth Century Florida, co-edited with Jack E. Davis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).

Book Series

The Modern South, co-edited with Susan Youngblood Ashmore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press)

Articles and Essays in Edited Collections

"Creating Rural Consumers in the Cold War," in *The Cold War in the American South*, ed. by Amy Sayward and Leah Valley (Abstract accepted: book under advance contract from University of Alabama Press).

Review Essay for Roundtable on *The Year That Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968*, in *Diplomatic History* (forthcoming).

"Making New Deal Citizens: Middle-Class Values and the Tenant Purchase Program," *Agricultural History* (submitted, December 2023).

"The South and the State in the Twentieth Century," in *The New History of the American South*, ed. by W. Fitzhugh Brundage (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2023), 392-431.

"John H. Bankhead," in *Tuscaloosans* (Tuscaloosa, AL: Borgo Publishing, 2019).

"Brand New District, Same Old Fight: The Bankhead-Hobson Campaign of 1916," *Alabama Review* 70 (October 2016), 267-295. Winner of the Milo B. Howard Jr. Award, Alabama Historical Association, for best article published over a two-year period.

"Manhood and Politics: The Hobson-Bankhead Campaigns of 1904 and 1906," in *Alabama Review* 69 (April 2016), 99-131.

"Creating a 'Respectable Area': Southerners and the Cold War," commentary, "Special Forum: Domestic Regionalism and U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 36 (June 2012), 487-90.

"Cold War Corporate Culture and the American South," in *With Liberty and Justice For All? Rethinking Politics in Cold War America, 1945-1965*, edited by Kathleen Donohue (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 361-82.

"The New South in Transition: New Deal, World War II, and Cold War," in *The American South: A Reader and Guide*, edited by Daniel Letwin (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2011), 320-30.

"World War II, White Violence, and Black Politics in V. O. Key's *Southern Politics*," in *Unlocking V.O. Key: "Southern Politics" for a New Century*, edited by Todd Shields and Angie Maxwell (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2011), 39-54.

"The Cold War at the Grassroots: Militarization and Modernization in the American South," in *The End of Southern History?: Integrating the Modern South and the Nation* Edited by Matthew Lassiter and Joseph Crespino (Oxford University Press, 2010), 190-209.

“Introduction” to Louise Cassels. *Unexpected Exodus*, reprint (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007).

“Confronting the Garrison State: South Carolina in the Early Cold War Era,” *Journal of Southern History* 72 (May 2006), 349-78.

“As a Man, I am Interested in States’ Rights’: Race, Gender, and the Political Culture of the States’ Rights Movement, 1948-1950,” in *Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Politics in the New South*, edited by Glenda E. Gilmore, Bryant Simon, and Jane Dailey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 260-74.

“Documenting ‘The South’s Number One Problem’: V. O. Key Jr. and the Study of Twentieth-Century Southern Politics,” in *Reading Southern History: Essays on Interpreters and Interpretations*, edited by Glenn Feldman (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), 123-33.

“Dual Actions, One for Each Race’: Biracial Political Challenges to the Dixiecrats, 1948-1950,” *International Social Science Review* 72 (Spring 1997), 14-25.

“The Slowest State, the Most Backward Community’: Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil Rights Legislation,” *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 98 (April 1997), 177-210.

“Cathrine Curtis and Conservative Isolationist Women, 1939-1941,” *The Historian* 58 (Summer 1996), 825-39.

Encyclopedia Entries

“Dixiecrats,” *Encyclopedia of Alabama*, www.encyclopediaofalabama.com

“Dixiecrats in South Carolina,” *South Carolina Encyclopedia*, edited by Walter Edgar (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 267.

“Fielding L. Wright,” *American National Biography*, Vol. 24, edited by John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12-14.

Book and Video Reviews

Review of Jefferson Cowie. *Freedom’s Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power*, in *Journal of Southern History* (forthcoming).

Review of Carl V. Harris (edited and completed by Elliot W. Brownlee), *Segregation in the New South: Birmingham, Alabama, 1871-1901*, in *Alabama Review* 77 (April 2024), 213-16.

“Who’s the ‘Mass,’ Where’s the Resistance? Gender, Class, and Region in the Reconsideration of Massive Resistance.” Review essay. Rebecca Bruckmann. *Massive Resistance and Southern Womanhood: White Women, Class, and Segregation*; Emma J. Folwell, *The War on Poverty in Mississippi: From Massive Resistance to New Conservatism*; and Elizabeth Gillespie McRae. *Mothers of Massive Resistance: White Women and the Politics of White Supremacy*, in *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics, and Culture* (October 2022 online), 244-247.

Review of Zachary J. Lechner, *The South of the Mind: American Imaginings of Southern Whiteness, 1960-1980*, in *Florida Historical Review* (Winter 2019), 365-66.

Review of Martin T. Olliff, *Getting out of the Mud: The Alabama Good Roads Movement and Highway Administration, 1896-1928*, in *Alabama Review* 72 (January 2019), 61-64.

Review of Andrew Fry, *The American South and the Vietnam War*, in *Diplomatic History* 40 (Spring 2016), 366-68.

Review of Keith Findley, *Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight Against Civil Rights, 1938-1965*, in *Florida Historical Quarterly* 88 (Summer 2009), 120-22.

Review of Gary Mormino, *Land of Sunshine, State of Dreams*, in *Florida Historical Quarterly* 85 (Fall 2006), 107-110.

Review of James B. Crooks: *Jacksonville Before Consolidation*, in *Journal of Southern History* 72 (August 2006), 709.

Review of Jeff Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968* (2004), in *Alabama Review* 58 (July 2005), 237-38.

Review of Steve Neal, ed., *Miracle of '48* (2003), in *Chicago Tribune*, February 22, 2004.

Review of Gordon E. Harvey, *A Question of Justice: New South Governors and Education, 1968-1976* (2002), in *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 104 (April 2003), 137-38..

Review of Earl Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (2002), in *Journal of Southern History* 69 (November 2003), 990-92.

Review of Samuel L. Webb and Margaret E. Armbruster, eds., *Alabama Governors: A Political History of the State* (2001), in *Alabama Review* 56 (July 2003), 225-27.

Review of Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908* (2001) in *The Historian* 65 (2003), 1428-29.

Review of John Drescher. *Triumph of Good Will: How Terry Sanford Beat a Champion of Segregation and Reshaped the South* (2000). in *North Carolina Historical Review*.

Review of Tracey E. Danese. *Claude Pepper and Ed Ball: Politics, Power, and Purpose* (2000), in *Florida Historical Quarterly* 80 (Spring 2002), 559-60.

Review of Sarah Hart Brown. *Standing Against Dragons: Three Civil Rights Lawyers in an era of Fear* (1998). in *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 83 (Fall 1999), 615-616.

Review of Janet L. Coryell, Martha H. Swain, Sandra Gioia Treadway, and Elizabeth Hayes Turner. *Beyond Image and Convention: Explorations in Southern Women's History* (1998), in *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 100 (July 1999), 286-87.

Review of "Riding the Rails," The American History Project (1997), in *Journal for Multimedia History* Volume 2, 1999.

Review of Bentley Orrick and Harry L. Crumpacker, *The Tampa Tribune: A Century of Florida Journalism* (1998), in *Journal of Southern History* 66 (February 2000), 149.

Review of R. Bruce Stephenson, *Visions of Eden: Environmentalism, Urban Planning, and City Building in St. Petersburg, Florida. 1900-1995* (1997), in *Journal of American History* 85 (September 1998), 709.

Review of David L. Chappell, *Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement* (1994), in *Southern Historian* 17 (1997), 91-93.

Review of Carl Grafton and Anne Permaloff, *Political Power in Alabama: The More Things Change...*(1996), in *The Historian* 60 (Fall 1997), 137-39.

Review of *Georgia in Black and White: Explorations in the Race Relations of a Southern State*, edited by John C. Inscoe (1994), in *Southern Historian*, 99-100.

Review of William Ivy Hair. *The Kingfish and His Realm: The Life and Times of Huey P. Long* (1991), in *Gulf Coast Historical Review* 10 (Spring 1995), 85-86.

Conferences

"The South and the State," Roundtable Discussion of *A New History of the American South* (University of North Carolina Press, 2023), at Louisiana Book Festival, Baton Rouge, October 28, 2023.

Organizer and Participant, "Truman Civil Rights Symposium: A National 75th Anniversary Commemoration," Sponsored by the Truman Library Institute, July 26-28, 2023, Washington DC.

"Finding Upland Bend: The Transformation of a Postwar Southern Community," Alabama Historical Association Annual Meeting, April 14, 2023, Prattville, Alabama.

“Making New Deal Citizens: Middle-Class Values and the Tenant Purchase Program,” Gulf South Historical Association Annual Meeting, Gulfport, Mississippi, October 13, 2022.

“Soft Power: Marie Bankhead Owen and the Politics of Race and Class in Alabama,” at “Rethinking Alabama Politics from the Civil War to the Present,” Symposium at the University of Alabama, October 3, 2022.

“Family Biography as Regional History: The Bankheads of Alabama,” A Roundtable Discussion of *Deep South Dynasty*, Alabama Historical Association Annual Meeting, April 8, 2022, Florence, Alabama

Panel Chair, “Memorialization and Resistance on Campus,” Southeastern American Studies Association Conference, Birmingham, Alabama, March 3, 2022.

“The Federal Road Aid Act of 1916,” Alabama Historical Association Meeting, Auburn, Alabama, April 2017.

Roundtable Participant, “Leading Women: A Roundtable Discussion of Gender and Academic Leadership,” Southern Historical Association Conference, Mobile, Alabama, November 3, 2012.

“World War II, Black Political Activity, and White Violence in V.O. Key’s Southern Politics,” Unlocking V.O. Key, Second Annual Blair Legacy Series Conference, Rockefeller Institute/Diane D. Blair Center for Southern Politics, University of Arkansas, Petit Jean Mountain, Arkansas, April 1-3, 2009.

Commentor, “The 1947 Lynching of Willie Earle: Three Perspectives on South Carolina’s Last Known Lynching,” Organization of American Historians, Seattle, Washington, March 27, 2009.

Moderator, “The State of Alabama Political History,” Alabama Association of Historians, University of West Alabama, Livingston, Alabama, February 6, 2009.

Organizer and Moderator, “Shifting Sands: Changing Images in the 1930s South,” Hickory Hill Fall Forum, Watson-Brown Foundation, November 2008.

Organizer, “Race and Place in the American South,” University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, April 2007.

“ACE’s Wild: The Army Corps of Engineers and Southern Life,” Southern Historical Association Conference, Birmingham, Alabama, November 2006.

“Corporate Culture, the Cold War, and the American South,” The Military and the American South, 1898 to Present, Watson-Brown Conference, Thomson, Georgia, October 6-7, 2006.

Commentator, "The Rise of the Christian Right," Organization of American Historians, Washington, DC.. April 2006.

"The Cold War at the Grass Roots," The End of Southern History? Integrating the Modern South and the Nation. Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. March 23-24, 2006.

"Uncle Sam in Dixie: Touring Federal Installations in the American South," International Society of Travel Writing, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 2004.

"The Cold War Comes South: A View from the Grassroots," Organization of American Historians, Boston, Massachusetts, March 2004.

"Atomic Spaces in Dixie: Land and Landscape in the Cold War South," Southern Historical Association, Houston, Texas, November 2003.

Commentator, "Alfred Gore Sr. and the Politics of the Modern South," Organization of American Historians, Memphis, Tennessee, April 2003.

"Federal Housing Policy and the Construction of the Savannah River Plant in the 1950s," Organization of American Historians, Washington, DC, April 13, 2002.

"'Displaced Persons' and 'New People': Creating the Savannah River Plant," South Carolina Historical Association, Charleston, South Carolina, March 1, 2002.

"Revolt of the Black Belt: The Dixiecrat Party of 1948," Southern Historical Association, Louisville, Kentucky, November 11, 2000.

Chair, "African American Experiences of Health Care in the South," Southern Association for the History of Medicine and Science, Birmingham, February 18, 2000.

"Southern Labor and Politics: Methodologies, Interpretations, Issues," Southern Labor Studies Conference," Atlanta, Georgia, October 2, 1999.

"Race, Class, and the Willie Earle Lynching: South Carolina, 1947," Southern Historical Association, Birmingham, Alabama, November 12, 1998.

"The Girls' Recreation Center in Orlando and the Origins of an Urban Social Service Network, 1920-1930," Florida Historical Society, Tampa, Florida, May 30, 1998.

"Girls Just Wanna Have Fun: The Girls' Recreation Center in Orlando, 1920-1930," Popular Culture Association, Orlando, Florida, April 10, 1998.

Chair, "Defining Boundaries of Americanism from Hot War to Cold: Race, Gender, Nationalism, and Subversion, 1940-1960," Organization of American Historians, Indianapolis, Indiana, April 4, 1998.

Commentator. "Gender and Sports." Sports and American Culture Lecture Series. University of South Florida. St. Petersburg. Florida. March 30, 1998.

"Class and Confederate Symbolism in the Dixiecrat Movement," Popular Culture Association in the South. Columbia. South Carolina. October 16, 1997.

Commentator. "Race and Education in Late-Nineteenth-Century Florida," Florida Historical Society, Jacksonville. Florida. May 30, 1997.

Commentator, "Women and South Carolina History," South Carolina Historical Association, Columbia, South Carolina. March 8, 1997.

"The Slowest State, the Most Backward Community": Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil Rights Initiatives," Florida Conference of Historians, Jacksonville, Florida, February 28, 1997.

"Dual Actions, One for Each Race": The Progressive Democrats, the Citizen Democrats, and the Challenge to the Dixiecrats in South Carolina, 1948-1950," Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, Charleston, South Carolina, October 3, 1996.

"As a Man, I am Interested in States' Rights": Race, Gender, and the Political Culture of States' Rights, 1948-1950," Organization of American Historians, Chicago, Illinois, March 31, 1996.

"Politicizing the Unprintable: Race, Sex, and Libel in South Carolina Politics, 1949-50," National Association of African American Studies, Virginia State University, St. Petersburg, Virginia, February 17, 1995.

"Reconstituting the Isolationists: Cathrine Curtis and the Mothers' Movement," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts, June 23, 1994.

"Deploying Motherhood: Right-Wing Women and World War II," World War II Conference, Siena College, Loudonville, New York, June 3, 1994.

Invited Lectures

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Museum of Mobile, August 9, 2023. Mobile, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Tuscaloosa Rotary, June 6, 2023, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

New Book Symposium on *Freedom's Dominion*, by Jefferson Cowie, Crossroads Civic Engagement Center, April 25, 2023, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Birmingham Historical Society, February 27, 2023, Birmingham, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama, March 29, 2022.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Leadership Board Meeting, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, March 5, 2022.

"Who are the Bankheads, and Why Should I Care About Them?" OLLE talk, January 31, 2022, Bryant Conference Center, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

"Family History as Regional Biography: An Overview of Deep South Dynasty," Ernest & Hadley Book Store, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, January 22, 2022.

"Family History as Regional Biography: The Bankheads of Alabama," Jasper Rotary Club, Jasper, Alabama, December 7, 2021.

"How did we Get Here? Some Answers from Alabama's Past," Women's Policy Institute of Birmingham, September 9, 2021.

"200 Years of Alabama History in 45 Minutes," Leadership Alabama, Birmingham, Alabama, January 8, 2021.

"200 Years of Alabama History in 45 Minutes," Blackburn Institute, University of Alabama, August 2020.

"'Better Living': Life in a Cold War Company Town," National Archives Southeast, Morrow, Georgia, September 2016.

Moderator, "Hidden Humanities" Roundtable Discussion with Professor William Ferris, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, October 6, 2014.

"Finding Women in the Cold War," Pickens-Salley Symposium on Southern Women, University of South Carolina at Aiken, March 25, 2014.

"'Better Living': Life in a Cold War Company Town," Up & Atom Breakfast, Employees of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (formerly Savannah River Site), Aiken, South Carolina, March 26, 2014.

"Cold War Dixie," Savannah River Site Employees (Retired), North Augusta, South Carolina, February 21, 2014.

"The South in the Cold War," Kiwanis of Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama, November 12, 2013.

“Searching for Political Alternatives in the Great Depression.” Harry S Truman Presidential Library. Independence. Missouri. July 22-24. 2009.

“Militarization and Modernization in Aiken. South Carolina. in the 1950s,” Up & Atom Breakfast. Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness, Aiken. South Carolina. March 14. 2007.

“Atomic Spaces in Dixie.” Southern Association for the History of Medicine. Science. and Technology, Augusta. Georgia. February 25, 2005.

“Life on the Nuclear Frontier: The Cold War in South Carolina,” South Carolina Historical Symposium. Columbia, South Carolina, February 23, 2005.

“Strom Thurmond and the Biography of Southern Political Change,” Continuing Education, University of Alabama, February 2004.

“Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat Revolt, and the Origins of the Two-Party South,” University of Missouri at Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri; and the Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, March 2003.

“Strom Thurmond. the Dixiecrat Revolt, and the Origins of the Two-Party South,” University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, March 26, 2002.

Documentary and Media Appearances

“The Bankheads of Alabama,” interview on WKRQ-TV (Mobile), August 6, 2023.

“The Cold War in the American South,” Modern Scholar Podcast (modernscholarpodcast.com). aired October 2023.

The Blinding of Isaac Woodard, American Experience, PBS, first aired March 30, 2021. On-screen content expert.

Finding the Cornerstone: The Wallace A. Rayfield Story, APTV, aired April 2021. On-screen content expert.

“Walter Edgar’s Journal,” South Carolina Educational Radio Network, January 2008

“Walter Edgar’s Journal,” South Carolina Educational Radio Network, March 22, 2002.

Grants, Awards, and Honors

2022	Michael V. R. Thomason Award, Best Book in History of the Gulf South, Gulf South Historical Association
2021-24	Leadership Board Faculty Fellowship, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Alabama
2018	Milo B. Howard Jr. Award, Alabama Historical Association.
2014	Bennett H. Wall Book Award, Southern Historical Association
2009	Academy for Improving Student Success Grant, University of Alabama
2008	Watson-Brown Foundation Contract Grant
2008	Community Based Partnership Grant, University of Alabama

2002	Harry S. Truman National Book Award
2000	National Endowment for the Humanities. Summer Stipend
2000-02	Research Advisory Committee Grant. Office of Sponsored Research. University of Alabama
1997-98	Scholar/Humanist Grant, Florida Humanities Council
1997-98	Dean's Initiative Grant, College of Arts and Sciences. University of Central Florida
1995-96	Louis Bevier Fellowship, Rutgers University
1994-96	Graduate Research Fellowship, Institute for Southern Studies, University of South Carolina
1993-95	Excellence Fellowship, Rutgers University
1994	Dissertation Research Grant, Harry S. Truman Institute

Community Engagement and Outreach

2023	Exhibit Review, Randall Museum at American Village, Montevallo, Alabama
2017-20	Executive Committee, Tuscaloosa Bicentennial Commission
2017-20	Chair, Education Committee, Tuscaloosa Bicentennial Commission Organized "Tuscaloosa Through Time: A Bicentennial History Expo," April 24-27, 2019. Expo featured 29 historical exhibitions from every public and private school in Tuscaloosa. Over 10,000 students attended the exhibit over the course of 3-1/2 days. Managing Editor, <i>200: An Artistic and Literary Celebration</i> (Tuscaloosa, 2019). Includes poems, short stories, and artwork from students representing every school in the city.

Related Professional Experience and Service

Consultant and Participant, "Isaac Woodard, Harry Truman, and Civil Rights," documentary, American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service (March 2021).

Consultant and Participant, "Finding the Cornerstone," documentary, Alabama Public Television (in progress).

Consultant, "Get Right With God," Southern Oral History Collection, University of North Carolina, 2015 to present.

Board of Directors, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Missouri, 2019-present.

Grants Committee, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Missouri, 2013-present (chair of committee, 2018-present).

Consultant and Participant, "The Bankheads," documentary, Center for Public Broadcasting, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama (2016).

Consultant, "Three Days at Foster," documentary, directed by Keith Dunnavent, Shadowvision Productions, 2013.

Consultant, "The Durrs of Montgomery," documentary, Alabama Public Television, 2012.

Consultant. "Displaced: The Unexpected Fallout from the Cold War." Directed by Mark Albertin. Produced by Scrapbook Video Productions. 2009.

Member. Educational Advisory Committee. Alabama Public Television. 2009-present.

Consultant. National Endowment for the Humanities. Exhibition Grant. University of West Georgia. 2009-present.

Member. Women in the Profession. Southern Historical Association. 2010-2012.

Chair. Lerner-Scott Dissertation Prize, Organization of American Historians. 2008-2009

Member. Southern Industrialization Project. Southern Historical Association Panel. 2007-2008

Member. William F. Holmes Award Committee, Southern Historical Association. 2003

Panelist. National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipends Program. 2000-2002, 2004, 2006

Editorial Board, *Florida Historical Quarterly*

Editorial Board. *The Alabama Review*

Editorial Board, *Atlanta History*

Member, State Records Commission, Montgomery, Alabama, 2000-2003

Member, Local Records Commission, Montgomery, Alabama, 2000-2003

Supervisor, Public History Internship Program, University of Alabama, 2001 to present

Supervisor, Public History Internship Program, University of Central Florida, 1997 to 1999

Consultant. Orange County Regional History Center, Maitland County Historical Museum

Manuscript reviewer for Houghton Mifflin, Harcourt Brace, Addison Wesley Longman. ABC-Clio, New York University Press, University of Alabama Press, University Press of Florida, University of Georgia Press, West Virginia University Press, University of North Carolina Press, University of Missouri Press, Cambridge University Press, Johns Hopkins University Press

Chair. Diversity Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Council, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Affairs Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Undergraduate Affairs Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Executive Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Technology and Media Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Faculty Development Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Affairs Committee, University of Central Florida

Member, University Assessment Committee, University of Central Florida

Member. Teaching Incentive Program Committee, University of Central Florida

Memberships

Organization of American Historians
Southern Historical Association
South Carolina Historical Association
Alabama Historical Association

