IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL GONIDAKIS, MARY PARKER, MARGARET CONDITT, BETH VANDERKOOI, LINDA SMITH, DELBERT DUDUIT, THOMAS W. KIDD JR., DUCIA HAMM, Plaintiffs,	Case No. 2:22-cv-00773
BRIA BENNETT, REGINA C. ADAMS, KATHLEEN M. BRINKMAN, MARTHA CLARK, SUSANNE L. DYKE, MERYL NEIMAN, HOLLY OYSTER, CONSTANCE RUBIN, EVERETT TOTTY, Intervenor-Plaintiffs,	Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley Judge Amul R. Thapar Judge Benjamin J. Beaton
V.	

FRANK LAROSE, in his capacity as Ohio Secretary of State,

Defendant.

BENNETT PETITIONERS' POST-HEARING BRIEF REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Intervenor-Plaintiffs Bria Bennett, Regina C. Adams, Kathleen M. Brinkman, Martha

Clark, Susanne L. Dyke, Meryl Neiman, Holly Oyster, Constance Rubin, and Everett Totty (the

"Bennett Petitioners") submit this post-hearing brief on Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction, in accordance with the Court's Order, ECF No. 143.

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INTRODUCTION AND LOCAL RULE 7.2(a)(3) SUMMARY

"[R]eapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court." *Growe v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (quoting *Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)). And if a federal court must intervene in the redistricting process, it must not "intrude upon state policy any more than necessary" to protect federal rights. *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973) (quoting *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1973)). This Court has carefully followed these principles to date, declining to intervene in Ohio's General Assembly redistricting process as long as possible to provide the state with as much time as possible to adopt a lawful General Assembly plan on its own. As the time when federal intervention may become necessary approaches, the Court's goal must remain the same: to do the least amount of damage to Ohio law, consistent with federal rights.

As explained in Part I, *infra* pp. 6-8, the Court should continue to abstain from ordering any relief until April 20. Testimony at the March 30 hearing confirmed that so long as a final plan is in place no later than April 20, Ohio can conduct a General Assembly primary on August 2 without any disruption to the usual election deadlines and time periods, for either the primary or the general election. Thus, the Court should give Ohio until April 20 to adopt a lawful plan. At that time, if the Court believes relief will ultimately be warranted, the Court should act, as waiting longer risks unacceptably limiting the Court's remedial options, potentially requiring a greater intrusion into Ohio law than would otherwise be required to protect federal rights.

As explained in Part II, *infra* pp. 8-15, if relief does become necessary, the Court must order the use of a General Assembly plan that complies with substantive requirements of both Ohio and federal law. The Court is required to comply with Ohio law to the greatest extent possible without impairing federal rights. *Infra* Part II.A, pp. 8-9; *White*, 412 U.S. at 795; *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964). That includes imposing a plan that meets the Ohio Constitution's detailed partisan fairness requirements, which the Ohio Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted in great detail. *Infra* Part II.B, pp. 9-11. To comply with those requirements, the Court must order the use of a General Assembly plan that was not adopted by the Commission if—as will necessarily be the case if relief is needed—that is the only way to impose a plan consistent with the substantive requirements of the Ohio Constitution. *Infra* Part II.C, pp. 11-15. The Ohio Constitution is the paramount law of the state and the sole source of the Commission's redistricting authority, so the Commission's actions in violation of the Ohio Constitution's requirements are *ultra vires* acts that are without legal effect. *Gentry v. Deuth*, 456 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 2006); *State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly v. Brunner*, 114 Ohio St. 3d 386, 393 (2007); *Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesfile R.R. Co. v. Comm 'rs of Clinton Cnty.*, 1 Ohio St. 77, 85 (1852). The Court cannot give effect to unconstitutional plans adopted by the Commission without improperly elevating the Commission over the sovereign people who expressly limited the Commission's redistricting authority to the adoption of plans compliant with the Ohio Constitution. *See Large v. Fremont Cnty.*, Wyo., 670 F.3d 1133, 1147 (10th Cir. 2012).

As explained in Part III, *infra* pp. 15-20, the Ohio Supreme Court has already ruled that the Third Plan adopted by the Commission violates the Ohio Constitution, and the evidence before the Court shows that the Fourth Plan is nearly identical to the Third Plan—99.7% unchanged—and unconstitutional for the same reason.

As explained in Part IV, however, *infra* pp. 20-24, the Court has at least two plans before it that fully comply with the substantive requirements of both Ohio and federal law: a plan developed by the independent map drawers retained by the Commission (the "Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan")¹; and a plan entirely developed by Stanford Political Scientist Dr. Jonathan Rodden (the "Rodden III Plan"). The existence of these plans demonstrates that there is no inherent or necessary conflict between protecting federal rights and complying with Ohio law, and thus no justification for ordering the use of a General Assembly plan that violates Ohio law.

Finally, as explained in Part V, *infra* pp. 24-26, the Court may not order elections to proceed under the 2011 Plan without violating voters' rights under both federal *and* Ohio law. As a result of population changes within Ohio, the 2011 Plan is now grievously malapportioned, with a maximum deviation between the most overpopulated and most underpopulated districts of more than 34 percent in the House and more than 25 percent in the Senate—far in excess of what the Equal Protection Clause allows. *Evenwel v. Abbott*, 578 U.S. 54, 60 (2016); *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973); *Swann v. Adams*, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). Moreover, the 2011 Plan was adopted before the 2015 constitutional amendments that created the Commission and imposed partisan fairness requirements on General Assembly plans. If it were imposed today, the 2011 Plan would violate those requirements, which were adopted in large part in response to the blatantly partisan process that produced the 2011 Plan, a clear partisan gerrymander.

BACKGROUND

The legal and factual background for this case is described in detail in the Bennett Petitioners' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 90 at PageID 1330-37, and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 107 at PageID 2532-34.

¹ As explained below, the Corrected Map Drawers' Plan includes a handful of minor corrections by the Bennett Petitioners' expert Dr. Rodden.

On March 28, after the submission of the Bennett Petitioners' Opposition, the Ohio Redistricting Commission adopted a new General Assembly apportionment plan (the "Fourth Plan"). *See* ECF No. 118. Unfortunately, the Commission did so by abandoning, at the eleventh hour, a plan being finalized by two independent map drawers retained by the Commission specifically to enact a lawful plan. Instead, the Commission voted late on March 28 to make only extraordinarily minor changes to the Third Plan, leaving more than 99.7% of Ohio's population in the same districts as before. Tr. 135:7-9, 145:15-22, 174:19-175:3. Further, the Commission abandoned the neutral, Commission-wide process that the Ohio Supreme Court had ordered: the Fourth Plan was prepared by partisan map drawers reporting only to certain Commissioners, just like every plan adopted before it. Tr. 135:7-136:7, 175:1-4. The next day, the Bennett Petitioners and others filed renewed motions for an order directing the Commission and its members to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating the Ohio Supreme Court's orders. ECF Nos. 134, 152. Objections to the Fourth Plan are fully briefed in the Ohio Supreme Court as of 9:00 a.m. on April 4.

Meanwhile, this Court heard testimony and representations from counsel on March 30 that it is already too late to hold a May 3 General Assembly primary, under *any* plan, Tr. 11:19-13:17, but that an August 2 General Assembly primary would not interfere in any way with the November general election, Tr. 65:14-21. The Court also heard testimony that to enable an August 2 primary under an otherwise normal election schedule, including time for candidates to move into new districts if they choose and circulate and file their candidacy petitions, Ohio must have a final General Assembly plan no later than April 20. Tr. 83:13-86:4.

The various plans that are before the Court may be viewed on "Dave's Redistricting App," a free website, at the following links:

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- 2011 Plan House: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::8db12bef-0510-4386-be22-19949a43b73c</u>.
- 2011 Plan Senate: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::bc4f22d5-75d7-42f5-a628-c1dc9b0740e4</u>.
- Third Plan House: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::488ab72e-581f-4dfe-a0c7-8c0eb502e9db</u>.
- Third Plan Senate: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::158ee081-376b-44b6-a550-915f5988a30f</u>.
- Fourth Plan House: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::4a20a11c-a95f-45a8-89ea-cbe741777e97</u>.
- Fourth Plan Senate: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::39605ccb-6872-41bd-99d4-f1b495b2a2fc</u>.
- Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan House: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/</u> maps#viewmap::550beca6-85ca-4049-9925-b6163549b488.
- Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan Senate: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/</u> <u>maps#viewmap::2345f29b-1184-4674-be6e-0a15af5d7b4c</u>.
- Rodden III Plan House: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::593b05f8-8859-4348-8f0f-4f9248a162fd</u>.
- Rodden III Plan Senate: <u>https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::af842936-bcb8-4cd9-a912-01853a441ab3</u>.

LEGAL STANDARD

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider: "(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction." *Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted*, 696 F.3d 580, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2012). "[T]he preliminary injunction is an 'extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very farreaching power, which is to be applied "only in [the] limited circumstances" which clearly demand

it." Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Direx Isr., Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)).

ARGUMENT

The Bennett Petitioners' prior briefing has focused on each of the four preliminary injunction factors. *See* ECF Nos. 90, 107. Given the testimony heard, representations made, and questions asked at the March 30 hearing, the Bennett Petitioners focus this post-hearing brief on remedial issues, explaining why—if the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have met their burden and that relief will ultimately be required—the Court should continue to wait as long as possible before ordering relief in response to Plaintiffs' motion, and why any relief that the Court does ultimately order must be consistent, to the greatest extent possible, with Ohio law.

I. The Court should avoid ordering any relief for as long as is possible without limiting its ability to intervene effectively if necessary.

As the Court's actions to date have recognized, "reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court," and the Court must "defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative *or* judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself." *Growe*, 507 U.S. at 33 (quoting *Chapman*, 420 U.S. at 27). Ohio's redistricting process has undeniably taken substantial time, but the Ohio Supreme Court remains actively engaged in efforts to bring the work of the Redistricting Commission to a conclusion, with objections to the Commission's Fourth Plan fully briefed before the Ohio Supreme Court and awaiting a decision. As the Court has until now, the Court should continue to give Ohio a chance to resolve the apportionment of its state legislative districts on its own, for as long as possible.

The Court should therefore not adopt any remedy until necessary—and that includes not prematurely revealing what remedy it may order in the event that federal intervention becomes necessary. Deferral under *Growe* requires not only that a federal court not "affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment" but also that the court not "permit federal litigation to be used to impede it." *Growe*, 507 U.S. at 34. For the Court to reveal what plan it will impose if the Commission is unable to adopt a lawful plan would fundamentally affect and impede the Commission's ability to agree on a lawful plan. *See New Mexico v. Dep't of Interior*, 854 F.3d 1207, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 2017) (describing how changes to a party's "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" affect the prospect of a negotiated resolution). In *Branch*, for example, the federal court did not promulgate its own, fallback redistricting plan until after the state had already adopted its own proposal, subject only to preclearance by the Department of Justice. *Branch v. Smith*, 538 U.S. 254, 259-60 (2003). This Court should similarly wait as long as possible—until at least April 20.

Growe's requirement of deferral does not last forever, however: at a certain point, the Court must take action if necessary to protect federal rights. *See id.* at 1235. At the March 30 hearing, counsel to the Secretary of State office represented that to avoid disrupting the general election, Ohio's primary election must be held by August 2. Tr. 65:14-20. And an employee of the Secretary of State's office testified that holding a primary election on August 2 without compressing various pre-election time periods under Ohio law requires a final plan by April 20. Tr. 83:13-86:4. If the Court credits this testimony and if it concludes that protection of federal rights requires ensuring that an August 2 primary is held, then if Ohio has not adopted a final plan by April 20, the Court should order a remedy at that time. To wait longer under those circumstances would risk greater, rather than less, disruption to Ohio law, by potentially requiring the use of a plan that violates the Ohio Constitution or the elimination of statutory time periods under state law for candidates to

move into their districts and file for election. Tr. 77:5-78:16.² That would violate the first rule of federal court intervention in state redistricting: to not "intrude upon state policy any more than necessary" to protect federal rights. *White*, 412 U.S. at 795 (quoting *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1973)).

II. If the Court does impose a General Assembly plan, it must be consistent with the substantive requirements of both Ohio and federal law.

A. The Court must follow Ohio law to the greatest extent possible without interfering with federal rights.

If the Court does ultimately order relief because Ohio is unable to adopt a General Assembly plan in time, the Court must order Ohio to conduct General Assembly elections under a plan that complies with the substantive requirements of Ohio law. In adopting a reapportionment plan to protect federal rights, federal courts must "follow the policies and preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution." *White*, 412 U.S. at 795; *see also Perry v. Perez*, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012); *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 584 ("[C]ourts should attempt to accommodate the relief ordered to the apportionment provisions of state constitutions insofar as is possible."). Thus, a federal court

² The Bennett Petitioners previously argued that Plaintiffs lack standing or a federal claim. ECF No. 107 at PageID 2540-47. Those arguments, however, were based on the posture of the case and the specific relief that Plaintiffs then sought. *See id.* In particular, Plaintiffs' focus was on the approaching May 3 primary, with Plaintiffs asking the Court to order the use of a General Plan that violates the Ohio Constitution so as to allow a General Assembly primary to occur on May 3. ECF No. 96 at 1578. As the Bennett Petitioners argued, and Mr. Gonidakis's own testimony at the March 30 hearing confirmed, Mr. Gonidakis was not injured, and his federal rights were not threatened, by a mere delay to the General Assembly primary beyond May 3. ECF No. 107 at PageID 2540-47; Tr. 115:8-14.

The Bennett Petitioners have always acknowledged, however, that if there were a threat that no election at all will be held, then there would be a threatened violation of federal rights and the requisite injury-in-fact. ECF No. 107 at PageID 2543, 2545. As time continues to pass and Ohio still has not been able to produce a valid General Assembly plan, that threat has become more concrete.

may not impose a "court-ordered plan that reject[s] state policy choices more than [is] necessary to meet the specific [federal] constitutional violations involved." *Upham v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37, 42 (1982) (per curiam). This is just a particular application of general preemption principles, under which federal law displaces state redistricting laws only if those laws "are an *unavoidable obstacle* to the vindication of the federal right." *Large*, 670 F.3d at 1145.

The federal rights at issue here—First Amendment associational rights and the one-person, one-vote right under the Equal Protection Clause—would be satisfied by any properly apportioned plan. The sole Plaintiff to provide evidence of any injury, Mr. Gonidakis, was very clear about that: he does not "care what voting plan is adopted," so long as he is able to vote. Tr. 115:8-9. Adherence to Ohio's substantive constitutional requirements for General Assembly plans therefore "does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution," so those requirements remain valid and un-preempted, and there is no basis for the Court to adopt a plan that violates them. *White*, 412 U.S. at 795; *see also Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 584; *Large*, 670 F.3d at 1147-48.

B. The Ohio Constitution imposes express partisan fairness requirements.

"In November 2015, Ohio voters overwhelmingly approved an amendment to the Ohio Constitution that . . . established a new process for creating General Assembly districts." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm 'n*, No. 2022-Ohio-65, ¶ 4, 2022 WL 110261 (Ohio Jan. 12, 2022) ("*LWV F*"). That amendment, which became Article XI of the Ohio Constitution, imposed various requirements for a General Assembly district plan. Of particular relevance, Section 6 of Article XI mandates that the Commission "shall attempt to draw a general assembly district plan that meets all of the following standards":

(A) No general assembly district plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party.

(B) The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years,

favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

(C) General assembly districts shall be compact.

Ohio Const. art. XI, § 6. The Commission may not "violate the district standards described in Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7" in an effort to comply with Section 6. *Id.* If, however, it is possible to draw a plan that meets these standards while complying with the other substantive provisions of Article XI, the Commission must do so. *See LWVI* at \P 87-88.

A Section 6(A) violation is determined by "discern[ing] the map drawers' intent." *Id.* at ¶ 116. "[D]irect or circumstantial evidence may establish that a districting plan was drawn primarily to favor one political party over another." *Id.* at ¶ 117 (citations omitted). Such evidence can include a "map-drawing process," such as one in which "the legislative caucuses of the two major political parties—i.e., the groups with the most self-interest in protecting their own members—drew maps for the commission to consider." *Id.* at ¶¶ 118-19. Respondents' "awareness of the partisan effects" of a plan also "supports an 'inference of predominant partisan intent." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n*, No. 2022-Ohio-342, ¶ 37, 2022 WL 354619 (Ohio Feb. 7, 2022) ("*LWV II*") (quoting *LWV I* at ¶ 118).

The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that there is "further evidence of a Section 6(A) violation" where the Commission has adopted "a plan in which the quality of partisan favoritism is monolithically disparate." *Id.* at ¶ 40. For example, the "adoption of a plan that labels what are by any definition 'competitive' or 'toss-up' districts as 'Democratic-leaning'—at least when the plan contains no proportional share of similar 'Republican-leaning' districts—is demonstrative of an intent to favor the Republican Party." *Id.*. In other words, "[t]he remarkably one-sided distribution of toss-up districts is evidence of an intentionally biased map." *League of Women*

Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n, 2022-Ohio-789, ¶ 33 2022 WL 803033 (Ohio Mar. 16, 2022) ("*LWV III*").

Section 6(B) provides that the Commission "shall attempt" to draw a district plan that meets the following standard: "The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio." "Under this methodology, there is no dispute that 'about 54 percent of Ohio voters preferred Republican candidates and about 46 percent of Ohio voters preferred Democratic candidates' in the relevant past elections." *LWV II* at ¶ 51 (quoting *LWV I* at ¶ 108). The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that "competitive districts"—those that do not clearly "favor" one party over the other—"must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." *Id.* at ¶ 62.

The Ohio Supreme Court's construction of these provisions of the Ohio Constitution are controlling on this Court. *See Mullaney v. Wilbur*, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ("[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law."); *Florida v. Powell*, 559 U.S. 50, 56 (2010) ("It is fundamental ... that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions." (quotations omitted)). As a result, the parties cannot use this action to advance any conflicting interpretations of the Ohio Constitution's partisan fairness requirements.

C. The Court can adopt a plan that was not adopted by the Commission.

While the Court must not impose a plan that violates the substantive requirements of Ohio law, including the partisan fairness requirements, the Court is free to impose a plan that has not been adopted by the Commission. If the Court must impose a plan, it is only because *no* lawful plan has been adopted by the Commission: otherwise, there would be no need for federal relief. And the Court cannot privilege an *unlawful* plan adopted by the Commission over a *lawful* plan that the Commission failed to adopt without improperly elevating unlawful acts by the Commission over the requirements of the Ohio Constitution, the "state's most fundamental law," *State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly v. Brunner*, 114 Ohio St. 3d at 393. Thus, if the Court imposes a plan, it must do what many courts have done and impose a plan proposed by litigants. *See, e.g., Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n*, 967 N.W.2d 469, 490 (Wis. 2021); Order on Remedial Plans, *Harper v. Hall*, No. 21 CVS 500085 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2022) (previously filed as ECF No. 107-2); *Carter v. Chapman*, No. 7 MM 2022, 2022 WL 549106 (Pa. Feb. 23, 2022); *Wattson v. Simon*, 970 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. Feb. 15, 2022).

It is true that the Ohio Constitution empowers the Commission—and only the Commission—to adopt General Assembly plans. But the Ohio Constitution limited that grant of authority by requiring that the Commission adopt only plans that comply with substantive requirements. *See generally* Ohio Const. art. XI. The Commission has never validly exercised that power. Rather, when the Commission adopted the unconstitutional Third and Fourth Plans, it acted *ultra vires*, beyond the authority delegated to it by the people of Ohio in the Ohio Constitution.

At the very foundation of Ohio law is the principle "that all political power resides with the people," and that the people have "the most undoubted right to delegate just as much, or just as little, of this political power with which they are invested as they see proper, and to such agents or departments of government as they see fit to designate." *Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesfile R.R.*, 1 Ohio St. at 85. The Ohio Constitution governs "the manner and extent of this delegation; and from that instrument, alone, must every department of the government derive its authority to exercise any portion of political power." *Id.* Acts of a governmental body are therefore "void" if they "do[] not fall within the general grant of power to that body or [are] expressly prohibited by some provision of the constitution." *Id.* at 86; *see also Middletown v. Ferguson*, 25 Ohio St. 3d

71, 80 (Ohio 1986) ("an unconstitutional law must be treated as having no effect whatsoever from the date of its enactment").

It makes no difference if the Commissioners who voted for the plans in question thought that they were valid. After a failed experiment with legislative supremacy in the early 19th century, it has been established for centuries in Ohio—as under federal law—that it is courts, not the other governmental agents themselves, who ultimately decide what the Ohio Constitution requires, and thereby serve "as a check on the other branches" in their carrying out of delegated authority. *See State ex. rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward*, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 462-67 (1999). To rule otherwise, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained, would be to render "our constitution a blank paper" by making governmental actors "the sole judges of their constitutionality," with "no guarantee for a single right to citizens." *Id.* at 463 (quoting *Rutherford v. M'Faddon* (1807), in Pollack, Ohio Unreported Judicial Decisions Prior to 1823 at 71 (1952)). This concern is fully present here: if this Court were to elevate the procedural requirement of passage by the Commission over the Ohio Constitution's substantive requirements, those requirements would be a dead letter, with the Commission free to pass whatever unlawful plans it liked, secure in the knowledge that a federal court would enforce them regardless.

Thus, the Commission's 4-to-3 adoption of the unconstitutional Third and Fourth Plans were *ultra vires* acts, undertaken in excess of the limited political authority delegated by the people to the Commission under the Ohio Constitution. Such "*ultra vires* acts bear no legitimate force in a government under the law. A public act without legitimate force is indistinct under the law from an act that never was, or an act that has been voided." *Gentry v. Deuth*, 456 F.3d at 697. And so the Commission's adoption of unconstitutional plans was "a proceeding without the authority of, and one that does not affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an

illegal act upon the part of . . . state official[s] in attempting, by the use of the name of the state," to violate state law. *Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908).³

The Tenth Circuit confronted an analogous situation in *Large*, and it reached the same conclusion. There, a federal court had ruled that a county's at-large system for electing its five county commissioners violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it prevented a Native American minority from electing any representative. 670 F.3d at 1135. The federal court had then ordered the county to adopt a remedial plan to cure the violation. *Id.* The county responded by adopting a plan under which one county commissioner would be elected to represent a majority-Native American district, while the remaining four county commissioners were elected at-large by the rest of the county. *Id.* at 1136. The problem with this remedial plan, *Large* explained, was "that this 'hybrid' election scheme is not authorized under Wyoming law." *Id.* Rather, Wyoming law required either that *all* county commissioners be elected at-large, or that each be elected from a single-member district. *Id.* Thus, while ordinarily, federal courts must defer to state remedial plans, the Tenth Circuit's affirmed the district court's refusal to adopt this one. *Id.* at 1137, 1148.

In so holding, the Tenth Circuit explained that its "deference must run first and foremost to the legislative decision-making of the sovereign State and, only through it, to its subordinate political subdivision." *Id.* at 1146. Because state law did not allow for the remedial plan adopted by the county, "it is *only* the dictate of this federal court that would give the County the authority to implement its plan." *Id.* at 1145, 1147. "After all, it is the State that imbues the political subdivision with the apportionment power, and the subdivision cannot stand on an independent

³ *Ex Parte Young*, of course, involved a violation of the U.S. Constitution, but from the perspective of Ohio officials, the effect of violating the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions are the same— in each case, the official's act "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character" *Id.* at 159.

and equal footing with respect to its creator." *Id.* at 1146. And when "a political subdivision of a State substantively contravenes the laws of that State—at least insofar as that contravention is not sanctioned by higher federal law—it no longer acts as an agent of that sovereign, and therefore is due no federal-court deference." *Id.* Were the court to defer to the county in violating state law, the court explained, it "would be granting deference to the wrong authority. We would, in essence, be using the authority of the federal courts to elevate a subordinate over its superior." *Id.* at 1147. And thus, the district court had properly "implemented a plan of its own design" to remedy the Section 2 violation, rather than adopting a plan proposed by the county but that needlessly violated other aspects of state law. *Id* at 1148.

The present case, of course, does not involve plans drafted by a local government. But just as a local government is subservient to the state and possessed with authority only to act in accordance with state laws, *id.* at 1146, so too Ohio government officials are subservient to the people of Ohio and possessed only with such authority as the Ohio Constitution grants them. *Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesfile R.R.*, 1 Ohio St. at 85. The Court's deference is to the redistricting choices of *Ohio*, not to those of Ohio officials who needlessly violated Ohio's paramount law. Much as in *Large*, to impose an *unlawful* plan on the grounds that it was adopted by the Commission, the proper actor, would be "using the authority of the federal courts to elevate a subordinate over its superior," 670 F.3d at 1147—here, elevating the Commission members over the sovereign people of Ohio, who delegated apportionment to the Commission *only* insofar as the Commission complies with the requirements of the Constitution. Simply put, the Commission's unconstitutional adopted plans are nullities to be ignored, not embodiments of state policy that require deference from this Court.

III. The Third and Fourth Plans adopted by the Commission violate the Ohio Constitution.

Both the Third and the Fourth Plans adopted by the Commission violate the Ohio Constitution: the Ohio Supreme Court has already held the Third Plan unconstitutional, and the Fourth Plan is nearly identical in relevant substance. And as explained in the next section, *infra* Part IV, no violation of the Ohio Constitution is necessary: it is entirely possible to draw General Assembly plans that fully comply with the substantive requirements of the Ohio Constitution and federal law. The Court therefore may not order the use of the Third or Fourth Plan, because to do so would fail to "accommodate the relief ordered to the apportionment provisions of state constitutions insofar as is possible," *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 585, and would instead improperly "contravene[] state laws that have not been remedially abrogated by the Supremacy Clause," *Large*, 670 F.3d at 1148.

A. The Third Plan

The Ohio Supreme Court struck down the Commission's Third Plan on March 16, finding that it violated Section 6(A) and 6(B) of Article XI. *LWV III*, at \P 2.

Regarding Section 6(A), the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[s]ubstantial and compelling evidence show[ed] beyond a reasonable doubt that the main goal of the individuals who drafted the [Third Plan] was to favor the Republican Party and disfavor the Democratic Party." *Id.* at ¶ 5. "Staff members of Senate President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp" had drafted the Third Plan, rather than map drawers employed by the Commission. *Id.* at ¶ 25. The Ohio Supreme Court held that Republican Legislative Commissioners' "nearly exclusive control over" map drawing "was strong evidence of partisan intent." *Id.* at ¶ 26. The Court directed that the Commission should "retain an independent map drawer – who answers to all commission members, not only to the Republican legislative leaders – to draft a plan through a transparent process." *Id.* at ¶ 30. The Ohio Supreme Court explained that the partisan asymmetry of the Third Plan also constituted evidence of partisan bias in violation of Section 6(A). The Third Plan contained "19 Democratic-leaning House districts in which the Democratic vote share [was] between 50 and 52 percent" and "seven Senate districts in which the Democratic vote share is in that range," but "no Republican-leaning House or Senate districts that ha[d] a Republican vote share that [was] less than 52.7 percent." *Id.* at ¶ 32. "The remarkably one-sided distribution of toss-up districts [was] evidence of an intentionally biased map." *Id.* at ¶ 33.

The Ohio Supreme Court also held that the Third Plan violated Section 6(B). The Court explained that "the sub-52-percent districts allocated to the Democratic Party under the [Third Plan] are 'competitive' districts" and so are excluded when assessing the plan's proportionality. *Id.* at ¶ 42. Under this calculus, 67.9 percent of the non-excluded districts in the Third Plan were allocated to Republicans and 32.1 percent to Democrats. *Id.* The Court concluded that the Third Plan therefore violated Section 6(B) because it did not "correspond closely" to the statewide preferences of Ohio's voters (54% Republican/46% Democratic). *Id.* Moreover, the Court had previously explained that, in considering "[t]he commission's choice to avoid a more proportional plan," the Court was "not unmindful" of the numbers "necessary to constitute a veto-proof supermajority" in the General Assembly. *LWV II* at ¶ 39 (citing Ohio Const., art. II, § 16, which provides that a vote of 60 percent of the members of each chamber is required to override the governor's veto).⁴

⁴ Although the Third Plan nominally gives the Republican Party less than 60 percent of the seats in the Ohio House and Senate, its asymmetric distribution of a large number of competitive seats makes it highly likely that the Republican Party would, nonetheless, achieve supermajorities in both chambers of the General Assembly, as the Ohio Supreme Court's proportionality calculus demonstrates. *See LWV III* at ¶ 42.

Based on this analysis, the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated the Third Plan "in its entirety" and ordered the Commission to "draft and adopt an entirely new General Assembly—district plan." *LWV III* at ¶ 44. It ordered the Commission to draft a remedial map in a public, transparent process with the aid of an independent map drawer. *Id*.

B. The Fourth Plan

The Commission adopted the Fourth Plan on March 28. *See* ECF No. 118. Unfortunately, the Fourth Plan is nearly identical to the Third Plan, and it violates Ohio's Constitution for the same reasons the Third Plan does. Tr. 136:3-138:6; 145:15-22 (Chris Glassburn: "They're essentially the same map."); 148:15-18; 174:19-175:4 ("They're almost identical They're essentially the same plan."). As between the Third and the Fourth Plan, 99.7 percent of the state's population remains in the same district; only 31,244 Ohioans out of nearly 11.8 million were placed into a different district. March 30 Affidavit of Dr. Jonathan Rodden ¶ 4, Exhibit 1 hereto. Indeed, even the Fourth Plan's proponents did not argue it was actually constitutional; rather, they argued it needed to be adopted so that the Commission did not entirely blow off a deadline imposed by the Ohio Supreme Court. *See* Tr. of Mar. 28, 2022 Comm'n Meeting Part 4, at 4, 8, https://redistricting.ohio.gov/assets/organizations/redistricting-commission/events/commission-meeting-march-28-2022-281/transcript-part-4.docx.

The Fourth Plan does not remedy the partisan fairness or proportionality violations of the Third Plan. In terms of the Section 6(A) and 6(B) requirements, the Fourth Plan's changes impact just three districts across the entire General Assembly: two in the House and one in the Senate. ECF No. 144-2 (showing reduction in Democratic toss-up seats in the House from nineteen in the Third Plan to seventeen in the Fourth Plan, with no Republican toss-up seats in either plan); Mar. 30 Rodden Aff. at 13-14, tbl. 2 (showing reduction in Democratic toss-up seats in the Senate from

seven in the Third Plan⁵ to six in the Fourth Plan, with no Republican toss-up seats in either plan). In all three districts, the Republican map drawers nudged the projected Democratic vote share to just above 52 percent. Mar. 30 Rodden Aff. ¶¶ 19-21. Setting aside the inherent superficiality of such a maneuver, the change did little to improve the Fourth Plan's proportionality. The Fourth Plan remains starkly asymmetrical and out of line with Ohioans' voting preferences. While the Fourth Plan (like the Third Plan) achieves nominal proportionality by placing 46 percent of seats above 50 percent Democratic vote share and 54 percent of seats below that figure, its allocation of competitive districts remains wildly disparate.

The Fourth Plan violates Section 6(A) because it preserves the Third Plan's partisan bias. The Fourth Plan does not contain a single Republican-leaning House or Senate seat that falls within the 50 percent to 52 percent vote share range. *. Id.* at 10-14. Every Republican-leaning seat in the plan is drawn in such a way that the Republicans in those districts are highly likely to win. *Id.* The treatment of Democratic-leaning seats is markedly different. The Fourth Plan creates only 28 House seats in which the Democratic vote share exceeds 52 percent. *Id.* Every other nominally "Democratic-leaning" district—17 in total, or about 38 percent of the total Democratic-leaning seats. *Falls within the 50 percent to 52 percent to 52 percent range. Id.* Likewise, the Fourth Plan contains six Senate seats that fall within that range, accounting for 40 percent of the total Democratic-leaning seats. *Id.* This asymmetry mirrors than in the invalidated Third Plan, which included 19 House seats and seven Senate seats in which the Democratic vote share fell between 50 percent and 52 percent. *See LWV III* at ¶ 32.

⁵ The Ohio Supreme Court refers to the Third Plan as the "Second Revised Plan," and Dr. Rodden's March 30 Affidavit follows that naming convention, and thus refers to the Fourth Plan as the "Third Revised Plan."

The Fourth Plan also violates Section 6(B). Its disparate allocation of competitive districts and lack of proportionality is clear when one excludes competitive districts from the seat count, as the Ohio Supreme Court did when considering prior plans. *See LWV II* at \P 62 ("competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share."); *LWV III* at \P 42 ("competitive" districts "must be excluded when assessing [a] plan's overall proportionality"). Under that analysis, the Fourth Plan creates just 28 Democratic seats and 54 Republican seats in the House (corresponding to a split of 34.1 percent Democratic and 65.9 percent Republican) and 9 Democratic and 18 Republican seats in the Senate (corresponding to a split of 33.3 percent Democratic and 66.7 percent Republican). Mar. 30 Rodden Aff. at 10-11, 13-14. As the Ohio Supreme Court has already held, this gross disparity in the allocation of competitive districts is neither inevitable nor required by Ohio's political geography, as demonstrated by other plans that achieve both partisan proportionality and symmetry while complying with Article XI's other requirements. *LVW I* at \P 124, 126, 131.

IV. The Court has at least two lawful plans before it: the Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan and the Rodden III Plan.

The Bennett Petitioners have presented evidence of two other General Assembly plans, each of which—in contrast to the unlawful Third and Fourth Plans—satisfies all substantive requirements of federal and Ohio law: a version of the plan jointly developed by the two independent map drawers retained by the full Commission, with a few corrections needed to finalize the plan (the "Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan") and a plan developed by Dr. Jonathan Rodden in litigation before the Ohio Supreme Court (the "Rodden III Plan"). If Ohio fails to adopt a plan in time, the Court should order the use of one of these two plans.

A. The Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan

On March 21, the Commission, in accordance with the directives of the Ohio Supreme Court in *LWV III*, retained two expert independent map drawers to produce a lawful General Assembly plan. Tr. 123:5-14. Those independent map drawers, one nominated by the Republicans on the Commission and one by the Democrats on the Commission, arrived in Ohio on March 23 and got to work late in the day after equipment was set up for them (it had not been in advance), and then worked over the next five plus days to produce General Assembly plans, which they then merged into a final plan on March 28. Tr. 126:12-14, 131:12-17; Minutes of Mar. 23, 2022 Meeting of the Ohio Redistricting Commission, https://www.redistricting.ohio.gov/assets/organizations/ redistricting-commission/events/commission-meeting-march-23-2022-276/minutes-1425.pdf. As described above, the Republican members of the Commission, over the strenuous objections of the other members, opted at the last minute to abandon the independent map drawers' work in favor of the Fourth Plan, but by then, the independent map drawers had largely completed the job, subject only to review for necessary finalization work, such as addressing minor technical issues. Tr. 133:10-20, 135:2-6.

In response to a question from the Court at the March 30 hearing, Dr. Rodden testified that at first glance, he thought the independent map drawers' plan looked compliant with the Ohio Constitution, but that he would want more time to examine the plan to verify whether it contained the kind of minor technical errors that he had encountered when making his own plan. Tr. 187:11-188:18. Since the March 30 hearing, Dr. Rodden has reviewed the independent map drawers' plan in detail and corrected certain technical errors in that plan. Apr. 5, 2022 Decl. of Jonathan Rodden ¶¶ 5-12, Exhibit 2 hereto. These corrections were minor: with one exception, they involved splits of townships and municipalities in unpopulated areas, in violation of Ohio's constitutional requirements, and even the exception required only a small reconfiguration of two districts. *Id.* at

¶¶ 7-8. None of Dr. Rodden's corrections altered the performance of the independent map drawers' plans in terms of compactness, number of split counties, expected partisan seat share, proportionality, or symmetry, and 99.9% of Ohio residents remain in the same district as in the independent map drawers' uncorrected plan. *Id.* at ¶¶ 11-12. In total, the corrections (to a plan with which he had no prior familiarity) took Dr. Rodden less than a day of work. *Id.* at ¶¶ 7-10.

The Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan complies with all substantive requirements of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at ¶ 10. It contains a ratio of Democratic-leaning to Republicanleaning seats that tracks Ohio's statewide partisan composition of 54 percent Republican and 46 percent Democratic. ECF No. 144-2. The House map allocates competitive seats with perfect symmetry, with three Democratic-leaning districts with a Democratic vote share between 50 percent and 52 percent and three Republican-leaning districts with a Republican vote share in that same range. Id. The Senate map is similarly symmetrical, with just two Democratic-leaning seats with a Democratic vote share in the 50 to 52 range and zero Republican-leaning seats with a Republican vote share in that range. Mar. 30 Rodden Aff. at 13-14, tbl. 2. The plan also proportionally allocates seats outside that range, with 42 Democratic and 51 Republican such seats in the House, corresponding to 45.2 percent Democratic and 54.8 percent Republican, and 13 Democratic and 18 Republican such seats in the Senate, corresponding to 41.9 percent Democratic and 58.1 percent Republican. Id. at 10-14, tbl. 1, 2; ECF No. 144-2. On each of these metrics, the Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan outperforms the Fourth Plan most recently adopted by the Commission. As to compactness, the Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan is more compact than the Fourth Plan on all three plan-wide measurements of compactness analyzed by Dr. Rodden (Reock, Polsby-Popper, and Area/Convex Hull) in both the House and Senate. ECF No. 144-2; Mar. 30 Rodden Aff. at 10-11, 13-14, tbl. 1, 2.

B. The Rodden III Plan

The Bennett Petitioners also present the Court with the Rodden III Plan, another General Assembly district plan that complies with all of the Ohio Constitution's substantive requirements, including those regarding equal population, technical line-drawing, partisan fairness, and traditional redistricting criteria.⁶ Notably, in February, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the implementation of a congressional map drawn by Dr. Rodden after a political branch impasse. *Carter*, 2022 WL 549106.

As Dr. Rodden's declaration and testimony at the March 30 hearing set forth in detail, the Rodden III Plan "complies with all of" the Ohio Constitution's substantive requirements. Tr. 167:1-2. It achieves greater proportionality than any plan adopted by the Commission to date, consistent with the state constitutional requirement that "[t]he statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio." Ohio Const. art. XI, § 6(B). In fact, the Rodden III Plan gets closer to proportionality than the Third Plan adopted by the Commission by *nearly 10%* in both chambers of the General Assembly, and closer to proportionality than the Fourth Plan by about 7% in the Senate and 8% in the House. Feb. 28 Aff. of Dr. Jonathan Rodden, ECF No. 107-3, ¶¶ 30, 34; Mar. 30 Rodden Decl. at ¶¶ 29-30; *see also LWV III* at ¶ 42 (explaining that "competitive" districts "must be excluded when assessing [a] plan's overall proportionality" (citing *LWV II* at ¶ 62) and holding that the Third Plan "does not 'correspond closely' to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio" and violates Article XI, Section 6(B)).

⁶ Earlier iterations of Dr. Rodden's plan were submitted to the Commission for its potential consideration on February 15, and substantially similar versions were submitted to the Commission and the Ohio Supreme Court as early as October 2021. The Commission never voted to consider, adopt, or reject Dr. Rodden's plan. Tr. 169:7-14.

Likewise, the Rodden III Plan was not "drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a[ny] political party," Ohio Const. art. XI, § 6(A), unlike the Third Plan. *See LWV III* at ¶ 24 ("Substantial and compelling evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the main goal of the individuals who drafted the second revised plan was to favor the Republican Party and disfavor the Democratic Party."). For example, whereas the Third Plan created 19 nominally Democratic-leaning House districts with Democratic vote shares between 50% and 52% (and no Republican-leaning House districts in the same category), the Rodden III Plan creates just two (and one such Republican-leaning House distribution of toss-up districts is evidence of an intentionally biased map, and it leads to partisan asymmetry."). Moreover, the Rodden III Plan surpasses the Commission's Third Plan and Fourth Plan on traditional redistricting criteria such as compactness and political subdivision splits, further demonstrating lack of partisan intent. ECF No. 144-2.

Finally, the Commission did not raise a single concern with the Rodden III Plan—under state law, federal law, or otherwise—in the entire time the Rodden III Plan was before it, and the Ohio Supreme Court has already cited Dr. Rodden's plans favorably in its opinions, *see LWV I* at ¶¶ 112-13, 126, 130; *LWV II* at ¶¶ 23 n.6, 32, 47.

V. Elections under the 2011 Plan would violate voters' rights under both federal and Ohio law.

At the March 30 hearing, the Court raised the possibility of ordering the continued use of the 2011 General Assembly plan. The Court should not do so. There is a reason no party had proposed the use of the 2011 Plan: to conduct elections under that plan would violate both federal and Ohio law.

As to federal law, the 2011 Plan is severely malapportioned in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, the unconstitutional malapportionment of Plaintiffs' districts under the

2011 Plan has long been the principal basis for Plaintiffs' claims in this case. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 59-61, 65-70; ECF No. 86 at ¶¶ 71-73, 78-83. And there is no dispute about it. Ohio's population distribution has changed dramatically since the 2010 census, and under the 2020 census, the 2011 Plan is severely malapportioned, with a maximum population deviation of 34.21 percent in the Ohio House and 25.26 percent in the Ohio Senate. Apr. 5 Rodden Decl. ¶ 13. A state legislative plan is "presumptively impermissible" under the one-person, one-vote rule if the "maximum population deviation between the largest and smallest district" exceeds 10 percent. Evenwel, 578 U.S. at 60 (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983)). And while greater deviations may be permissible if the state proves they are necessary to accommodate traditional redistricting principles like preserving political subdivisions, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a 16 percent maximum deviation in pursuit of those ends "may well approach tolerable limits." Mahan, 410 U.S. at 329. The Supreme Court has never upheld a plan with a population deviation as great as that in the 2011 Plan. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. at 444 (invalidating plan with "variations of 30% among senate districts and 40% among house districts"). And the population deviation in the 2011 Plan is the result of changes in Ohio's population distribution over the last decade, not of any intentional effort to further traditional redistricting principles. Secretary LaRose has made no effort to justify the use of a plan with such large deviations; to the contrary, he has conceded that using the 2011 Plan would raise a "clear malapportionment issue." Tr. 87:1-3.

If it were proposed today, the 2011 Plan would also violate the Ohio Constitution. The 2011 Plan was adopted before the 2015 amendments to the Ohio Constitution that created today's Article XI, which introduced the Commission as a body, certain line-drawing criteria, and the partisan-fairness requirements of Article XI, Section 6. When the 2011 Plan was adopted, General Assembly redistricting was the responsibility of a five member "apportionment board," and the

Ohio Constitution did not "mandate political neutrality in the reapportionment of house and senate districts." Wilson v. Kasich, 134 Ohio St. 3d 221, 226 (2012). The 2011 Plan was thus adopted in an overtly and extraordinarily partisan process, having been drafted in secret by the Republican members of the Apportionment Board in a blatant effort to maximize Republicans' partisan interests. See Relators' Merits Br. at 5-8, Bennett v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n, No. 2021-1198 (Ohio Oct. 29, 2022) (citing evidence); see generally Jim Slagle, Ohio Redistricting Transparency The Report: Elephant the Room (Dec. 12. 2011), in https://my.lwv.org/sites/default/files/leagues/wysiwyg/%5Bcurrent-user%3Aog-user-

node%3A1%3Atitle%5D/the_elephant_in_the_room_-_transparency_report.pdf. The partisan excesses of the 2011 Plan were a large part of the impetus for the 2015 amendments, and in the official statement for the 2015 amendments, Ohio voters were told that it would "[e]nd the partisan process for drawing Ohio House and Senate districts" that had prevailed before then, including in 2011. *LWV I*, at ¶ 56.

The 2011 Plan is thus maximally unlawful: it is malapportioned in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and it does not comply with the partisan neutrality provisions of Article XI that were adopted four years later to prevent a similar plan from being adopted in the future. It was not even adopted by the Commission, as the Commission did not exist at the time. There is no basis for the Court to impose the 2011 Plan as a remedy in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should wait as long as possible to allow Ohio to implement its own, lawful redistricting plan, but if no such plan is adopted, the Court should impose a lawful plan such as the Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan or the Rodden III Plan. Respectfully submitted,

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** Admitted pro hac vice*** Motion for admission pro hac vice pending

Counsel for Bennett Petitioners

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify a copy of the foregoing was served upon all counsel of record by means

of the Court's electronic filing system on this 6th Day of April, 2022.

/s/ Donald J. McTigue Donald J. McTigue (OH 0022849)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, et al.,	
Petitioners,	Case No. 2021-1198
v.	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S. Ct. Prac. R. 14.03]
Respondents.	1700.10.11.00

EXPERT AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN

I, Jonathan Rodden, having been duly sworn and cautioned according to law, hereby state that I am over the age of eighteen years and am competent to testify to the facts set forth below based on my personal knowledge and having personally examined all records referenced in this affidavit, and further state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- 1. For the purpose of this report, I have been asked to examine the third revised redistricting plan for the Ohio State House of Representatives and Ohio Senate, adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on March 28, 2022 (attached as Exhibits A and B) ("Third Revised Plan"). In previous reports, I have addressed the standards set forth in Article XI, Section 6, namely, that (A) "No general assembly district plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party," (B) "The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio," and (C) "General assembly districts shall be compact."
- 2. Additionally, I have been asked to assess an additional redistricting plan created by the independent map drawers appointed by the Ohio Redistricting Commission and submitted to the Commission on March 28, 2022 ("Independent Map Drawers' Plan").
- 3. As this Court stated in its January 12, 2022 opinion declaring invalid the General Assembly plan adopted by the Commission on September 16, 2021, "[i]f it is possible for a district plan to comply with Section 6 and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, the commission must adopt a plan that does so." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 88.
- 4. The Third Revised Plan is nearly identical to the Second Revised Plan, with 99.7 percent of Ohio residents placed in the same district as in the Second Revised Plan. In total, the Third Revised Plan changes only 451 census blocks, accounting for 31,244 people out of the state's

population of nearly 11.8 million, which amounts to a change affecting less than 0.3 percent of Ohio's population. As with the Second Revised Plan, the distribution of support for the two parties across districts in the Third Revised Plan is extremely unusual, indicating that Commissioners attempted to achieve nominal statewide partisan proportionality by generating a large number of districts with very slim Democratic majorities, while creating 0 districts with similarly slim Republican majorities. Under the Second Revised Plan, virtually all the majority-Republican seats are quite safe: 52 of 54 seats with Republican majorities in the Ohio House of Representatives would have Republican vote shares above 55 percent, and the same is true for 16 of 18 seats with Republican majorities in the Senate. The situation is starkly different for Democrats. Of 45 seats with nominal Democratic majorities, fewer than half-only 22-would have Democratic vote shares above 55 percent in the House, and the same would be true of only 7 of 15 "Democratic" seats in the Senate. These numbers are exactly the same as in the Second Revised Plan. This striking asymmetry in the distribution of competitive and non-competitive seats has the effect of creating what is likely to be a very hard ceiling on the number of seats that can possibly be won by Democratic candidates, preserving a comfortable Republican legislative majority even in the event of an exceedingly strong statewide performance by Democrats.

- 5. In my previous reports submitted in this matter, I discussed and analyzed "toss-up" districts: those seats where the expected vote share for a party is between 48 and 52 percent. The same asymmetry in the Third Revised Plan is obvious even when looking at only the narrowest toss-up districts for each party. Under the Third Revised Plan, every majority-Republican House seat would have a Republican vote share above 52 percent: all 54 seats in the House and all 18 seats in the Senate. On the other hand, only 28 of 45 majority-Democratic seats in the House (2 more than in the Second Revised Plan), and only 9 majority-Democratic seats (1 more than in the Second Revised Plan) in the Senate have Democratic vote shares above 52 percent. As a result, there are, as in the Second Revised Plan, a large number of ultracompetitive districts, which monolithically "lean" Democrat.
- 6. Using the Ohio Supreme Court's guidance on proportionality, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342 at ¶ 62. Accordingly, the Third Revised Plan is far from proportional.
- 7. If these toss-up seats are excluded, the Third Revised Plan reflects a 28D/54R advantage in the House, or an advantage of 34.1 percent to 65.9 percent of allocated seats in favor of Republicans. In the Senate, it reflects a 18R/9D advantage, which corresponds to a 33.3% percent to 66.7% percent advantage in Republicans' favor.
- 8. Moreover, like its predecessor, the Third Revised Plan produces an unusually large number of districts with Democratic vote shares of around 51 percent, indicating the application of a specific target. This is to say, it appears that the drawers of the Second Revised Plan were instructed to draw as many of the Democratic-leaning districts as possible to be as close as possible to 51 percent, and this unusual feature remains in the Third Revised Plan. Only 2 House districts and 1 Senate district have been altered in the Third Revised Plan so as to bump their Democratic vote share above 52 percent.

- 9. In order to ascertain whether it was possible for the Commission to comply with both Section 6 and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution, I submit my own alternative maps (with images attached as Exhibits C and D and submitted as native files to the Court on February 18, 2022).
- 10. The alternative maps attached as Exhibits C and D comply with each of the requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. They also produce a partisan breakdown that more closely corresponds to the preferences of Ohio voters. Using plan-wide averages, compactness scores reveal that these maps draw far more compact districts than those in the Third Revised Plan. They also split fewer counties and vote tabulation districts and are far more reflective of communities of interest. Moreover, these maps reveal that there is nothing about the political geography of Ohio that might explain an unusual bunching of districts with Democratic vote shares between 50 and 52 percent, or right at the 51 percent mark in particular, while simultaneously resulting in all Republican districts exceeding 52 percent.
- 11. I have not yet had the opportunity to assess whether the Independent Map Drawers' Plan meets all the criteria of the Ohio Constitution, specifically with respect to the issue of municipal splits. However, I have been asked to place this plan in comparative perspective with respect to compactness, splits of counties and vote tabulation districts, and the distribution of support for the two parties across districts. I conclude that the plan performs very well in reflecting the statewide preferences of Ohio voters. Like the Rodden Plan and Third Revised Plan, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan achieves nominal proportionality in both houses. It also allocates toss-up seats in a much more even-handed fashion than the Third Revised Plan. Excluding toss-up seats from the calculus, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan reflects a 42D/51R split in the House and a 13D/18R split in the Senate, corresponding to a 45.2 percent Democratic/54.8 percent Republican split in the House and 41.9 percent Democratic/58.1 percent Republican split in the Senate.
- 12. When it comes to traditional redistricting criteria, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan outperforms the Third Revised Plan on almost all dimensions. For example, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan has higher plan wide compactness scores than the Third Revised Plan in the House and Senate on every single measure, and splits the same number of counties and fewer Vote Tabulation Districts in the House; in the Senate, it splits fewer Vote Tabulation Districts as well, although it splits somewhat more counties. On traditional redistricting criteria, the plan I have submitted to the Court outperforms both the Third Revised Plan and the Independent Map Drawers' Plan.

II. QUALIFICATIONS

13. I am currently a tenured Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the founder and director of the Stanford Spatial Social Science Lab—a center for research and teaching with a focus on the analysis of geo-spatial data in the social sciences. I am engaged in a variety of research projects involving large, fine-grained geo-spatial data sets including ballots and election results at the level of polling places, individual records of registered voters, census data, and survey responses. I am also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Hoover Institution. Prior to my employment at Stanford, I was the Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I received my Ph.D. from Yale University and my B.A. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, both in political science. A copy of my current C.V. is included as Exhibit E.

- In my current academic work, I conduct research on the relationship between the patterns of 14. political representation, geographic location of demographic and partisan groups, and the drawing of electoral districts. I have published papers using statistical methods to assess political geography, balloting, and representation in a variety of academic journals including Statistics and Public Policy, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Virginia Law Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, the Annual Review of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics. One of these papers was selected by the American Political Science Association as the winner of the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best paper on political economy published in the last year, and another received an award from the American Political Science Association section on social networks. In 2021, I received a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, and received the Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations."
- 15. I have recently written a series of papers, along with my co-authors, using automated redistricting algorithms to assess partisan gerrymandering. This work has been published in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Election Law Journal*, and *Political Analysis*, and it has been featured in more popular publications like the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and *Boston Review*. I have recently completed a book, published by *Basic Books* in June of 2019, on the relationship between political districts, the residential geography of social groups, and their political representation in the United States and other countries that use winner-take-all electoral districts. The book was reviewed in *The New York Times*, *The New York Review of Books*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, and *The Atlantic*, among others.
- 16. I have expertise in the use of large data sets and geographic information systems (GIS), and I conduct research and teaching in the area of applied statistics related to elections. My PhD students frequently take academic and private sector jobs as statisticians and data scientists. I frequently work with geo-coded voter files and other large administrative data sets, including in recent papers published in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* and *The New England Journal of Medicine*. I have developed a national data set of geo-coded precinct-level election results that has been used extensively in policy-oriented research related to redistricting and representation.
- 17. I have been accepted and testified as an expert witness in several election law and redistricting cases: *Romo v. Detzner*, No. 2012-CA-000412 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2012); *Mo. State Conference of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist.*, No. 4:2014-CV-02077 (E.D. Mo. 2014); *Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, No. 3:15-CV-00357 (E.D. Va. 2015); *Democratic Nat'l Committee et al. v. Hobbs et al.*, No. 16-1065-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz. 2016); *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-cv-00852-REP-AWA-BMK (E.D. Va. 2014); and *Jacobson et al. v. Lee*, No. 4:18-cv-00262 (N.D. Fla. 2018). I also worked with a coalition of academics to file Amicus Briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court in *Gill v. Whitford*, No. 16-1161, and *Rucho v. Common Cause*, No. 18-422. Much of the testimony
in these cases had to do with geography, electoral districts, voting, ballots, and election administration. I recently drew a Pennsylvania Congressional redistricting plan, known as the "Carter Plan," that was chosen by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for implementation. *Carter v. Chapman*, No. 7 MM 2022, 2022 WL 549106 (Pa. Feb. 23, 2022).

III. DATA SOURCES

18. I have collected statewide election data for 2012 to 2020 from the Ohio Secretary of State. I also accessed precinct-level election results from the Ohio Secretary of State for statewide elections from 2016 to 2020 that were matched to 2020 Ohio vote tabulation districts by a team at Harvard University called the Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology Project.¹ Additionally, I accessed the Third Revised Plan approved by the Commission and uploaded to the web page of the Ohio Redistricting Commission, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits A and B, as well as the Independent Map Drawers' Plan, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits G and H.² For the analysis conducted in this report, I use two software packages: Stata and Maptitude for Redistricting. In creating my maps, I used the same U.S. Census redistricting data used by the Ohio Redistricting Commission, as archived in the "Ohio University Common and Unified Redistricting Database."³

IV. WHAT HAS CHANGED IN THE THIRD REVISED PLAN?

- 19. The first thing to notice about the Third Revised Plan is that it is virtually identical to the Second Revised Plan. I have added up the block-level population that falls into the same district in both plans, as well as the population that has been moved to a different district. For the Ohio House of Representatives, 99.74 percent of the population remains in the same district in the two plans. The boundaries for the House districts in the Third Revised Plan are exactly the same as in the Second Revised Plan throughout the state, with two very small exceptions. Figure 1 below provides a map of the boundaries of the Second Revised Plan in red, and the Third Revised Plan in black. When looking at the entire state, it is very difficult to appreciate any differences. To see the slight changes, it is necessary to zoom in on the northern part of Franklin County (Figure 2) and on the Canton area (Figure 3).
- 20. First, there has been a very minor movement of a boundary in the area of Worthington and Upper Arlington in Northern Franklin County. In Figure 2 also, the boundaries of the Second Revised Plan are shown in red, and the boundaries of the Third Revised Plan are shown in black. Only a handful of census blocks are involved in this change. This small change did not alter any of the partisan metrics discussed in this report for the House—both Districts 7 and 8 are extremely Democratic districts. However, for the Senate, this small maneuver brought Senate District 16 from an average Democratic vote share of 51.1 percent in the Second Revised Plan to 52.1 percent in the Third Revised Plan.
- 21. Figure 3 shows that some small changes were also made near Canton. First, District 49 gained a very small sliver of urban population and shed a small number of rural voters. This

¹ https://alarm-redist.github.io/posts/2021-08-10-census-2020/

² https://redistricting.ohio.gov/maps

³ https://www.redistricting.ohio.gov/resources

maneuver brough District 49 from an average Democratic vote share of 51.6 percent to 52.2 percent. Additionally, District 59, which combines Youngstown with surrounding rural areas, simply shed a few rural voters, bringing the average Democratic vote share from 51.9 percent to 52.8 percent. These changes did not have any implications for the Senate districts. Other than these very small changes, the Second and Third Revised Plans are identical.



Figure 1: Boundaries of Second and Third Revised Plans



Figure 2: Northern Franklin County



Figure 3: Canton Area

V. CONTRASTING THE REVISED PLANS, THE RODDEN III PLAN, AND THE INDEPENDENT MAP DRAWERS' PLAN

22. According to *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 108, the Commission must attempt to draw a plan with a seat share that "closely corresponds" to a breakdown of 54 percent in favor of Republicans and 46 percent in favor of Democrats. As this Court has held in interpretating Section 6(B)'s proportionality requirement, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342 at ¶ 62.

- 23. Determining the proportion of districts that favor each party, based on consideration of the relevant elections identified in Article XI, Section 6, requires an aggregation of the precinct-level results of these past elections to the boundaries of a map's proposed districts. However, precinct-level election results linked with geo-spatial boundaries were not available for the 2012 and 2014 elections, as the Commission itself acknowledged in its initial Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement (accompanying the since-struck down September 16, 2021 General Assembly plan), attached as Exhibit F. As discussed in my previous reports to this Court, using the full statewide election results from 2012 to 2020, the statewide preferences of Ohio voters must be translated into state legislative maps in which 45.9 percent of seats favor Democrats and 54.1 percent of seats favor Republicans. Since there are 99 seats in the Ohio House of Representatives, a statewide vote share of 45.9 percent would be associated with 45.44 Democratic seats, which rounds down to 45 seats. Similarly, a 45.9 percent vote share would be associated with about 15.15 Democratic seats in the 33-member Ohio Senate, which rounds down to 15 seats.
- 24. It is my understanding that the Commission's approach to evaluating the partisanship of each district was to add up all the votes cast for each of the two major parties in each statewide election and divide by the total number of votes cast for both of the two major parties, summing over all of those elections.⁴ I have calculated this measure of district-level partisanship for each district in the Third Revised Plan. In Table 1, I include these metrics for the Commission's First Revised Plan, the Second Revised Plan, the Third Revised Plan, the plan that I have submitted to the Commission and the Court (the "Rodden Plan"), and the Independent Map Drawers' Plan. Table 2 provides the same information for the Ohio Senate.
- 25. For each plan, Figure 4 also provide histograms that allow one to visualize the distribution of support for the two parties across the House districts in each proposed plan. That is, the districts are divided into bins according to a specific narrow range of average Democratic vote share, and the height of the bin corresponds to the number of districts that fall into that bin. Figure 5 displays the same information for the Ohio Senate.

⁴ In my reports concerning the first two plans approved by the Commission, I calculated vote shares of the two major parties in each election in each district, and then took an average across all 9 statewide elections. This approach gives equal weight to each election, regardless of turnout, whereas the approach taken by the Commission, and reproduced here for purposes of comparability, gives greater weight to presidential election years with higher turnout. The two approaches yield very similar results, and lead to very similar inferences, but exact numbers of seats above and below certain thresholds can sometimes vary by a single seat.

	Commission First Revised Plan	Commission Second Revised Plan	Commission Third Revised Plan	Rodden Plan	Independent Map Drawers' Plan
Average compactness scores					
(Higher scores = more compact)					
Reock	0.40	0.39	0.39	0.41	0.41
Polsby-Popper	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.36	0.33
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.79	0.77
Number of split counties	37	38	38	32	38
Number of split VTDs	112	135	135	96	118
# of seats with two-party	42	45	45	12	45
Democratic vote share >.5	42	45	45	42	45
Expressed as percentage of seats	42.4%	45.45%	45.45%	42.4%	45.45%
# of seats with two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5	57	54	54	57	54
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.5%	54.5%	57.6%	54.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.52	28	26	28	40	42
Expressed as a percentage of seats	28.3%	26.3%	28.28%	40.4%	42.4%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.48	57	54	54	56	51
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.55%	54.55%	56.6%	51.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .5	0	0	0	1	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	3.0%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5		10	47	2	
and .52	14	19	17	2	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	14.1%	19.19%	17.17%	2.0%	3.0%
# of seats with two-party	74	22	22	20	24
Expressed as a percentage of sector	24 21 2%	۷۲ ⁄۲۲ ۲۲	۷۲ ⁄۲۲ ۲۲	29 20 20/	24 21 20/
LAPIESSEU as a percentage of seats	24.2/0	22.22/0	22.22/0	29.3/0	24.270

Table 1: Plan Statistics, Ohio House of Representatives

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# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.45	54	52	52	51	48
Expressed as percentage of seats	54.5%	52.53%	52.53%	51.5%	48.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5					
and .55	18	23	23	13	21
Expressed as percentage of seats	18.2%	23.23%	23.23%	13.1%	21.2%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .45					
and .5	3	2	2	6	6
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	2.02%	2.02%	6.1%	6.1%

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Figure 4: Histograms of Democratic Vote Share, House Plans

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	Commission First Revised Plan	Commission Second Revised Plan	Commission Third Revised Plan	Rodden Plan	Independent Map Drawers' Plan
Average compactness scores					
(Higher scores = more compact)					
Reock	0.41	0.38	0.38	0.44	0.42
Polsby-Popper	0.3	0.28	0.28	0.37	0.31
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.78	0.76
Number of split counties	17	15	15	15	22
Number of split VTDs	41	57	58	22	46
# of seats with two-party					
Democratic vote share >.5	13	15	15	15	15
Expressed as percentage of seats	39.4%	45.45%	45.45%	45.5%	45.5%
# of seats with two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5	20	18	18	18	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	60.6%	54.5%	54.5%	54.5%	54.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.52	8	8	9	12	13
Expressed as a percentage of seats	24.2%	24.2%	27.3%	36.4%	39.4%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.48	19	18	18	18	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.55%	54.55%	54.5%	54.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .5	1	0	0	0	0
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5 and .52	5	7	6	З	2
Expressed as percentage of seats	15.2%	, 21.21%	18.18%	9.1%	6.1%
	20.2/0	_1.21/0	20.20,0	0.1/0	0.170

Table 2: Plan Statistics, Ohio Senate

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# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.55	7	7	7	11	6
Expressed as a percentage of seats	21.2%	21.21%	21.21%	33.3%	18.2%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.45	18	16	16	17	15
Expressed as percentage of seats	54.5%	48.48%	48.48%	51.5%	45.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5 and .55	6	8	8	4	9
Expressed as percentage of seats	18.2%	24.24%	24.24%	12.1%	27.3%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .45 and .5	2	2	2	1	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	6.1%	6.06%	6.06%	3.0%	9.1%



Figure 5: Histograms of Democratic Vote Share, Senate Plans

- 26. Reviewing the data above, a few things are immediately apparent. Since the Second and Third Revised Plans are, again, virtually identical, with only the small changes mentioned above, the number of seats in each vote share range (e.g., 50-52 percent Democratic, greater than 52% Democratic) remains the same with the exceptions of only the two seats in the House mentioned above (49 and 59), and the one in the Senate (16). In each case, the seats were moved from around 51 percent Democratic to just above 52 percent.
- 27. The similarity between the Second and Third Revised Plans is also clear from the histograms representing the number of seats at each level of Democratic vote share, which shows that the Third Revised Plan continues the Second Revised Plan's strategy of bunching Democratic seats very close to the 50% line. Once again, this reflects a conscious attempt to

achieve the appearance of partisan proportionality, while in actuality ensuring disproportionate Republican majorities.

- 28. Both the Rodden Plan and the Independent Map Drawers' Plan help to confirm that this bunching of Democratic seats in the toss-up range was not the result of Article XI's requirements or Ohio's political geography. In both alternative plans, in both the House and Senate, there is a much more even distribution of seats across the histogram.
- 29. As this Court has held in interpretating Section 6(B)'s proportionality requirement, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342 at ¶ 62. Under either approach, the Third Revised Plan, like its predecessor, is highly disproportionate. If competitive districts are excluded (i.e., if any seats between 48 and 52 percent Democratic vote share are excluded from the analysis), the Third Revised Plan produces a breakdown of 9D/18R in the Senate (or 33.3 percent Democratic/66.7 percent Republican) and 28D/54R in the House (or 34.1 percent Democratic/65.9 percent Republican). Nor are competitive seats allocated to each party in proportion to their vote share. The Third Revised Plan contains 17 Democratic-leaning toss-ups and no Republican leaning toss-ups in the House, and 6 Democratic-leaning toss-ups and no Republican-leaning toss-ups in the Senate. In both houses, the Third Revised Plan contains more Democratic-leaning toss-up districts than the First Revised Plan, which was struck down by this Court for its disparate allocation of tossup seats.
- 30. The Rodden Plan and Independent Map Drawers' Plan, by contrast, distribute toss-up districts more evenly. In the House, the Rodden Plan contains fewer toss-up districts overall, with 1 Republican-leaning toss-up district and 2 Democratic-leaning toss-up district in the House and 0 Republican-leaning and 3 Democratic-leaning toss-up districts in the Senate. The Independent Map Drawers Plan contains 3 Republican-leaning toss-ups and 3 Democratic-leaning toss-ups in the House and 0 Republican-leaning toss-ups in the Senate. Excluding these toss-up districts, both come much closer to proportionality. For the Rodden Plan, the non-toss-up seat count amounts to a 41.7%/58.3% split in the House and a 40%/60% split in the Senate. For the Independent Map Drawers' Plan, this comes to a 45.2%/54.8% split in the House and a 41.9%/58.1% split in the Senate.
- 31. As discussed in my previous submissions to this Court, the disparity in the allocation of tossup districts between Democrats and Republicans in the Third Remedial Plan (similar to its predecessors), ensures Republicans will attain disproportionate success in General Assembly elections. Imagine a massive uniform swing across all districts of 5 percentage points in favor of the Republican Party. Assuming that the partisanship score being considered here is a perfect predictor of legislative victories, this would yield an additional 23 House seats, providing the Republican Party with 78 percent of the seats. However, a similar swing toward the Democratic Party—providing it with a statewide majority of votes—would yield a pickup of only 2 seats. That is to say, a vote share of around 51 percent in favor of Democrats would generate a seat share of only 47 percent, and that is only if we make the very unrealistic assumption that Democratic candidates win *every single one* of the 17 House districts with a

Democratic vote share between 50 and 52 percent. This striking asymmetry in the treatment of the two parties emerges from an effort to create a large number of bare majority Democratic seats while taking care to avoid the creation of competitive Republican-leaning seats, ensuring that Republican-leaning seats are very comfortable.

- 32. Thus, just like its predecessors, the purported Democratic seat count in the Third Remedial Plan constitutes a ceiling for Democrats, while the purported Republican seat count constitutes a floor. Even in the best electoral environments, Democrats cannot hope to win more than their proportional seat count, while Republicans are nearly guaranteed to exceed their proportional seat count across almost all electoral environments.
- 33. Tables 2 and 3 also include information about traditional redistricting criteria, including splits of counties and voting tabulation districts (VTDs) as well as average planwide compactness metrics. The Rodden Plan outperforms the Third Revised Plan on every single traditional redistricting criterion, while the Independent Map Drawers' Plan outperforms the Third Revised Plan on most. On compactness, the Rodden Plan is superior to both the Third Revised Plan and Independent Map Drawers' Plan in both the House and Senate under all three measures I analyzed (Reock, Polsby-Popper and Area/Convex Hull). The Independent Map Drawers' Plan also outperforms the Third Revised Plan on all three measures in both houses.
- 34. Another relevant redistricting criterion is the number of split counties or voting tabulation districts. As in my previous submissions to the Court, I do not consider a county to be split if multiple districts are entirely contained within the county such that no district crosses the county boundary. Out of the three plans, the Rodden Plan splits fewer counties and Vote Tabulation Districts in the House than any of the other plans. In the Senate, the Rodden Plan ties the Third Revised Plan on county splits, but splits substantially fewer Voter Tabulation Districts. The Independent Map Drawers' Plan splits the same numbers of counties in the House as the Third Revised Plan, but a few more counties in the Senate. It splits fewer Vote Tabulation Districts than the Third Revised Plan in both houses.

V. CONCLUSION

35. The Third Revised Plan is nearly identical to the Second Revised Plan, already invalidated by this Court in *LWV III*. With the exception of moving a very small number of voters in order to move a total of three seats in the entire General Assembly from around 51 percent to just above 52 percent Democratic vote share, the Second and Third Revised Plans are in fact the same. Like the Second Revised Plan, the Third Revised Plan disparately allocates toss-up seats between Democrats and Republicans, thereby ensuring Republicans a disproportionate share of the seats in almost all foreseeable electoral environments. The Third Revised Plan therefore contains nearly precisely the same features as those identified by this Court as reasons it invalidated the Second Revised Plan in *LWV III*.

State of Texas

Jonathan Rodden

County of <u>Travis</u>

Jonathan Rodden

Sworn to before me this ______ day of March 2022.

Notary Public



My commission expires _____11/23/2024

Notary Public, State of Texas

Notarized online using audio-video communication

Exhibit A



Exhibit B



Exhibit C

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Exhibit D

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Exhibit E

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Personal

Born on August 18. 1971, St. Louis, MO.

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Education

Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, 2000.Fulbright Scholar, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993–1994.B.A., Political Science, University of Michigan, 1993.

Academic Positions

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2020-present.

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Director, Spatial Social Science Lab, Stanford University, 2012–present.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2010–2012.

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2007–2012.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, CA, 2006–2007.

Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT, 2003-2006.

Visiting Scholar, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 2004.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT, 1999–2003.

Instructor, Department of Political Science and School of Management, Yale University, 1997–1999.

Publications

Books

Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Divide. Basic Books, 2019.

Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming. Co-edited with Erik Wibbels, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Winner, Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007; Martha Derthick Award for lasting contribution to the study of federalism, 2021.

Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press, 2003. Co-edited with Gunnar Eskeland and Jennie Litvack.

Peer Reviewed Journal Articles

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The Achilles Heel of Plurality Systems: Geography and Representation in Multi-Party Democracies, 2015, *American Journal of Political Science* 59,4: 789-805 (with Ernesto Calvo). Winner, Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association.

Case: 2:22-cv-00773-ALM-ART-BJB Doc #: 161-1 Filed: 04/06/22 Page: 30 of 43 PAGEID #: 4615

Why has U.S. Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960?, 2014, *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings* May 2014 (with Nicholas Bloom, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Scott Baker, and Steven Davis).

Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 2013, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8: 239-269 (with Jowei Chen).

How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?, 2012, *Journal of Politics* 74, 1: 203-219 (with Chris Warshaw).

Representation and Redistribution in Federations, 2011, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108, 21:8601-8604 (with Tiberiu Dragu).

Dual Accountability and the Nationalization of Party Competition: Evidence from Four Federatons, 2011, *Party Politics* 17, 5: 629-653 (with Erik Wibbels).

The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, 2010, Annual Review of Political Science 13: 297–340.

Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 2009, *Economics and Politics* 22,1: 37–67 (with Erik Wibbels).

Getting into the Game: Legislative Bargaining, Distributive Politics, and EU Enlargement, 2009, *Public Finance and Management* 9, 4 (with Deniz Aksoy).

The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting, 2008. *American Political Science Review* 102, 2: 215–232 (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder).

Does Religion Distract the Poor? Income and Issue Voting Around the World, 2008, *Comparative Political Studies* 41, 4: 437–476 (with Ana Lorena De La O).

Purple America, 2006, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20,2 (Spring): 97–118 (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder).

Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence from the U.S. States, 2006, *British Journal of Political Science* 36, 3: 527–47 (with Michael Ebeid).

Distributive Politics in a Federation: Electoral Strategies, Legislative Bargaining, and Government Coalitions, 2004, *Dados* 47, 3 (with Marta Arretche, in Portuguese).

Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement, 2004, *Comparative Politics* 36, 4: 481-500. (Portuguese version, 2005, in *Revista de Sociologia e Politica* 25).

Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government, 2003, *International Organization* 57 (Fall), 695–729.

Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-tiered Systems, 2003, *World Politics* 54, 4 (July): 494–531 (with Erik Wibbels).

The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World, 2002, *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 670–687.

Strength in Numbers: Representation and Redistribution in the European Union, 2002, *European Union Politics* 3, 2: 151–175.

Does Federalism Preserve Markets? *Virginia Law Review* 83, 7 (with Susan Rose-Ackerman). Spanish version, 1999, in *Quorum* 68.

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Working Papers

Elections, Political Polarization, and Economic Uncertainty, NBER Working Paper 27961 (with Scott Baker, Aniket Baksy, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven Davis).

Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Working Paper 2009/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations, Working Paper 2010/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (with Tiberiu Dragu).

Chapters in Books

Political Geography and Representation: A Case Study of Districting in Pennsylvania (with Thomas Weighill), in *Political Geometry*, edited by Moon Duchin and Olivia Walch, forthcoming 2021, Springer.

Keeping Your Enemies Close: Electoral Rules and Partisan Polarization, in *The New Politics of Insecurity*, edited by Frances Rosenbluth and Margaret Weir, forthcoming 2021, Cambridge University Press.

Decentralized Rule and Revenue, 2019, in Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, eds., *Decentralized Governance and Accountability*, Cambridge University Press.

Geography and Gridlock in the United States, 2014, in Nathaniel Persily, ed. *Solutions to Political Polarization in America*, Cambridge University Press.

Can Market Discipline Survive in the U.S. Federation?, 2013, in Daniel Nadler and Paul Peterson, eds, *The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U.S. and European Federalism*, Brookings Press.

Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, 2012, in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel, Jr., eds, *When States Go Broke: The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis,* Cambridge University Press.

Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution, 2010, in Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa, and Albert Sole Olle, eds., *The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows*, Edward Elgar.

Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics, 2009, in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press.

The Political Economy of Federalism, 2006, in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford University Press.

Fiscal Discipline in Federations: Germany and the EMU, 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

The Political Economy of Pro-cyclical Decentralised Finance (with Erik Wibbels), 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

Globalization and Fiscal Decentralization, (with Geoffrey Garrett), 2003, in Miles Kahler and David Lake, eds., *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition*, Princeton University Press: 87-109. (Updated version, 2007, in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis, and Annalisa Zinn, eds., *Globalization and Self-Determination: Is the Nation-State under Siege?* Routledge.)

Introduction and Overview (Chapter 1), 2003, in Rodden et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

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Soft Budget Constraints and German Federalism (Chapter 5), 2003, in Rodden, et al, *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil (Chapter 7), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Lessons and Conclusions (Chapter 13), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Online Interactive Visualization

Stanford Election Atlas, 2012 (collaboration with Stephen Ansolabehere at Harvard and Jim Herries at ESRI)

Other Publications

Supporting Advanced Manufacturing in Alabama, Report to the Alabama Innovation Commission, Hoover Institution, 2021.

How America's Urban-Rural Divide has Shaped the Pandemic, 2020, Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.

An Evolutionary Path for the European Monetary Fund? A Comparative Perspective, 2017, Briefing paper for the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations: A Research Report, 2009, in *World Report* on *Fiscal Federalism*, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

On the Migration of Fiscal Sovereignty, 2004, PS: Political Science and Politics July, 2004: 427–431.

Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, *PREM Note* 41, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C. (July).

Decentralization and Hard Budget Constraints, *APSA-CP* (Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association) 11:1 (with Jennie Litvack).

Book Review of The Government of Money by Peter Johnson, Comparative Political Studies 32,7: 897-900.

Fellowships, Honors, and Grants

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2021.

Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations," 2021.

National Institutes of Health, funding for "Relationship between lawful handgun ownership and risk of homicide victimization in the home," 2021.

National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research, funding for "Cohort Study Of Firearm-Related Mortality Among Cohabitants Of Handgun Owners." 2020.

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT), GA004696, 2017-2018.

Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant, 2015.

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Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association, 2016.

Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.

General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.

Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.

Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, beginning Fall 2010.

Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 2009.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2008.

United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.

Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections, public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).

MIT Dean's Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.

Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize the conference, "European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective," held at Harvard University, November 4, 2000.

Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.

Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.

Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the University of Michigan, 1993.

W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan, 1993.

Other Professional Activities

Selection committee, best paper award, American Journal of Political Science.

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.

Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.

Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.

Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.

Courses

Undergraduate

Politics, Economics, and Democracy Introduction to Comparative Politics Introduction to Political Science

Political Science Scope and Methods

Institutional Economics

Spatial Approaches to Social Science

Graduate

Political Economy Political Economy of Institutions Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization Politics and Geography

Consulting

2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.

2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID, Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).

2019: Written expert testimony in *McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann,* United States District Court, Mississippi.

2019: Expert witness in Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* No. 4:18-cv-002510, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

2017: Expert witness in *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

2017: Expert witness in *Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al.*, No. 2:16-CV-01065, United States District Court for Arizona.

2016: Expert witness in *Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.

2016: Expert witness in *Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.

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2014-2015: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al.,* 2012-CA-002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).

2013-2014: Expert witness in *Romo v Detzner*, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County (Florida Congressional redistricting case).

2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.

2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.

2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.

2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank decentralization and safety net programs.

2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.

1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for *World Development Report*, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentralization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator on review of subnational adjustment lending.

Last updated: September 23, 2021

Exhibit F

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Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement

Pursuant to Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Redistricting Commission issues the following statement:

The Commission determined that the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio predominately favor Republican candidates.

The Commission considered statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years. There were sixteen such contests. When considering the results of each of those elections, the Commission determined that Republican candidates won thirteen out of sixteen of those elections resulting in a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates of 81% and a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates of 19%. When considering the number of votes cast in each of those elections for Republican and Democratic candidates, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is 54% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is 46%. Thus, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is between 54% and 81% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is between 19% and 46%. The Commission obtained publicly available geographic data for statewide partisan elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020. Publicly available geographic data for those elections was not available for elections in 2012 and 2014. Using this data, the Commission adopted the final general assembly district plan, which contains 85 districts (64.4%) favoring Republican candidates and 47 districts (35.6%) favoring Democratic candidates out of a total of 132 districts. Accordingly, the statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each political party corresponds closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

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The final general assembly district plan adopted by the Commission complies with all of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution. The Commission's attempt to meet the aspirational standards of Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution did not result in any violation of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution.

Exhibit G

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Exhibit H

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL GONIDAKIS, MARY PARKER
MARGARET CONDITT, BETH
VANDERKOOI, LINDA SMITH,
DELBERT DUDUIT, THOMAS W. KIDD
JR., DUCIA HAMM,

Plaintiffs,

BRIA BENNETT, REGINA C. ADAMS, KATHLEEN M. BRINKMAN, MARTHA CLARK, SUSANNE L. DYKE, MERYL NEIMAN, HOLLY OYSTER, CONSTANCE RUBIN, EVERETT TOTTY, Case No. 2:22-cv-00773

Judge Amul R. Thapar Judge Algenon L. Marbley Judge Benjamin J. Beaton

Intervenor-Plaintiffs,

v.

FRANK LAROSE, in his capacity as Ohio Secretary of State,

Defendant.

DECLARATION OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN

I, Jonathan Rodden, hereby declare as follows:

- 1. I am currently a tenured Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the founder and director of the Stanford Spatial Social Science Lab—a center for research and teaching with a focus on the analysis of geo-spatial data in the social sciences. I am engaged in a variety of research projects involving large, fine-grained geo-spatial data sets including ballots and election results at the level of polling places, individual records of registered voters, census data, and survey responses. I am also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Hoover Institution. Prior to my employment at Stanford, I was the Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I received my Ph.D. from Yale University and my B.A. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, both in political science. A copy of my current C.V. is included as Exhibit A.
- 2. I have submitted expert affidavits in three redistricting cases in the Ohio Supreme Court this cycle: *Bennett v. Ohio Redistricting Commission*, Case No. 2021-1198 (state legislative redistricting); *Adams v. DeWine*, Case No. 2021-1428 (congressional

redistricting); *Neiman v. LaRose*, Case No. 2022-0298 (congressional redistricting). My expert affidavits in *Bennett*, which are most relevant to this proceeding, are available at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Clerk/ecms/#/caseinfo/2021/1198 and attached as Exhibits B-F for convenience.

- 3. As part of my expert work in *Bennett*, I drew a General Assembly district plan in compliance with traditional redistricting criteria as well as substantive redistricting criteria set forth in Article XI of the Ohio Constitution and federal law. That plan (the "Rodden III Plan") was submitted to the Ohio Redistricting Commission on February 15, 2022 and is available on the Commission's website at https://redistricting.ohio.gov/assets/district-maps/district-map-773.zip. For ease of reference, images of the House map and Senate map are attached as Exhibit G. The Rodden III Plan was also submitted to the Ohio Supreme Court with the Bennett Petitioners' Objections to the Third Plan, filed on February 28.
- 4. As I testified on March 30 before this Court, I had submitted substantially similar versions of the same plan to the Ohio Supreme Court earlier in the *Bennett* litigation. The nature of the technical changes made to these earlier plans to create the Rodden III Plan are described in a letter to the Ohio Redistricting Commission, included in the aforementioned zip folder on the Commission's website, *see supra* ¶ 3, and attached as Exhibit H.
- 5. On March 28, counsel for the Bennett Petitioners sent me the block assignment files for the Independent Map Drawers' Plan, available as "Johnson McDonald Independent Plan 328 Final" on the Redistricting Commission's website at https://www.redistricting.ohio.g ov/assets/district-maps/district-map-1180.zip.
- 6. Article XI, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution contains a number of technical requirements governing, among other things, whether and when counties and other political subdivisions may be "split" in the course of drawing General Assembly districts. These rules are rather complex and, given the constraints of map drawing software and the ways in which Ohio political subdivisions intersect and overlap, fairly easy to violate in minor ways, particularly when drawing a map under significant time constraints.
- 7. On April 2, I reviewed the Independent Map Drawers' Plan for technical compliance with the substantive redistricting criteria set forth in Article XI of the Ohio Constitution. I saw that there were certain instances, similar to those in earlier versions of my own plan, where (1) a few small sets of largely unpopulated census blocks were separated from their township and municipalities, resulting in inadvertent splits and (2) certain districts were drawn to follow township boundaries instead of municipal boundaries, contrary to common Ohio redistricting practice. It took me about five hours to review and correct the Independent Map Drawers' House Map with respect to these technical errors, which I would characterize as minor—the kinds of "cleanup" issues common to resolve at the conclusion of the map drawing process.
- 8. After correcting the minor errors, I saw that District 68 still split two municipal corporations and/or townships (Berkshire Township and Delaware City), which is greater than the number allowed by Article XI, Section 3(D)(3) of the Ohio Constitution. Because District 68 was already quite underpopulated and deviated 4.79 percent from the ideal

population of a House district, I could not simply "unsplit" one of the political subdivisions at issue. Instead, I spent about one hour reconfiguring the two districts so that they each included only one split of a municipal corporation or township, while also being within the 5 percent population deviation required by the Ohio Constitution and, as I understand it, federal law.

- 9. On April 3, I spent about two hours reviewing my work and combining the updated House districts to form a constitutionally compliant Senate Map.
- 10. Attached as Exhibit I are images of my corrected version of the Independent Map Drawers' Plan, for which block assignment files are available at https://www.dropbox.com/sh/hh640uk0cfja48v/AADt65LWrnWFnqYAYu4xAoAZa?dl=0. It only took me about eight hours to make all requisite edits to the Independent Map Drawers' Plan, which is now, with my corrections, compliant with the substantive requirements of the Ohio Constitution to the best of my knowledge. As reflected by the fact that I was able to complete this work in a matter of hours, it was not particularly difficult to finalize the Independent Map Drawers' Plan.
- 11. My "Corrected Independent Map Drawers' Plan" places 99.9 percent of Ohio residents in the same district as in the Independent Map Drawers' Plan that was posted to the Commission's website on March 28.
- 12. None of the edits that I made affect the performance of the Independent Map Drawers' Plan with respect to compactness, number of split counties or vote tabulation districts (VTDs), or expected partisan seat share—including proportionality and symmetry. Accordingly, all of the metrics for the Independent Map Drawers' House Map to which I testified on March 30 remain accurate.
- 13. I also reviewed the population of each district in the 2011 General Assembly Plan. Exhibit J provides a table showing the 2020 census population for each Ohio House district under the 2011 Plan. Exhibit K provides a similar table for each Ohio Senate district under the 2011 Plan. As shown in Exhibits J and K, the maximum deviation for Ohio House districts is 34.21 percent, and the maximum deviation for Ohio Senate districts is 25.26 percent.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 5th day of April, 2022.

-DocuSigned by: Jonathan Rodden R4A480BE8448417...

Dr. Jonathan Rodden

Rodden Decl. Ex. A

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Jonathan Rodden

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Personal

Born on August 18. 1971, St. Louis, MO.

United States Citizen.

Education

Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, 2000.Fulbright Scholar, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993–1994.B.A., Political Science, University of Michigan, 1993.

Academic Positions

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2020-present.

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Director, Spatial Social Science Lab, Stanford University, 2012-present.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2010–2012.

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2007–2012.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, CA, 2006–2007.

Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT, 2003–2006.

Visiting Scholar, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 2004.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT, 1999–2003.

Instructor, Department of Political Science and School of Management, Yale University, 1997–1999.

Publications

Books

Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Divide. Basic Books, 2019.

Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming. Coedited with Erik Wibbels, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Winner, Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007; Martha Derthick Award for lasting contribution to the study of federalism, 2021.

Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press, 2003. Co-edited with Gunnar Eskeland and Jennie Litvack.

Peer Reviewed Journal Articles

Who Registers? Village Networks, Household Dynamics, and Voter Registration in Rural Uganda, 2021, *Comparative Political Studies* forthcoming (with Romain Ferrali, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas).

Partisan Dislocation: A Precinct-Level Measure of Representation and Gerrymandering, 2021, *Political Analysis* forthcoming (with Daryl DeFord Nick Eubank).

Who is my Neighbor? The Spatial Efficiency of Partisanship, 2020, *Statistics and Public Policy* 7(1):87-100 (with Nick Eubank).

Handgun Ownership and Suicide in California, 2020, *New England Journal of Medicine* 382:2220-2229 (with David M. Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Sonja A. Swanson, Lea Prince, Erin E. Holsinger, Matthew J. Spittal, Garen J. Wintemute, and Matthew Miller).

Viral Voting: Social Networks and Political Participation, 2020, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* (with Nick Eubank, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas).

It Takes a Village: Peer Effects and Externalities in Technology Adoption, 2020, *American Journal of Political Science* (with Romain Ferrali, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas). Winner, 2020 Best Conference Paper Award, American Political Science Association Network Section.

Assembly of the LongSHOT Cohort: Public Record Linkage on a Grand Scale, 2019, *Injury Prevention* (with Yifan Zhang, Erin Holsinger, Lea Prince, Sonja Swanson, Matthew Miller, Garen Wintemute, and David Studdert).

Crowdsourcing Accountability: ICT for Service Delivery, 2018, *World Development* 112: 74-87 (with Guy Grossman and Melina Platas).

Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization, 2018, *Political Science Research and Methods* doi:10.1017/psrm.2018.12 (with Nolan McCarty, Boris Shor, Chris Tausanovitch, and Chris Warshaw).

Handgun Acquisitions in California after Two Mass Shootings, 2017, *Annals of Internal Medicine* 166(10):698-706. (with David Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Rob Hyndman, and Garen Wintemute).

Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 2015, *Election Law Journal* 14,4:1-15 (with Jowei Chen).

The Achilles Heel of Plurality Systems: Geography and Representation in Multi-Party Democracies, 2015, *American Journal of Political Science* 59,4: 789-805 (with Ernesto Calvo). Winner, Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association.

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Why has U.S. Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960?, 2014, *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings* May 2014 (with Nicholas Bloom, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Scott Baker, and Steven Davis).

Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 2013, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8: 239-269 (with Jowei Chen).

How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?, 2012, *Journal of Politics* 74, 1: 203-219 (with Chris Warshaw).

Representation and Redistribution in Federations, 2011, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108, 21:8601-8604 (with Tiberiu Dragu).

Dual Accountability and the Nationalization of Party Competition: Evidence from Four Federatons, 2011, *Party Politics* 17, 5: 629-653 (with Erik Wibbels).

The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, 2010, Annual Review of Political Science 13: 297–340.

Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 2009, *Economics and Politics* 22,1: 37–67 (with Erik Wibbels).

Getting into the Game: Legislative Bargaining, Distributive Politics, and EU Enlargement, 2009, *Public Finance and Management* 9, 4 (with Deniz Aksoy).

The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting, 2008. *American Political Science Review* 102, 2: 215–232 (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder).

Does Religion Distract the Poor? Income and Issue Voting Around the World, 2008, *Comparative Political Studies* 41, 4: 437–476 (with Ana Lorena De La O).

Purple America, 2006, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20,2 (Spring): 97–118 (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder).

Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence from the U.S. States, 2006, *British Journal of Political Science* 36, 3: 527–47 (with Michael Ebeid).

Distributive Politics in a Federation: Electoral Strategies, Legislative Bargaining, and Government Coalitions, 2004, *Dados* 47, 3 (with Marta Arretche, in Portuguese).

Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement, 2004, *Comparative Politics* 36, 4: 481-500. (Portuguese version, 2005, in *Revista de Sociologia e Politica* 25).

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Working Papers

Elections, Political Polarization, and Economic Uncertainty, NBER Working Paper 27961 (with Scott Baker, Aniket Baksy, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven Davis).

Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Working Paper 2009/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations, Working Paper 2010/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (with Tiberiu Dragu).

Chapters in Books

Political Geography and Representation: A Case Study of Districting in Pennsylvania (with Thomas Weighill), in *Political Geometry*, edited by Moon Duchin and Olivia Walch, forthcoming 2021, Springer.

Keeping Your Enemies Close: Electoral Rules and Partisan Polarization, in *The New Politics of Insecurity*, edited by Frances Rosenbluth and Margaret Weir, forthcoming 2021, Cambridge University Press.

Decentralized Rule and Revenue, 2019, in Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, eds., *Decentralized Governance and Accountability*, Cambridge University Press.

Geography and Gridlock in the United States, 2014, in Nathaniel Persily, ed. *Solutions to Political Polarization in America*, Cambridge University Press.

Can Market Discipline Survive in the U.S. Federation?, 2013, in Daniel Nadler and Paul Peterson, eds, *The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U.S. and European Federalism*, Brookings Press.

Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, 2012, in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel, Jr., eds, *When States Go Broke: The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis,* Cambridge University Press.

Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution, 2010, in Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa, and Albert Sole Olle, eds., *The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows*, Edward Elgar.

Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics, 2009, in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press.

The Political Economy of Federalism, 2006, in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford University Press.

Fiscal Discipline in Federations: Germany and the EMU, 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

The Political Economy of Pro-cyclical Decentralised Finance (with Erik Wibbels), 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

Globalization and Fiscal Decentralization, (with Geoffrey Garrett), 2003, in Miles Kahler and David Lake, eds., *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition*, Princeton University Press: 87-109. (Updated version, 2007, in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis, and Annalisa Zinn, eds., *Globalization and Self-Determination: Is the Nation-State under Siege?* Routledge.)

Introduction and Overview (Chapter 1), 2003, in Rodden et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

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Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil (Chapter 7), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Lessons and Conclusions (Chapter 13), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Online Interactive Visualization

Stanford Election Atlas, 2012 (collaboration with Stephen Ansolabehere at Harvard and Jim Herries at ESRI)

Other Publications

Supporting Advanced Manufacturing in Alabama, Report to the Alabama Innovation Commission, Hoover Institution, 2021.

How America's Urban-Rural Divide has Shaped the Pandemic, 2020, Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.

An Evolutionary Path for the European Monetary Fund? A Comparative Perspective, 2017, Briefing paper for the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations: A Research Report, 2009, in *World Report* on *Fiscal Federalism*, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

On the Migration of Fiscal Sovereignty, 2004, PS: Political Science and Politics July, 2004: 427-431.

Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, *PREM Note* 41, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C. (July).

Decentralization and Hard Budget Constraints, *APSA-CP* (Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association) 11:1 (with Jennie Litvack).

Book Review of The Government of Money by Peter Johnson, Comparative Political Studies 32,7: 897-900.

Fellowships, Honors, and Grants

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2021.

Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations," 2021.

National Institutes of Health, funding for "Relationship between lawful handgun ownership and risk of homicide victimization in the home," 2021.

National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research, funding for "Cohort Study Of Firearm-Related Mortality Among Cohabitants Of Handgun Owners." 2020.

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT), GA004696, 2017-2018.

Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant, 2015.

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Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association, 2016.

Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.

General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.

Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.

Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, beginning Fall 2010.

Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 2009.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2008.

United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.

Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections, public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).

MIT Dean's Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.

Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize the conference, "European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective," held at Harvard University, November 4, 2000.

Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.

Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.

Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the University of Michigan, 1993.

W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan, 1993.

Other Professional Activities

Selection committee, best paper award, American Journal of Political Science.

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.

Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.

Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.

Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.

Courses

Undergraduate

Politics, Economics, and Democracy Introduction to Comparative Politics Introduction to Political Science

Political Science Scope and Methods

Institutional Economics

Spatial Approaches to Social Science

Graduate

Political Economy Political Economy of Institutions Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization Politics and Geography

Consulting

2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.

2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID, Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).

2019: Written expert testimony in *McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann,* United States District Court, Mississippi.

2019: Expert witness in Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* No. 4:18-cv-002510, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

2017: Expert witness in *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

2017: Expert witness in *Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al.*, No. 2:16-CV-01065, United States District Court for Arizona.

2016: Expert witness in *Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.

2016: Expert witness in *Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.

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2014-2015: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al.,* 2012-CA-002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).

2013-2014: Expert witness in *Romo v Detzner*, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County (Florida Congressional redistricting case).

2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.

2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.

2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.

2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank decentralization and safety net programs.

2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.

1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for *World Development Report*, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentralization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator on review of subnational adjustment lending.

Last updated: September 23, 2021

Rodden Decl. Ex. B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, <i>et al.</i> ,		
Relators,	Case No.	
v.	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)	
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S. Ct. Prac. R 14.031	
Respondents.	17ac. R. 17.05j	

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN

I, Jonathan Rodden, having been duly sworn and cautioned according to law, hereby state that I am over the age of eighteen years and am competent to testify to the facts set forth below based on my personal knowledge and having personally examined all records referenced in this affidavit, and further state as follows:

- 1. I am currently a tenured Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the founder and director of the Stanford Spatial Social Science Lab—a center for research and teaching with a focus on the analysis of geo-spatial data in the social sciences. I am engaged in a variety of research projects involving large, fine-grained geo-spatial data sets including ballots and election results at the level of polling places, individual records of registered voters, census data, and survey responses. I am also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Hoover Institution. Prior to my employment at Stanford, I was the Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I received my Ph.D. from Yale University and my B.A. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, both in political science. A copy of my current C.V. is included as Exhibit G.
- 2. In my current academic work, I conduct research on the relationship between the patterns of political representation, geographic location of demographic and partisan groups, and the drawing of electoral districts. I have published papers using statistical methods to assess political geography, balloting, and representation in a variety of academic journals including *Statistics and Public Policy, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, the *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, the *Virginia Law Review*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, the *Annual Review of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Politics*. One of these papers was selected by the American Political Science Association as the winner of the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best paper on political Science Association section on social networks. In 2021, I received a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, and received the Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science

Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations."

- 3. I have recently written a series of papers, along with my co-authors, using automated redistricting algorithms to assess partisan gerrymandering. This work has been published in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Election Law Journal*, and *Political Analysis*, and it has been featured in more popular publications like the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and *Boston Review*. I have recently completed a book, published by *Basic Books* in June of 2019, on the relationship between political districts, the residential geography of social groups, and their political representation in the United States and other countries that use winner-take-all electoral districts. The book was reviewed in *The New York Times*, *The New York Review of Books*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, and *The Atlantic*, among others.
- 4. I have expertise in the use of large data sets and geographic information systems (GIS), and conduct research and teaching in the area of applied statistics related to elections. My PhD students frequently take academic and private sector jobs as statisticians and data scientists. I frequently work with geo-coded voter files and other large administrative data sets, including in recent papers published in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* and *The New England Journal of Medicine*. I have developed a national data set of geo-coded precinct-level election results that has been used extensively in policy-oriented research related to redistricting and representation.
- 5. I have been accepted and testified as an expert witness in six election law and redistricting cases: Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-000412 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2012); Mo. State Conference of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., No. 4:2014-CV-02077 (E.D. Mo. 2014); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:15-CV-00357 (E.D. Va. 2015); Democratic Nat'l Committee et al. v. Hobbs et al., No. 16-1065-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz. 2016); Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, No. 3:14-cv-00852-REP-AWA-BMK (E.D. Va. 2014); and Jacobson et al. v. Lee, No. 4:18-cv-00262 (N.D. Fla. 2018). I also worked with a coalition of academics to file Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, and Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422. Much of the testimony in these cases had to do with geography, electoral districts, voting, ballots, and election administration. I am currently working as a consultant for the Maryland Redistricting Commission. I am being compensated at the rate of \$550/hour for my work in this case. My compensation is not dependent upon my conclusions in any way.

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

6. For the purpose of this affidavit, I have been asked to examine whether the redistricting plan for the Ohio State House of Representatives and Ohio Senate, adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on September 16, 2021, and attached as Exhibit A ("2021 Commission Plan"), complies with the standard set forth in Article XI, Section 6(B), namely, that "[t]he statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio."

- 7. I demonstrate that this "partisan proportionality" standard was clearly not met by the maps adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission.
- 8. Furthermore, I have been asked to examine whether the partisan composition of the Commission's maps may have been a result of the Commission's need to satisfy other requirements of the Ohio Constitution: specifically, the requirements to avoid county and municipal splits, laid out in Article XI, Sections 3 and 4, and to attempt to draw compact districts, as set forth in Article XI, Section 6(C).
- 9. I examine several additional maps that were available to the Commission, and to the public, prior to September 15. I demonstrate that these maps were able to abide by the "partisan proportionality" clause while also abiding by the strict rules of the Ohio Constitution regarding county and municipality splits, and while creating districts with similar or better compactness scores than those drawn by the Commission.

II. DATA SOURCES

10. I have collected statewide election data for 2012 to 2020 from the Ohio Secretary of State. I also accessed precinct-level election results from the Ohio Secretary of State for statewide elections from 2016 to 2020 that were matched to 2020 Ohio vote tabulation districts by a team at Harvard University called the Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology Project.¹ Additionally, I accessed the proposed and adopted Ohio redistricting plans uploaded to the web page of the Ohio Redistricting Commission, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits A, C, D, and E.²

III. MEASURING PARTISAN PROPORTIONALITY

- 11. The Ohio Constitution instructs the commissioners to use "statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years" to ascertain the "statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio," and attempt to draw a map in which the "statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each party shall correspond closely" to those "statewide preferences."
- 12. As further discussed below, the only reasonable way to implement this notion of "statewide preferences," as ascertained from past elections to anticipated future seat shares, is via the proportion of votes received by the candidates for the two parties. That is to say, if a party won 50 percent of the average statewide vote in the relevant elections, a proposed map should favor that party—aggregating the results of those same elections—in somewhere very close to 50 percent of the seats.
- 13. The first task, then, is to establish this target from the last decade of statewide partisan election results. Figure 1 provides a visualization of Ohio statewide general election results from 2012 to 2020. Ohio is a hotly contested state with a tradition of split-ticket voting and significant swings from one year to another. The Democratic candidate won the presidential

¹ https://alarm-redist.github.io/posts/2021-08-10-census-2020/

² https://redistricting.ohio.gov/maps

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contest in 2012, but the Republican candidate won in 2016 and 2020. Ohio's U.S. Senate delegation is typically split between the parties, and other statewide elections are often very competitive, although 2014 was an exception, as was the 2016 U.S. Senate race.

14. Figure 1 reveals that while Ohio statewide elections have been mostly quite close over the last decade, Republican candidates have held a narrow advantage. To quantify this, Table 1 provides the raw data. Including all of the statewide general elections from 2012 to 2020, the Democratic vote share of the two-party vote (ignoring small parties and write-in candidates) was around 45.9 percent.



Figure 1: Statewide General Election Outcomes, Ohio, 2012-2020

	Democratic Votes	Republican Votes	Other	Two-party Democratic Vote Share
2012 President	2,827,709	2,661,439	91,791	51.5%
2012 U.S. Senate	2,762,766	2,435,744	250,618	53.1%
2014 Governor	1,009,359	1,944,848	101,706	34.2%
2014 Att. Gen.	1,178,426	1,882,048		38.5%
2014 Auditor	1,149,305	1,711,927	143,363	40.2%
2014 Sec. of State	1,074,475	1,811,020	141,292	37.2%
2014 Treasurer	1,323,325	1,724,060		43.4%
2016 President	2,394,164	2,841,005	261,318	45.7%
2016 Senate	1,996,908	3,118,567	258,689	39.0%
2018 Senate	2,358,508	2,057,559	1,017	53.4%
2018 Governor	2,070,046	2,235,825	129,949	48.1%
2018 Att. Gen.	2,086,715	2,276,414		47.8%
2018 Auditor	2,008,295	2,156,663	175,962	48.2%
2018 Sec. of State	2,052,098	2,214,273	103,585	48.1%
2018 Treasurer	2,024,194	2,308,425		46.7%
2020 President	2,679,165	3,154,834	88,203	45.9%
Sum, all elections	30,995,458	36,534,651	1,747,493	45.9%
Sum, 2016-2020	19,670,093	22,363,565	1,018,723	46.8%

Table 1: Statewide General Election Outcomes, Ohio, 2012-2020

- 15. Determining the proportion of districts that favor each party, as set forth in Article XI, Section 6, requires an aggregation of the precinct-level results of these past elections to the boundaries of its proposed districts. However, precinct-level election results linked with geospatial boundaries were not available for the 2012 and 2014 elections, as the Commission itself acknowledged in its Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement, attached as Exhibit F. Thus, Table 1 also sets forth that the two-party Democratic vote share in 2016, 2018, and 2020 general elections was around 47 percent.
- 16. Accordingly, using the full statewide election results from 2012 to 2020, the Ohio Constitution requires the Commission to attempt to draw state legislative maps in which 45.9 percent of seats favor Democrats and 54.1 percent of seats favor Republican. Since there are 99 seats in the Ohio House of Representatives, a statewide vote share of 45.9 percent would be associated with 45.44 Democratic seats, which rounds down to 45 seats. Similarly, a 45.9 percent vote share would be associated with about 15.15 Democratic seats in the 33-member Ohio Senate, which rounds down to 15 seats.

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- 17. I have aggregated the precinct-level results of each election from 2016 to 2020 included in Table 1 to the level of the districts in the 2021 Commission Plan. For each district, I calculate the average Democratic share of the votes received by the candidates of the two major parties across each of these elections. I then ascertain the number of districts in which this quantity is greater than 50 percent. Using this technique, I ascertain that the 2021 Commission Plan produced 37 majority-Democratic House seats and 62 majority-Republican House seats, as shown in Table 2 below. In the Senate, the 2021 Commission Plan produced 10 majority-Democratic Senate seats and 23 majority-Republican seats. This is a gap of 8 House seats and 5 Senate seats between the Democratic-leaning seats produced by the 2021 Commission Plan and the seat share that would be proportionate to the statewide Democratic vote share.
- 18. Notably, the partisanship of the Commission's maps is not very different from that of the current maps, adopted in 2011 and attached as Exhibit B. The current breakdown of the General Assembly under the 2011 maps is as follows: 35 Democrats and 64 Republicans in the House; 8 Democrats and 25 Republicans in the Senate.
- 19. In addition to this examination of seats above and below the 50 percent cut-point, it is also useful to examine how many of the Democratic- and Republican-leaning seats are razor-thin majorities, and how many are more comfortable majorities. I count the number of seats where the average Democratic share of the vote for the two major parties was less than 48 percent—let us call these expected Republican seats. And I count the number of seats where the average Democratic share of the vote for the two major parties was greater than 52 percent—let us call these expected Democratic seats. Finally, I count the number of seats that we might call "tossups," where the average Democratic vote share was between 48 percent and 52 percent.
- 20. As set forth in Table 2 below, in the 2021 Commission Plan, all of the majority-Republican House seats are greater than 52 percent Republican. Of the 37 majority-Democratic seats, only 32 are greater than 52 percent Democratic. All five of the "toss-up" seats are slim Democratic majorities. In the Commission's Senate plan, there are 21 expected Republican seats, 9 expected Democratic seats, and three "toss-ups."
- 21. In its Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement, the Commission explained its ostensible attempt to comply with the "partisan proportionality" requirement in the Ohio Constitution. In this statement, the Ohio Redistricting Commission offers an unsound implementation of the constitutional requirement, suggesting that "statewide preferences" can be measured as the share of all elections in which each party received more votes than the other party. This is a flawed way of characterizing voter preferences in general, but especially when the purpose is to evaluate seat shares. With this interpretation, a party that always wins 50.01 percent of the vote in general elections would be viewed as having 100 percent of the "statewide preference," entitling it to draw a map that gave itself all of the seats, a patently absurd outcome.
- 22. Consider, for example, a situation in which the United States adopted Ohio's constitutional amendment for U.S. House of Representatives districts. The only nationwide elections are presidential elections, for which Democratic candidates have won a majority of popular votes in each election since 2004, although many of these elections were extremely close. By the

Commission's logic, voters preferred Democratic candidates 100 percent of the time, and would therefore be entitled to 100 percent of the seats in Congress. This is simply not a tenable notion of voter preferences. In the vast academic literature on votes and seats, I have never encountered the notion that the seat share should correspond to the share of past elections in which a party received a plurality. Rather, the Ohio Constitution is clearly invoking the notion of voter preferences used by academics, pundits, and everyone else: the vote share.

IV. COMPARING THE COMMISSION'S MAPS TO ALTERNATIVE MAPS PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION

- 23. It is clearly the case that the 2021 Commission Plan deviates significantly from any reasonable interpretation of the Ohio Constitution's partisan fairness requirement. But one might imagine that the partisan composition of the Commission's maps was a function of constraints imposed by other constitutional requirements related to so-called "traditional redistricting principles" that the Commission understood to be more important.
- 24. In fact, the next line after the "partisan proportionality" clause dictates that the Commission "shall attempt" to draw compact districts. One might wonder whether the Commission found it difficult to achieve partisan proportionality because of a tension between that goal and the additional goal of drawing compact districts. Moreover, the Constitution requires that the Commission use entire counties, municipal corporations, and townships as the building blocks of districts to the extent possible. Counties with population greater than that which is sufficient for a single district must spill into only a single additional district. The Commission must also endeavor not to split counties more than once, and not to split more than one municipality per district. One might imagine that efforts to abide by these requirements made it difficult for the Commission to achieve partisan proportionality.
- 25. A simple and effective way to examine such assumptions is to examine other maps that had been made available to the Commission before it finalized its own maps. Did those maps come closer to achieving partisan proportionality while abiding by the same rules and achieving similar benchmarks with respect to the traditional redistricting principles emphasized in the Constitution? If so, one cannot accept the claim that the Commission was forced by restrictive rules into drawing maps with a large advantage for one party.
- 26. I have therefore aggregated precinct-level election results to the level of proposed districts for a map introduced by Senator Sykes on September 2, attached as Exhibit C. An additional map was proposed by a group called the "Ohio Citizens Redistricting Commission" and is attached as Exhibit E. Based on my review, these maps are fully compliant with the line-drawing rules explained above, as set forth in Article XI, Sections 3 and 4 of the Ohio Constitution.
- 27. For each of these maps, as well as the 2021 Commission Plan and maps the Commission initially proposed, attached as Exhibit D, I have also produced compactness scores for the districts to assess the maps' compliance with Article XI, Section 6(C). I have included Reock, Polsby-Popper, and Convex Hull compactness measures, each of which takes a somewhat different approach to the notion of district compactness.

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- 28. Although the Ohio Constitution does not specify the optimal number of county splits, I have also calculated the number of county splits generated by each plan. I define a county split in the same way as the Ohio Constitution. For example, Franklin County is not considered to be split in a House of Representatives plan if 11 districts are formed that fit completely within the county, and no fragment of any district spills over the county boundary. Moreover, a county that is kept intact but joined together with other "split" counties is not considered a split county. A county is only considered to be split if some part—but not all—of its territory is joined with territory from another county in the formation of a district.
- 29. In Table 2 below, I provide compactness scores and information on county splits for each of the Ohio House of Representatives plans I analyzed. Next, using the same technique described above, I include the number of majority-Democratic districts, majority-Republican districts, expected Democratic districts, expected Republican districts, and "toss-up" districts that would be produced by each plan.
- 30. First, in terms of compactness, the 2021 Commission Plan was similar to the plans submitted by Senator Sykes and the Citizens' Commission. If anything, the plan produced by the Citizens' Commission was on average more compact, according to both the Polsby-Popper and Convex Hull scores, and Senator Sykes's plan was slightly more compact according to its Polsby-Popper score.
- 31. The Commission's House map splits 33 counties. The Citizens' Commission splits a greater number of counties (43) than does the Ohio Redistricting Commission, while Senator Sykes's House map splits fewer counties (only 30).
- 32. Next, let us examine the partisan outcomes associated with these alternative plans. The relevant information is contained in Table 2. The plan submitted by Senator Sykes came very close to achieving partisan proportionality. It produced 44 majority-Democratic seats and 55 majority-Republican seats—a difference from proportionality of only one seat. The plan produced by the Citizens' Commission produced 43 Democratic seats and 56 Republican seats—a difference from proportionality of only 2 seats. Again, the distance from proportionality in the Ohio Redistricting Commission's final House map was 8 seats.
- 33. In short, Senator Sykes's plan for the Ohio House of Representatives does just as well—in fact a little better—than the Commission's House map at abiding by the traditional redistricting criteria emphasized in the Ohio Constitution, and it also comes much closer to achieving the required partisan proportionality. This indicates that the failure of the 2021 Commission Plan to achieve partisan proportionality and its overall favorability to Republicans was an intentional choice, rather than a natural outgrowth of other constraints.

	Commission 9/16	Commission 9/9	Sykes 9/2	Citizens 9/10
Average compactness scores				
(Higher scores = more compact)				
Reock	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
Polsby-Popper	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.34
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.73	0.74	0.76
Number of split counties	33	33	30	43
# of seats with average two-party <i>Democratic</i> vote share >.5	37	32	44	43
Expressed as percentage of seats	37.4%	32.3%	44.4%	43.4%
# of seats with average two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5	62	67	55	56
Expressed as percentage of seats	62.6%	67.7%	55.6%	56.6%
Distance from proportional seat	0	12	1	2
allocation (seats)	8 8 10/	13 12 10/	I 1 094	2 004
Expressed as percentage of sears	0.170	13.170	1.070	2.076
# of seats with average two-party	22	21	41	42
Democratic vote snare >.52	32	31 21 20/	41	42
Expressed as a percentage of seats	52.570	51.5%	41.470	42.4%
# of seats with average two-party				
Democratic vote share <.48	62	63	54	54
Expressed as percentage of seats	62.6%	63.6%	54.5%	54.5%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share between .48				
and .52	5	5	4	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	5.1%	5.1%	4.0%	3.0%

Table 2: Summary Information, Ohio House of Representative Plans Submitted to Ohio Redistricting Commission

	Commission 9/16	Commission 9/9	Sykes 9/2	Citizens 9/10
Average compactness scores				
(Higher scores = more compact)				
Reock	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.43
Polsby-Popper	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.37
Area/Convex Hull	0.73	0.72	0.73	0.78
Number of split counties	13	13	16	18
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share >.5	10	9	14	14
Expressed as percentage of seats	30.3%	27.3%	42.4%	42.4%
# of seats with average two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5	23	24	19	19
Expressed as percentage of seats	69.7%	72.7%	57.6%	57.6%
Distance from proportional seat allocation (seats)	5	6	1	1
Expressed as percentage of seats	15.2%	18.2%	3.0%	3.0%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share >.52	9	8	13	12
Expressed as a percentage of seats	9.1%	8.1%	13.1%	12.1%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share <.48	21	21	18	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	63.6%	63.6%	54.5%	54.5%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and 52	3	4	2	3
anu .52				

Table 3: Summary Information, Ohio Senate PlansSubmitted to Ohio Redistricting Commission

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- 34. Next, let us undertake a similar comparison of the Ohio Redistricting Commission's Senate map with those submitted by Senator Sykes and the Citizens' Commission. The key information is contained in Table 3.
- 35. Once again, the plan presented by Senator Sykes demonstrated a similar level of average compactness as the Commission's map on each of the three metrics I considered. And again, the plans produced by the Citizens' Commission were more compact. Relative to the Commission's Senate map, the Sykes map split three additional counties, and the Citizens' map split five additional counties.
- 36. The Commission's Senate map produces only 10 majority-Democratic seats and 23 majority-Republican Seats. In contrast, both the Sykes plan and the Citizens' Commission plan produced 14 Democratic seats and 19 Republican seats. Recall that the target set forth by the Constitution was 15 Democratic seats, meaning that both plans came within a single seat of the target. Again, as with the House of Representatives, these alternative maps demonstrate that for the Senate as well, it is possible to abide both by the Ohio Constitution's traditional redistricting requirements as well as its partisan proportionality requirement. The fact that the Commission's map strongly favors the Republican Party is the result of discretionary choices made by the Commission and reflects that the Commission did not attempt to achieve partisan proportionality.

V. CONCLUSION

- 37. The 2021 Commission Plan does not comply with the partisan proportionality requirement set forth in Article XI, Section 6(B).
- 38. The 2021 Commission Plan favors Republicans for reasons other than traditional redistricting criteria and the Ohio Constitution's other requirements, as demonstrated by alternative maps presented to the Commission—which achieve greater partisan proportionality and are relatively similar, and in some cases slightly better, according to traditional redistricting criteria.
- **39**. I have read the Complaint filed in this action and affirm that the factual allegations contained in paragraphs 50, 88, 98, 118, 125-128, 134-135, 137-141, 143 are true.

JURAT

Jonathan Andrew Radden

Jonathan Rodden

Sworn to before me this <u>____4th</u> day of September, 2021.

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF SAINT LUCIE

By Jonathan Andrew Rodden

Form of ID Produced: Driver's License

Notary Public

Darrell Dwayne Evans



My commission expires _____01/19/2025

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Exhibit A

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Exhibit B

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Last Revised 02/2018

Exhibit C




Exhibit D





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Exhibit E





Exhibit F

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Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement

Pursuant to Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Redistricting Commission issues the following statement:

The Commission determined that the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio predominately favor Republican candidates.

The Commission considered statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years. There were sixteen such contests. When considering the results of each of those elections, the Commission determined that Republican candidates won thirteen out of sixteen of those elections resulting in a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates of 81% and a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates of 19%. When considering the number of votes cast in each of those elections for Republican and Democratic candidates, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is 54% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is 46%. Thus, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is between 54% and 81% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is between 19% and 46%. The Commission obtained publicly available geographic data for statewide partisan elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020. Publicly available geographic data for those elections was not available for elections in 2012 and 2014. Using this data, the Commission adopted the final general assembly district plan, which contains 85 districts (64.4%) favoring Republican candidates and 47 districts (35.6%) favoring Democratic candidates out of a total of 132 districts. Accordingly, the statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each political party corresponds closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

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The final general assembly district plan adopted by the Commission complies with all of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution. The Commission's attempt to meet the aspirational standards of Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution did not result in any violation of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution.

Exhibit G

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Personal

Born on August 18. 1971, St. Louis, MO.

United States Citizen.

Education

Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, 2000.Fulbright Scholar, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993–1994.B.A., Political Science, University of Michigan, 1993.

Academic Positions

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2020-present.

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Director, Spatial Social Science Lab, Stanford University, 2012-present.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2010–2012.

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2007–2012.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, CA, 2006-2007.

Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT, 2003–2006.

Visiting Scholar, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 2004.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT, 1999–2003.

Instructor, Department of Political Science and School of Management, Yale University, 1997–1999.

Publications

Books

Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Divide. Basic Books, 2019.

Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming. Coedited with Erik Wibbels, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Winner, Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007; Martha Derthick Award for lasting contribution to the study of federalism, 2021.

Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press, 2003. Co-edited with Gunnar Eskeland and Jennie Litvack.

Peer Reviewed Journal Articles

Who Registers? Village Networks, Household Dynamics, and Voter Registration in Rural Uganda, 2021, *Comparative Political Studies* forthcoming (with Romain Ferrali, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas).

Partisan Dislocation: A Precinct-Level Measure of Representation and Gerrymandering, 2021, *Political Analysis* forthcoming (with Daryl DeFord Nick Eubank).

Who is my Neighbor? The Spatial Efficiency of Partisanship, 2020, *Statistics and Public Policy* 7(1):87-100 (with Nick Eubank).

Handgun Ownership and Suicide in California, 2020, *New England Journal of Medicine* 382:2220-2229 (with David M. Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Sonja A. Swanson, Lea Prince, Erin E. Holsinger, Matthew J. Spittal, Garen J. Wintemute, and Matthew Miller).

Viral Voting: Social Networks and Political Participation, 2020, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* (with Nick Eubank, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas).

It Takes a Village: Peer Effects and Externalities in Technology Adoption, 2020, *American Journal of Political Science* (with Romain Ferrali, Guy Grossman, and Melina Platas). Winner, 2020 Best Conference Paper Award, American Political Science Association Network Section.

Assembly of the LongSHOT Cohort: Public Record Linkage on a Grand Scale, 2019, *Injury Prevention* (with Yifan Zhang, Erin Holsinger, Lea Prince, Sonja Swanson, Matthew Miller, Garen Wintemute, and David Studdert).

Crowdsourcing Accountability: ICT for Service Delivery, 2018, *World Development* 112: 74-87 (with Guy Grossman and Melina Platas).

Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization, 2018, *Political Science Research and Methods* doi:10.1017/psrm.2018.12 (with Nolan McCarty, Boris Shor, Chris Tausanovitch, and Chris Warshaw).

Handgun Acquisitions in California after Two Mass Shootings, 2017, *Annals of Internal Medicine* 166(10):698-706. (with David Studdert, Yifan Zhang, Rob Hyndman, and Garen Wintemute).

Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 2015, *Election Law Journal* 14,4:1-15 (with Jowei Chen).

The Achilles Heel of Plurality Systems: Geography and Representation in Multi-Party Democracies, 2015, *American Journal of Political Science* 59,4: 789-805 (with Ernesto Calvo). Winner, Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association.

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Why has U.S. Policy Uncertainty Risen Since 1960?, 2014, *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings* May 2014 (with Nicholas Bloom, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Scott Baker, and Steven Davis).

Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 2013, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8: 239-269 (with Jowei Chen).

How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?, 2012, *Journal of Politics* 74, 1: 203-219 (with Chris Warshaw).

Representation and Redistribution in Federations, 2011, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108, 21:8601-8604 (with Tiberiu Dragu).

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The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, 2010, Annual Review of Political Science 13: 297–340.

Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 2009, *Economics and Politics* 22,1: 37–67 (with Erik Wibbels).

Getting into the Game: Legislative Bargaining, Distributive Politics, and EU Enlargement, 2009, *Public Finance and Management* 9, 4 (with Deniz Aksoy).

The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting, 2008. *American Political Science Review* 102, 2: 215–232 (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder).

Does Religion Distract the Poor? Income and Issue Voting Around the World, 2008, *Comparative Political Studies* 41, 4: 437–476 (with Ana Lorena De La O).

Purple America, 2006, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20,2 (Spring): 97–118 (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder).

Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence from the U.S. States, 2006, *British Journal of Political Science* 36, 3: 527–47 (with Michael Ebeid).

Distributive Politics in a Federation: Electoral Strategies, Legislative Bargaining, and Government Coalitions, 2004, *Dados* 47, 3 (with Marta Arretche, in Portuguese).

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The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World, 2002, *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 670–687.

Strength in Numbers: Representation and Redistribution in the European Union, 2002, *European Union Politics* 3, 2: 151–175.

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Working Papers

Elections, Political Polarization, and Economic Uncertainty, NBER Working Paper 27961 (with Scott Baker, Aniket Baksy, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven Davis).

Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Working Paper 2009/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations, Working Paper 2010/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (with Tiberiu Dragu).

Chapters in Books

Political Geography and Representation: A Case Study of Districting in Pennsylvania (with Thomas Weighill), in *Political Geometry*, edited by Moon Duchin and Olivia Walch, forthcoming 2021, Springer.

Keeping Your Enemies Close: Electoral Rules and Partisan Polarization, in *The New Politics of Insecurity*, edited by Frances Rosenbluth and Margaret Weir, forthcoming 2021, Cambridge University Press.

Decentralized Rule and Revenue, 2019, in Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, eds., *Decentralized Governance and Accountability*, Cambridge University Press.

Geography and Gridlock in the United States, 2014, in Nathaniel Persily, ed. *Solutions to Political Polarization in America*, Cambridge University Press.

Can Market Discipline Survive in the U.S. Federation?, 2013, in Daniel Nadler and Paul Peterson, eds, *The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U.S. and European Federalism*, Brookings Press.

Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, 2012, in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel, Jr., eds, *When States Go Broke: The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis,* Cambridge University Press.

Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution, 2010, in Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa, and Albert Sole Olle, eds., *The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows*, Edward Elgar.

Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics, 2009, in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press.

The Political Economy of Federalism, 2006, in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford University Press.

Fiscal Discipline in Federations: Germany and the EMU, 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

The Political Economy of Pro-cyclical Decentralised Finance (with Erik Wibbels), 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

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Introduction and Overview (Chapter 1), 2003, in Rodden et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

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Soft Budget Constraints and German Federalism (Chapter 5), 2003, in Rodden, et al, *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil (Chapter 7), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Lessons and Conclusions (Chapter 13), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Online Interactive Visualization

Stanford Election Atlas, 2012 (collaboration with Stephen Ansolabehere at Harvard and Jim Herries at ESRI)

Other Publications

Supporting Advanced Manufacturing in Alabama, Report to the Alabama Innovation Commission, Hoover Institution, 2021.

How America's Urban-Rural Divide has Shaped the Pandemic, 2020, Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.

An Evolutionary Path for the European Monetary Fund? A Comparative Perspective, 2017, Briefing paper for the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations: A Research Report, 2009, in *World Report on Fiscal Federalism*, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

On the Migration of Fiscal Sovereignty, 2004, PS: Political Science and Politics July, 2004: 427-431.

Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, *PREM Note* 41, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C. (July).

Decentralization and Hard Budget Constraints, *APSA-CP* (Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association) 11:1 (with Jennie Litvack).

Book Review of *The Government of Money* by Peter Johnson, *Comparative Political Studies* 32,7: 897-900.

Fellowships, Honors, and Grants

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2021.

Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations," 2021.

National Institutes of Health, funding for "Relationship between lawful handgun ownership and risk of homicide victimization in the home," 2021.

National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research, funding for "Cohort Study Of Firearm-Related Mortality Among Cohabitants Of Handgun Owners." 2020.

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT), GA004696, 2017-2018.

Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant, 2015.

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Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association, 2016.

Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.

General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.

Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.

Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, beginning Fall 2010.

Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 2009.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2008.

United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.

Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections, public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).

MIT Dean's Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.

Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize the conference, "European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective," held at Harvard University, November 4, 2000.

Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.

Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.

Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the University of Michigan, 1993.

W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan, 1993.

Other Professional Activities

Selection committee, best paper award, American Journal of Political Science.

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.

Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.

Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.

Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.

Courses

Undergraduate

Politics, Economics, and Democracy Introduction to Comparative Politics Introduction to Political Science

Political Science Scope and Methods

Institutional Economics

Spatial Approaches to Social Science

Graduate

Political Economy Political Economy of Institutions Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization Politics and Geography

Consulting

2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.

2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID, Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).

2019: Written expert testimony in *McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann,* United States District Court, Mississippi.

2019: Expert witness in Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* No. 4:18-cv-002510, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

2017: Expert witness in *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

2017: Expert witness in *Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al.*, No. 2:16-CV-01065, United States District Court for Arizona.

2016: Expert witness in *Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.

2016: Expert witness in *Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.

Case: 2:22-cv-00773-ALM-ART-BJB Doc #: 161-3 Filed: 04/06/22 Page: 49 of 180 PAGEID #: 4680

2014-2015: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al.,* 2012-CA-002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).

2013-2014: Expert witness in *Romo v Detzner*, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County (Florida Congressional redistricting case).

2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.

2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.

2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.

2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank decentralization and safety net programs.

2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.

1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for *World Development Report*, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentralization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator on review of subnational adjustment lending.

Last updated: September 23, 2021

Rodden Decl. Ex. C

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

BRIA BENNETT, et al.,

Relators,

Case No. 2021-1198

OHIO REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, *et al.*,

v.

Respondents.

EVIDENCE OF BENNETT RELATORS

(Expert Affidavit of Dr. Jonathan Rodden & Exhibits)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, et al.,			
Relators,	Case No. 2021-1198		
v.	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)		
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S. Ct. Prac. R. 14 03]		
Respondents.			

EXPERT AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN

I, Jonathan Rodden, having been duly sworn and cautioned according to law, hereby state that I am over the age of eighteen years and am competent to testify to the facts set forth below based on my personal knowledge and having personally examined all records referenced in this affidavit, and further state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- 1. For the purpose of this report, I have been asked to examine whether and how the redistricting plan for the Ohio State House of Representatives and Ohio Senate, adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on September 16, 2021, and attached as Exhibit A ("2021 Commission Plan"), addresses the standard set forth in Article XI, Section 6(B), namely, that "[t]he statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio."
- 2. I demonstrate that this "partisan proportionality" standard was clearly not met by the map adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission.
- 3. Furthermore, I have been asked to examine whether the partisan composition of the Commission's maps may have been a result of the Commission's need to satisfy other requirements of the Ohio Constitution: specifically, the requirements to avoid county and municipal splits, laid out in Article XI, Sections 3 and 4, and to attempt to draw compact districts, as set forth in Article XI, Section 6(C).
- 4. In order to answer this question, I do two things. First, I examine several additional maps that were available to the Commission, and to the public, prior to September 15. Second, I create my own alternative redistricting maps for the Ohio House and Senate, abiding by the rules set forth in the Ohio Constitution. I demonstrate that my alternative redistricting maps, like each of the alternative plans available to the Commission, were able to abide by the "partisan proportionality" requirement more closely while also abiding by the strict rules of

the Ohio Constitution regarding county and municipality splits, and while creating districts with similar or better compactness scores than those drawn by the Commission.

5. I was also asked to conduct a careful examination of the key geographic regions where the likely partisan outcomes associated with the 2021 Commission Plan were notably different from those of the alternative maps. In most instances, the alternative plans are more respectful of traditional redistricting criteria than the 2021 Commission Plan. Moreover, in some metro areas, the Commission's plan clearly achieves a lower anticipated Democratic seat share than the alternative plans by breaking up urban and suburban Democratic communities, including Black communities, and embedding them in districts where exurban and rural whites make up majorities. Moreover, some of the Commission's specific splits of urban counties are especially well-crafted to reduce the overall Democratic seat share in a region. And relative to the alternative plans, the Commission's plan often packs Democratic voters into overwhelmingly Democratic urban districts, which allows the Commission to carve out additional suburban and exurban districts with comfortable Republican majorities.

II. QUALIFICATIONS

- 6. I am currently a tenured Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the founder and director of the Stanford Spatial Social Science Lab—a center for research and teaching with a focus on the analysis of geo-spatial data in the social sciences. I am engaged in a variety of research projects involving large, fine-grained geo-spatial data sets including ballots and election results at the level of polling places, individual records of registered voters, census data, and survey responses. I am also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Hoover Institution. Prior to my employment at Stanford, I was the Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I received my Ph.D. from Yale University and my B.A. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, both in political science. A copy of my current C.V. is included as Exhibit G.
- 7. In my current academic work, I conduct research on the relationship between the patterns of political representation, geographic location of demographic and partisan groups, and the drawing of electoral districts. I have published papers using statistical methods to assess political geography, balloting, and representation in a variety of academic journals including Statistics and Public Policy, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Virginia Law Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, the Annual Review of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics. One of these papers was selected by the American Political Science Association as the winner of the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best paper on political economy published in the last year, and another received an award from the American Political Science Association section on social networks. In 2021, I received a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, and received the Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations."

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- 8. I have recently written a series of papers, along with my co-authors, using automated redistricting algorithms to assess partisan gerrymandering. This work has been published in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Election Law Journal*, and *Political Analysis*, and it has been featured in more popular publications like the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and *Boston Review*. I have recently completed a book, published by *Basic Books* in June of 2019, on the relationship between political districts, the residential geography of social groups, and their political representation in the United States and other countries that use winner-take-all electoral districts. The book was reviewed in *The New York Times*, *The New York Review of Books*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, and *The Atlantic*, among others.
- 9. I have expertise in the use of large data sets and geographic information systems (GIS), and I conduct research and teaching in the area of applied statistics related to elections. My PhD students frequently take academic and private sector jobs as statisticians and data scientists. I frequently work with geo-coded voter files and other large administrative data sets, including in recent papers published in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* and *The New England Journal of Medicine*. I have developed a national data set of geo-coded precinct-level election results that has been used extensively in policy-oriented research related to redistricting and representation.
- I have been accepted and testified as an expert witness in several election law and redistricting cases: Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-000412 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2012); Mo. State Conference of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., No. 4:2014-CV-02077 (E.D. Mo. 2014); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:15-CV-00357 (E.D. Va. 2015); Democratic Nat'l Committee et al. v. Hobbs et al., No. 16-1065-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz. 2016); Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, No. 3:14-cv-00852-REP-AWA-BMK (E.D. Va. 2014); and Jacobson et al. v. Lee, No. 4:18-cv-00262 (N.D. Fla. 2018). I also worked with a coalition of academics to file Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, and Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422. Much of the testimony in these cases had to do with geography, electoral districts, voting, ballots, and election administration. I recently worked as a consultant for the Maryland Redistricting Commission. I am being compensated at the rate of \$550/hour for my work in this case. My compensation is not dependent upon my conclusions in any way.

III. DATA SOURCES

11. I have collected statewide election data for 2012 to 2020 from the Ohio Secretary of State. I also accessed precinct-level election results from the Ohio Secretary of State for statewide elections from 2016 to 2020 that were matched to 2020 Ohio vote tabulation districts by a team at Harvard University called the Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology Project.¹ Additionally, I accessed the proposed and adopted Ohio redistricting plans uploaded to the web page of the Ohio Redistricting Commission, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits A, C, D, and E.² For the analysis conducted in this report, I use three software packages: Stata, Maptitude for Redistricting, and ArcGIS Pro. In creating my maps,

¹ https://alarm-redist.github.io/posts/2021-08-10-census-2020/

² https://redistricting.ohio.gov/maps

I used the same U.S. Census redistricting data used by the Ohio Redistricting Commission, as archived in the "Ohio University Common and Unified Redistricting Database."³

IV. MEASURING PARTISAN PROPORTIONALITY

- 12. The Ohio Constitution instructs the Commission to use "statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years" to ascertain the "statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio" and attempt to draw a map in which the "statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each party shall correspond closely" to those "statewide preferences."
- 13. As further discussed below, the only reasonable way to implement this notion of "statewide preferences," as ascertained from past elections to anticipated future seat shares, is via the proportion of votes received by the candidates for the two parties. That is to say, if a party won 50 percent of the average statewide vote in the relevant elections, a proposed map should favor that party—aggregating the results of those same elections—in somewhere very close to 50 percent of the seats.
- 14. The first task, then, is to establish this target from the last decade of statewide partisan election results. Figure 1 provides a visualization of Ohio statewide general election results from 2012 to 2020. Ohio is a hotly contested state with a tradition of split-ticket voting and significant swings from one year to another. The Democratic candidate won the presidential contest in 2012, but the Republican candidate won in 2016 and 2020. Ohio's U.S. Senate delegation is typically split between the parties, and other statewide elections are often very competitive, although 2014 was an exception, as was the 2016 U.S. Senate race.
- 15. Figure 1 reveals that while Ohio statewide elections have been mostly quite close over the last decade, Republican candidates have held a narrow advantage. To quantify this, Table 1 provides the raw data. Including all of the statewide general elections from 2012 to 2020, the Democratic share of the two-party vote (ignoring small parties and write-in candidates) was around 46 percent.

³ https://www.redistricting.ohio.gov/resources



Figure 1: Statewide General Election Outcomes, Ohio, 2012-2020

Table 1: Statewide General Election Outcomes, Ohio, 2012-2020

	Democratic Votes	ocratic Republican Other tes Votes		Two-party Democratic Vote Share	
2012 President	2,827,709	2,661,439	91,791	51.5%	
2012 U.S. Senate	2,762,766	2,435,744	250,618	53.1%	
2014 Governor	1,009,359	1,944,848	101,706	34.2%	
2014 Att. Gen.	1,178,426	1,882,048		38.5%	
2014 Auditor	1,149,305	1,711,927	143,363	40.2%	
2014 Sec. of State	1,074,475	1,811,020	141,292	37.2%	
2014 Treasurer	1,323,325	1,724,060		43.4%	

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2016 President	2,394,164	2,841,005	261,318	45.7%
2016 Senate	1,996,908	3,118,567	258,689	39.0%
2018 Senate	2,358,508	2,057,559	1,017	53.4%
2018 Governor	2,070,046	2,235,825	129,949	48.1%
2018 Att. Gen.	2,086,715	2,276,414		47.8%
2018 Auditor	2,008,295	2,156,663	175,962	48.2%
2018 Sec. of State	2,052,098	2,214,273	103,585	48.1%
2018 Treasurer	2,024,194	2,308,425		46.7%
2020 President	2,679,165	3,154,834	88,203	45.9%
Sum, all elections	30,995,458	36,534,651	1,747,493	45.9%
Sum 2016 2020	10 670 002	22 262 565	1 019 722	16 99/
Suiii, 2010-2020	19,070,095	22,303,303	1,010,723	40.0%

- 16. Determining the proportion of districts that favor each party, based on consideration of the relevant elections identified in Article XI, Section 6, requires an aggregation of the precinct-level results of these past elections to the boundaries of a map's proposed districts. However, precinct-level election results linked with geo-spatial boundaries were not available for the 2012 and 2014 elections, as the Commission itself acknowledged in its Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement, attached as Exhibit F. Thus, Table 1 also sets forth that the two-party Democratic vote share in the 2016, 2018, and 2020 general elections was around 47 percent.
- 17. Accordingly, using the full statewide election results from 2012 to 2020, the statewide preferences of Ohio voters must be translated into state legislative maps in which 45.9 percent of seats favor Democrats and 54.1 percent of seats favor Republicans. Since there are 99 seats in the Ohio House of Representatives, a statewide vote share of 45.9 percent would be associated with 45.44 Democratic seats, which rounds down to 45 seats. Similarly, a 45.9 percent vote share would be associated with about 15.15 Democratic seats in the 33-member Ohio Senate, which rounds down to 15 seats.
- 18. I have aggregated the precinct-level results of each election from 2016 to 2020 included in Table 1 to the level of the districts in the 2021 Commission Plan. For each district, I calculate the average Democratic share of the votes received by the candidates of the two major parties across each of these elections. I then ascertain the number of districts in which this quantity is greater than 50 percent. Using this technique, I determine that the 2021 Commission Plan

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produced 37 majority-Democratic House seats and 62 majority-Republican House seats, as shown in Table 2 below. In the Senate, the 2021 Commission Plan produced 10 majority-Democratic Senate seats and 23 majority-Republican seats. This is a gap of 8 House seats and 5 Senate seats between the Democratic-leaning seats produced by the 2021 Commission Plan and the seat share that would be proportionate to the statewide Democratic vote share.

- 19. Notably, the partisanship of the Commission's maps is not very different from that of the current maps, adopted in 2011 and attached as Exhibit B. The current breakdown of the General Assembly under the 2011 maps is as follows: 35 Democrats and 64 Republicans in the House; 8 Democrats and 25 Republicans in the Senate.
- 20. In addition to this examination of seats above and below the 50 percent cut-point, it is also useful to examine how many of the Democratic- and Republican-leaning seats are razor-thin majorities, and how many are more comfortable majorities. I count the number of seats where the average Democratic share of the vote for the two major parties was less than 48 percent—let us call these expected Republican seats. And I count the number of seats where the average Democratic share of the vote for the two major parties was greater than 52 percent—let us call these expected Democratic seats. Finally, I count the number of seats that we might call "toss-ups," where the average Democratic vote share was between 48 percent and 52 percent.
- 21. As set forth in Table 2 below, in the 2021 Commission Plan, all of the majority-Republican House seats are greater than 52 percent Republican. Of the 37 majority-Democratic seats, only 32 are greater than 52 percent Democratic. All 5 of the toss-up seats are slim Democratic majorities. As set forth in Table 3, in the Commission's Senate plan, there are 21 expected Republican seats, 9 expected Democratic seats, and 3 toss-ups, of which 1 is a slim Democratic majority and 2 are slim Republican majorities. As explained further below, by generating a large number of seats with comfortable Republican majorities, the Commission has generated plans that would provide the Republican Party with a majority of seats even in the event of a comfortable Democratic statewide victory.
- 22. In its Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement, the Commission explained its ostensible attempt to comply with the "partisan proportionality" requirement in the Ohio Constitution. In this statement, the Ohio Redistricting Commission offers an unsound implementation of the constitutional requirement, suggesting that in addition to the vote share, an equally reasonable way to measure "statewide preferences" is by calculating the share of all elections in the last decade in which each party received more votes than the other party. This is a flawed way of characterizing voter preferences in general, but especially when the purpose is to evaluate seat shares. With this interpretation, a party that always wins 50.01 percent of the vote in general elections would be viewed as having 100 percent of the "statewide preference," entitling it to draw a map that gave itself all the seats, a patently absurd outcome.
- 23. Consider, for example, a situation in which the United States adopted Ohio's constitutional amendment for U.S. House of Representatives districts. The only nationwide elections are presidential elections, for which Democratic candidates have won a majority of the popular vote in each election since 2004, although many of these elections were extremely close. By the Commission's logic, voters preferred Democratic candidates 100 percent of the time, and

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would therefore be entitled to 100 percent of the seats in Congress. Similarly, the Commission's measurement would suggest that Minnesota voters prefer 100 percent of their elected officials to be Democrats, simply because Democrats have won 100 percent of the statewide partisan races in the past decade—even though those elections were relatively close, and control of the state legislature in Minnesota has been closely divided throughout that period. The same would be true in California, even though more than 6 million people in that state voted for former President Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election. This is simply not a tenable methodology for determining voter preferences.

- 24. In the vast academic literature on voter preferences and seats, I have never encountered the notion that the seat share should correspond to the share of past elections in which a party "won," or received a plurality of votes. Perhaps the foundational work in this literature is a paper published in 1950 by Kendall and Stuart,⁴ exploring the vote share in each election as a measure of voter preferences and examining the transformation of those votes to seats in the British Parliament. Then, Gudgin and Taylor published a book in 1979 that explored the geography of voter preferences, as ultimately expressed through vote shares in specific elections, and the transformation of those votes to seats.⁵ Next, a variety of books and articles by Ronald Johnston and collaborators, and more recently, Gary King and collaborators, further developed these insights about preferences, votes, and seats.⁶ A recent analytical review of the resulting literature is provided in a 2020 article by Katz, King, and Rosenblatt.⁷
- 25. In this entire literature, the basic starting point is to conceptualize vote shares in specific elections as indicators of voter preferences. These works explore how the geography of preferences, combined with the specific electoral districting plan, combine to translate votes into seats in the legislature. All of this literature shares a basic normative notion that 50 percent of the votes should translate into 50 percent of the seats, and that in a two-party system, there should be symmetry in the way a redistricting plan treats the two parties.
- 26. Partisan symmetry means that if the two parties' vote shares were reversed, their seat shares would be similarly reversed. For instance, imagine a redistricting plan in which Party A, if it received 52 percent of the votes, could anticipate 55 percent of the seats, due the fact that it was victorious in several of the most competitive seats. Partisan symmetry means that an electoral wave in favor of Party B, such that Party B now received 52 percent of the votes, would also provide Party B with a similar 55 percent seat share. However, if Party A can manipulate the redistricting process to produce partisan asymmetry, it might produce an unusually large number of seats with comfortable, but not overwhelming, majorities for Party

⁴ M. Kendall and A. Stuart, 1950, "The Law of Cubic Proportion in Election Results," *British Journal of Sociology* 1,3:183,96.

⁵ Gudgin G, PJ Taylor PJ. 1979, *Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organisation of Elections*. London: Pion.

⁶ See PJ Taylor Ronald Johnston, 1979, *Geography of Elections*. London: Croom Helm; and Robert Browning and Gary King, 1987, "Seats, Votes, and Gerrymandering: Estimating Representation and Bias in State Legislative Redistricting." *Law and Policy* 9,3:305-322.

⁷ J. Katz, G. King, and E. Rosenblatt, 2020, "Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evaluations of Partisan Fairness in District-Based Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 114,1: 164-178.

A, thus building a levy to withstand a wave in favor of Party B. In the asymmetric scenario, then, 52 percent of the vote for Party B would be insufficient to provide it with a legislative majority.

- 27. This literature on partisan proportionality and, relatedly, partisan symmetry, does sometimes examine multiple elections in order to examine the impact of different vote shares and different geographies of support over time on the transformation of votes to seats, but the starting point remains that vote share is the means to determine partisan preference. At no point in this literature do scholars conceptualize the notion of partisan proportionality or symmetry as pertaining to the relationship between the seat share and the number of overall pluralities achieved over a period of time.
- 28. In short, the notion of proportionality employed by academics is no different from that employed by pundits, politicians, and the mass public: it pertains to the relationship between the vote share and the seat share. Surely this is also the notion invoked by the Ohio Constitution.
- 29. Thus, the Commission was tasked with attempting to draw a map in which around 54 percent of the seats are anticipated to produce Republican majorities. Instead, they have drawn a House map where Republicans can expect comfortable majorities in 63 percent of the seats. And they have drawn a Senate map in which Republicans can expect majorities in a stunning 70 percent of seats.
- 30. Neither the academic literature nor common usage in political discourse could suggest that this result "closely corresponds" to the "statewide preferences" of voters. In fact, the lack of correspondence between votes and seats is even more profound than suggested by the simple statewide averages discussed thus far. As mentioned above, an important focus of the academic literature on votes and seats is the notion of "symmetry." In a two-party system, what would happen to the seat shares if the vote shares of the two parties reversed?
- 31. Fortunately, recent Ohio electoral history gives us an opportunity to examine just that scenario. In 2018, the Republican candidate for Treasurer, Robert Sprague, won 53.3 percent of the two-party vote. If we aggregate the precinct-level votes in the 2018 Treasurer election to match the 2021 Commission's Ohio House of Representatives districts, Mr. Sprague would win majorities in 64 percent of the districts. That is to say, based on the 2018 votes for Treasurer, the Republican seat share is more than 10 percentage points higher than the Republican vote share.
- 32. On the same day, November 6, 2018, on the same ballot, the Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate, Sherrod Brown, received slightly more votes than Mr. Sprague, ending up with 53.4 percent of the two-party vote. Yet if we aggregate these U.S. Senate votes up to match the 2021 Commission's House districts, Senator Brown would receive majorities in only 49.5 percent of the seats. With relatively similar statewide victories of just over 53 percent, these two candidates' vote shares translate to dramatically different outcomes in terms of seats in the 2021 Commission House map. The Republican candidate's 53.3 percent win translates to a supermajority of seats, while the Democratic candidate's slightly *higher* 53.4 percent win translates to a *minority* of seats.

33. This example reveals the troubling extent to which the 2021 Commission Plan falls short of any notion of correspondence between voters' preferences and legislative seats. Because so many of the Republican majorities in districts drawn by the Commission are comfortable, even if the Democrats win a comfortable majority of votes—on the order of 53.4 percent—they still cannot expect to serve in the legislative majority.

V. COMPARING THE COMMISSION'S MAPS TO ALTERNATIVE MAPS

- 34. It is clearly the case that the 2021 Commission did not adopt maps in which the party seat share closely corresponds with the vote share in relevant statewide elections under any reasonable interpretation of the Ohio Constitution's partisan fairness requirement. But one might imagine that the partisan composition of the Commission's maps was a function of constraints imposed by other constitutional requirements related to traditional redistricting principles that the Commission understood to be more important. Perhaps the Commission *attempted* to abide by Article XI, Section 6(B), but the job was simply too difficult.
- 35. In fact, the next line after the "partisan proportionality" clause dictates that the Commission "shall attempt" to draw compact districts. One might wonder whether the Commission found it difficult to achieve partisan proportionality because of a tension between that goal and the additional goal of drawing compact districts. Moreover, the Constitution requires that the Commission use entire counties, municipal corporations, and townships as the building blocks of districts to the extent possible. Counties with population greater than that which is sufficient for a single district must spill over into only a single additional district. The Commission must also endeavor not to split counties more than once, and not to split more than one municipality per district. Conceivably, efforts to abide by requirements like these could make it difficult for a map-drawer to achieve partisan proportionality despite a concerted effort to do so.
- 36. A simple and effective way to examine such assumptions is to analyze other maps that were made available to the Commission before it finalized its own maps. Did those maps come closer to achieving partisan proportionality while abiding by the same rules and achieving similar benchmarks with respect to the traditional redistricting principles emphasized in the Constitution? If so, one cannot accept the claim that the Commission was forced by restrictive rules into drawing maps with a large advantage for one party.
- 37. Specifically, I examined a map introduced by Senator Sykes on September 2, attached as Exhibit C, and another map introduced by Senator Sykes on September 15, attached as Exhibit H. An additional map was proposed by a group called the "Ohio Citizens Redistricting Commission" and is attached as Exhibit E. Based on my review and to the best of my knowledge, with the possible exception of the Sykes September 2 map, discussed further below, these maps are materially compliant with the line-drawing rules explained above, as set forth in Article XI, Sections 3 and 4 of the Ohio Constitution.
- 38. In addition to examining maps produced by others, I have produced my own redistricting plan for the Ohio House and Senate. By drawing my own maps, I was able to gain a full appreciation for the challenges and trade-offs associated with the Ohio Constitution's

redistricting rules, and can explain how I resolved them, and with what implications for partisanship and respect for traditional redistricting criteria.

- 39. My approach was to begin by creating a complete plan for the House of Representatives and then assemble groups of three House districts in order to produce a Senate plan. However, this approach ran into a roadblock since most reasonable configurations of House districts cannot produce a valid Senate plan. Article XI, Section 4(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution states that "Counties having less than one senate ratio of representation, but at least one house of representatives ratio of representation, shall be part of only one senate district." In Northeast Ohio, it is extremely difficult to comply with Section 4(B)(2) in conjunction with the immediately preceding 4(B)(1), which states that "a county having at least one whole senate ratio of representation shall have as many senate districts wholly within the boundaries of the county as it has whole senate ratios of representation. Any fraction of the population in excess of a whole ratio shall be a part of only one adjoining senate district."
- 40. This is complex in Northeast Ohio because both Cuyahoga and Summit Counties have well beyond the population of a single extra house district that must find a home in an adjoining district, and many surrounding House districts are unavailable as partners because of the prohibition on splits of medium-sized counties and the position of all relevant counties in the corner of the state. A rather unsatisfactory way to solve this problem is to severely underrepresent the people of Northeast Ohio, over-populating virtually every district in this part of the state as close as possible to the 5 percent constraint, and under-populating many districts throughout the rest of the state. I came to the conclusion that this is the only way to configure districts in the House of Representatives in a way that allows for Senate districts that *strictly* comply with Article XI, Section 4 in Northeast Ohio. I thus configured House districts in Northeast Ohio with a sole focus on finding an arrangement that would yield valid Senate districts.
- 41. This same basic approach, with dramatic over-population of Cuyahoga and other Northeast Ohio districts, was also taken in the 2021 Commission Plan, the Citizens' Commission Plan, and the Sykes 9/15 Plan. It is not entirely clear, however, that the Ohio Constitution *requires* this unusual type of harm to the voters of Northeast Ohio, since Article XI, Section 4(B)(3) instructs the commission to "commit the fewest possible violations" in the event that "it is not possible to draw representative districts that comply with all of the requirements of this article." The Sykes map of September 2, 2021 does not strictly comply with Article XI, Section 4, because it splits Trumbull County (between districts 1 and 18), even though it is in the population range of counties for which splits should usually be avoided. The Sykes 9/2 map is, thus, a useful reference point as a map that takes a slightly different approach to interpreting Article XI, Section 4: one that purchases fair representation for Northeast Ohio at the rather minute cost of a single county split. In contrast, the Sykes 9/15 plan removes the offending county split and reconfigures both the House and Senate maps to under-represent Northeast Ohio.
- 42. After resolving the dilemma of Northeast Ohio, my approach was to follow the rules laid out by the Ohio Constitution, beginning with House districts, and, within the strict constraints regarding municipal and county splits, also attempt to maximize compactness and minimize county splits. These goals are sometimes in conflict. In some regions of Ohio, the population

sizes and geographic arrangement of counties mean that in order to keep counties together, one must tolerate some non-compact districts. In general, since the Constitution calls for the use of entire counties as building blocks for districts whenever possible, my approach was to prioritize the minimization of county splits when drawing (and refining) first my House and then my Senate plan, while also trying to make decisions that facilitated a relatively compact set of districts for any given region.

- 43. After achieving these things, I considered an additional factor in metro areas. I attempted to avoid drawing districts that excessively packed members of one of the parties in a way that would undermine their representation. Moreover, when drawing district lines, I attempted to avoid splitting groups of geographically proximate co-partisans in a way that would prevent them from forming a majority.
- 44. I did not deviate from the application of traditional redistricting principles in order to help or harm one of the political parties. For instance, in Toledo, it is possible to further "unpack" urban Democrats and produce an additional majority-Democratic district, but this would have created a rather non-compact district that would have also intentionally split geographically proximate Republican communities. Elsewhere, in a couple of places it is possible within the rules of the Ohio Constitution to string together far-flung Democratic industrial and college towns. I avoided drawing districts in this manner. Rather, within the confines of the constitutional rules and the application of traditional redistricting criteria, I simply made a conscious effort to avoid drawing districts that would have the effect of clearly packing or cracking geographically proximate co-partisans.
- 45. I paid no attention to racial data when drawing my maps. However, after completing my redistricting plans, I checked for compliance with the Voting Rights Act as follows. First, I used precinct-level data on race and partisanship, using the same statewide general election races detailed in Table 1 above and, using ecological inference, ascertained whether racially polarized voting was present within each of Ohio's major metropolitan counties. Next, in counties where racially polarized voting was present, I made sure that, under my alternative Senate and House plans, candidates of choice for Black voters in statewide elections had indeed been victorious in the relevant districts in my redistricting plan. In each metro area with a large Black community and clear evidence of racially polarized voting—specifically Akron, Cincinnati, Dayton, and Toledo—this was clearly the case. I thus did not make any changes to my alternative plans to ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
- 46. For my maps, attached as Exhibit I, for each of the alternative maps presented to the Commission, and for the Commission's proposed maps (attached as Exhibit D), I have produced compactness scores for the districts to assess the maps' compliance with Article XI, Section 6(C). I have included Reock, Polsby-Popper, and Convex Hull compactness measures, each of which takes a somewhat different approach to the notion of district compactness.
- 47. Although the Ohio Constitution does not specify the optimal number of county splits, I have also calculated the number of county splits generated by each plan. I define a county split in the same way as the Ohio Constitution. For example, Franklin County is not considered to be split in a House of Representatives plan if 11 districts are formed that fit completely within

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the county, and no fragment of any district spills over the county boundary. Moreover, a county that is kept intact but joined together with other "split" counties is not considered a split county. A county is only considered to be split if some part—but not all—of its territory is joined with territory from another county in the formation of a district.

Table 2: Summary Information, Ohio House of Representative Plans Submitted to Ohio Redistricting Commission

	Commission 9/15	Commission 9/9	Sykes 9/2	Sykes 9/15	Citizens 9/10	Rodden
Average compactness scores						
(Higher scores = more compact)						
Reock	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.39	0.40	0.41
Polsby-Popper	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.29	0.34	0.36
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.73	0.74	0.72	0.76	0.79
Number of split counties	33	33	30	33	43	32
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share >.5	37	32	44	42	43	43
Expressed as percentage of seats	37.4%	32.3%	44.4%	42.4%	43.4%	43.4%
# of seats with average two-party Republican vote share >.5	62	67	55	57	56	56
Expressed as percentage of seats	62.6%	67.7%	55.6%	57.6%	56.6%	56.6%
Distance from proportional seat allocation (seats)	8	13	1	3	2	2
Expressed as percentage of seats	8.1%	13.1%	1.0%	3.0%	2.0%	2.0%

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# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share >.52	32	31	41	38	42	40
Expressed as a percentage of seats	32.3%	31.3%	41.4%	38.4%	42.4%	40.4%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share <.48	62	63	54	54	54	56
Expressed as percentage of seats	62.6%	63.6%	54.5%	54.5%	54.5%	56.6%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .52	5	5	4	6	3	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	5.1%	5.1%	4.0%	6.1%	3.0%	3.0%

- 48. In Table 2, I provide compactness scores and information on county splits for each of the Ohio House of Representatives plans I analyzed. Next, using the same technique described above, I include the number of majority-Democratic districts, majority-Republican districts, expected Democratic districts, expected Republican districts, and toss-up districts that would be produced by each plan.
- 49. First, in terms of compactness, Senator Sykes' initial plan was slightly more compact than the Commission's final September 15 plan, but his revised plan, after reconfiguring Northeast Ohio, was slightly less compact. The plan produced by the Citizens' Commission was on average more compact according to both the Polsby-Popper and Convex Hull scores. The House map I produced was more compact by every measure than those produced by the Commission, Senator Sykes, and the Citizens' Commission.
- 50. The Commission's House of Representatives Plan splits 33 counties. The Citizens' Commission splits a greater number of counties (43) than does the Ohio Redistricting Commission's, while Senator Sykes' original plan splits fewer counties (only 30), and his revised plan is similar to the Commission's on this dimension. Likewise, my alternative plan splits 32 counties.
- 51. Next, let us examine the partisan outcomes associated with these alternative plans. The relevant information is also contained in Table 2. The initial plan submitted by Senator Sykes came very close to achieving partisan proportionality. It produced 44 majority-Democratic seats and 55 majority-Republican seats—a difference from proportionality of only 1 seat. My alternative plan, as well as the plan produced by the Citizens' Commission, produced 43 Democratic seats and 56 Republican seats—a difference from proportionality of only 2 seats. Senator Sykes's revised plan produced 42 majority-Democratic seats—a difference from proportionality of 3 seats. Again, in contrast to my alternative plan and these other plans, which came very close to achieving partisan proportionality, the Ohio Redistricting Commission's final plan deviated 8 seats from true proportionality.
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- 52. In short, the plans introduced by Senator Sykes and the Citizens' Redistricting Commission are relatively similar to the Commission's Plan in their deference to traditional redistricting criteria emphasized in the Ohio Constitution—and my alternative plan is more compact on average—but each of these plans also comes much closer to achieving the required partisan proportionality. This indicates that the failure of the 2021 Commission Plan to achieve partisan proportionality and its overall favorability to Republicans were intentional choices, rather than natural outgrowths of other constraints.
- 53. Next, let us undertake a similar comparison of the Ohio Redistricting Commission's Senate maps with these alternative maps. The key information is contained in Table 3. Once again, the plans presented by Senator Sykes demonstrated a similar level of average compactness to the Commission's plan on each of the three metrics I considered. And again, my alternative plan, along with the plan produced by the Citizens' Commission, were clearly more compact than the Commission plan. Relative to the Commission's Senate map, my alternative map split 2 additional counties, the Sykes maps split 3 additional counties, and the Citizens' map split 5 additional counties.
- 54. The Commission's Senate map produced only 10 majority-Democratic seats, and 23 majority-Republican seats. In contrast, both the original Sykes Senate map and the Citizens' Commission Senate map produced 14 Democratic seats and 19 Republican seats. The revised Sykes map produced 13 Democratic seats and 20 Republican seats. My alternative map produced 15 Democratic seats and 18 Republican seats. Recall that the target set forth by the Constitution was 15 Democratic seats, meaning that 2 of these plans came within a single seat of the target, and 1 achieved proportionality. Again, as with the House of Representatives, these alternative maps demonstrate that, for the Senate as well, it is possible to abide both by the Ohio Constitution's traditional redistricting requirements as well as its partisan proportionality requirement. The fact that the Commission's map so strongly favors the Republican Party is the result of discretionary choices made by the Commission and reflects that the Commission did not attempt to achieve partisan proportionality.

	Commission 9/15	Commission 9/9	Sykes 9/2	Sykes 9/15	Citizens 9/10	Rodden
Average compactness scores						
(Higher scores = more compact)						
Reock	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.38	0.43	0.44
Polsby-Popper	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.37	0.37
Area/Convex Hull	0.73	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.78	0.78
Number of split counties	13	13	16	16	18	15

Table 3: Summary Information, Ohio Senate Plans Submitted to Ohio Redistricting Commission

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# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share >.5	10	9	14	13	14	15
Expressed as percentage of seats	30.3%	27.3%	42.4%	42.4%	42.4%	45.5%
# of seats with average two-party Republican vote share >.5	23	24	19	20	19	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	69.7%	72.7%	57.6%	60.6%	57.6%	54.5%
Distance from proportional seat allocation (seats)	5	6	1	2	1	0
Expressed as percentage of seats	15.2%	18.2%	3.0%	6.1%	3.0%	0
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share >.52	9	8	13	12	12	12
Expressed as a percentage of seats	9.1%	8.1%	13.1%	12.1%	12.1%	12.1%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share <.48	21	21	18	19	18	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	63.6%	63.6%	54.5%	57.6%	54.5%	54.5%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .52	3	Л	2	2	3	2
anu .32	5	4	Z	Z	5	5
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	4.0%	2.0%	2.0%	3.0%	3.0%

VI. WHY DID THE OHIO REDISTRICTING COMMISSION FALL SO FAR SHORT OF PROPORTIONALITY?

55. It is clear that the 2021 Commission Plan produces outcomes that are at odds with the partisan fairness required by the Ohio Constitution, while alternative plans achieve near-proportional outcomes. Next, it is useful to gain a better understanding of how this happened by examining the specific choices that led to such striking differences in the partisanship of the Commission's maps relative to the alternative maps. This section examines the differences between the maps in more detail, focusing first on aggregate data, and then drilling down into the individual regions where different outcomes are notable.

The Geographic Distribution of Partisanship Across Districts

- 56. In order to gain a better appreciation for the way in which the maps drawn by the Commission differ from the more proportional alternative maps presented by Senator Sykes and the Citizens' Commission, and in this report, it is useful to look at how the different maps diverged in addressing the geographic distribution of partisanship across districts.
- 57. To do this, I present a kernel density—which is simply a smoothed histogram—that displays the distribution of the Democratic vote share across districts for each proposed redistricting plan. Figure 2 does this first for the House plans (in the top panel), and then for Senate plans (in the bottom panel). The bold line captures the distribution of Democratic vote share across the districts in the Commission's maps, and the dashed gray line captures the same thing for the Sykes 9/15 maps. The distributions for the Sykes 9/2 maps as well as the Citizens' Commission maps, as well as my own maps, look very similar to the gray dashed lines, so, for ease of exposition, I do not include them.
- 58. The basic shape of the kernel density in Figure 2 is one that I have written about elsewhere.⁸ Democratic voters tend to be highly concentrated in the urban core of large cities, while Republican voters are concentrated in sprawling rural areas, and suburban areas are heterogeneous and competitive. Inner-ring suburban areas usually lean toward Democrats, and as one moves to the outer-ring suburbs, the Republican vote share increases. In recent years, Democratic majorities have been spilling further out into the suburbs, and in cities like Columbus, now reach to the distant outer suburbs and even some exurbs.

⁸ See Jonathan Rodden, 2010 "The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13:297-340; Jonathan Rodden, 2019, *Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide.* New York: Basic Books.



Figure 2: Distribution of Average Democratic Vote Shares Across Proposed Districts

59. The concentration of some Democratic voters in some very urban areas means that it is often impossible to avoid drawing electoral districts that are extremely Democratic. As a result, both the Commission's map and the alternative maps produce distributions with a long right tail. All of the districts in the right tail of the distributions in Figure 2 are in very urban areas.

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- 60. It should also be noted that in Ohio, many rural areas are also now extremely Republican, and it can be difficult to avoid drawing rural districts that are not overwhelmingly Republican. This phenomenon is only occasionally tempered by the presence of an isolated college town like Oxford or Yellow Springs, which might, for example, turn an otherwise 80 percent Republican area into a 70 percent Republican area. While the left tail of the distribution is not quite as long as the right tail, it also includes a large number of landslide Republican districts.
- 61. The *overall shape* of the distribution—driven by Ohio's political geography—is similar for both the Commission's plan and the alternative plans. That is to say, both have long right tails composed of urban, Democratic districts, and both produce similar numbers of rural, highly Republican districts, as demonstrated by the fact that, on the left side of the graph, the dashed line and solid line are right on top of one another.
- 62. It is clear that Ohio's political geography necessitates some solidly Democratic and solidly Republican districts, but map-drawers have considerable flexibility in the middle of the distribution, and with the extent of packing of Democrats in cities. In Figure 2, we can see that the shape of the distribution of partisanship across districts in the Commission's plan is distinctive in the districts that are neither solidly Republican nor solidly Democratic. This is apparent as we move to the right on the graph and enter the territory of comfortable, but not landslide, Republican victories. The Commission's maps produce a far larger number of such districts. And then, once we cross the 50 percent threshold, there is a dramatic reversal. The Commission's maps produce far *fewer* districts with Democratic majorities. Finally, the maps are also different when we move further to the right, where the black line is above the gray dashed line, indicating that the Commission's maps produce a larger number of landslide Democratic districts—what is known in the literature as "packing."
- 63. How did the Commission and these alternative groups of map-drawers produce maps with such starkly different partisan outcomes, given that they were working within the constraints of the same political geography and the same rather restrictive rules? To find the answer, we must examine Ohio's cities and their surroundings. The differences between the black and gray lines in Figure 2 is driven by choices made in and around cities. In particular, the Commission's maps produced notably fewer majority-Democratic districts in the regions around Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and Dayton.

Franklin County Area

- 64. Consider Franklin County and its surroundings. Figure 3 displays this region, with yellow lines corresponding to the districts drawn in the 2021 Commission House map. Colors go from light blue to dark blue as the precinct-level 2020 presidential Democratic vote share increases. From Figure 3, one can see how the Commission's district boundaries correspond to partisanship.
- 65. Several things are noteworthy about the Commission's map. First, as Franklin County has become more Democratic over time, and as Democratic dominance has spilled over from the urban core to suburban areas, there is now only one possible area for the construction of a comfortable majority-Republican district—in the southwest corner. District 10 in the

Commission's map pulls together all of the most Republican exurban parts of Franklin County in order to carve out such a district. This district runs almost the entire length of Franklin County, from the southern border almost to the northern border, stopping just short of the more Democratic-leaning suburban areas in the northwest corner of the county.

- 66. Second, in the northwest corner of the county, Dublin—especially the part in Franklin County closest to Ohio State University—is an educated suburban community that has been drifting toward the Democratic Party in recent years. It is one of the most Democratic border-adjacent communities in Franklin County. However, instead of connecting it with surrounding Democratic-leaning communities, the Commission map splits Franklin County in the northwest corner to extract Dublin from the rest of Franklin County, combining Dublin with relatively rural Union County. In doing so, the Commission map thus extracts a growing Democratic community and embeds it in a district with numerically greater rural Republicans. Given its population of 1,323,807, Franklin County could easily accommodate 11 districts without a split. Instead, the Commission chose to create 9 under-populated districts and extract a relatively large chunk of Democratic voters from the county, preventing those voters from contributing to an additional Democratic district.
- 67. Finally, there is a group of growing, increasingly Democratic-leaning Columbus suburbs hugging the southern border of Delaware County, and a corridor of Democratic-leaning precincts connecting to the relatively Democratic town of Delaware. If we use decade averages, these suburbs appear to be Republican leaning. However, they have moved sharply toward the Democratic Party in recent years, and in the 2020 Presidential Election, a majority of voters in these suburbs voted for the Democratic candidate. Using the most recent election results, these areas would easily correspond to a compact majority-Democratic district. Instead, the Commission's districts split those increasingly Democratic voters in half with a north-south dividing line, thus preventing a majority-Democratic district. This is a classic example of what is known in the literature on gerrymandering as "cracking."

Figure 3: Franklin County and Surroundings; Partisanship and the Commission's House Boundaries



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- 68. It is useful to contrast the Commission's plan with the alternative plans that exhibited greater statewide proportionality. Beginning with the Commission's plan, followed by my own alternative plan (referred to as the "my plan" or the "Rodden plan"), the Sykes 9/15 plan, and the Citizens' Commission plan, Figure 4 simply displays the districts with Democratic majorities in blue and Republican majorities in red, using averages over all statewide elections from 2012 to 2020. Similar maps will be presented below for other regions, where highly competitive districts, with average Democratic vote share between 48 percent and 52 percent will be displayed with separate colors, but none of the districts displayed in Figure 4 are in that range.
- 69. In Franklin County and the surrounding area, the Commission's plan produces 10 majority-Democratic House districts. In Figure 4, we can see that the Rodden plan, along with the Citizens' Commission plan, produces 11 majority-Democratic districts, while the Sykes plan produces 12.
- 70. Let us now examine the choices made in the alternative maps that produced additional Democratic-leaning Franklin-County districts. First, those drawing alternative maps simply avoided making a special effort to carve out a Republican district in the southwest. For instance, my plan included a relatively compact district in the southwest corner of the county, but I made no effort to keep Democratic-leaning Columbus districts out in order to craft a Republican-leaning district.
- 71. Second, since they did not attempt to carve out a Republican district, the alternative plans engaged in less packing of Democrats into highly non-competitive districts. While the Commission's plan produced 4 Franklin-County districts where the Democratic vote share was above 75 percent, each of the alternative plans each produced only 2 such districts.
- 72. Third, the alternative plans took different approaches to splitting the county. As described above, my approach was to keep counties whole whenever possible. Since it was possible to avoid splitting Franklin County, I did not introduce a split. Like the Commission's plan, the Sykes plan did include a split, and it generated a district that combined some Franklin County precincts that favor Democrats with some rural Republican precincts in a surrounding county (Pickaway). But Pickaway is a smaller county than Union, such that while the Commission's split produced a comfortable Republican district in the northwest, the Sykes plan's split produced a competitive but Democratic-leaning district in the south. The Citizens' Commission did not produce systematically underpopulated districts in Franklin County and, as a result, required a much smaller split fragment of Franklin County.
- 73. Fourth, note that each of the alternative plans produced a compact district in southern Delaware County by keeping the growing Columbus suburbs together rather than splitting them in half. These districts are colored red in Figure 4, which is based on average vote shares over the last decade. However, if one focuses on the 2020 presidential election, these districts are majority-Democratic. Joseph Biden received around 51 percent of the vote in district 61 in both configurations.

Figure 4: Franklin County and Surroundings; Party Majorities Associated with House Boundaries of Four Redistricting Plans



Sykes 9/15





Citizens' Commission



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74. Finally, it is worth noting that the districts in my plan are more compact than those created by the Commission. If we leave aside Delaware County and focus only on the districts of Franklin County, the average compactness of my districts, according to the Polsby-Popper score, was .39, while the score for the Commission's plan was .19. The score for the Sykes plan was .25, and that for the Citizens' plan was .30. The average Reock score for my plan was .47, while the score for the Commission's plan was .37. The scores for the Sykes and Citizens' plans were .40 and .37 respectively.

Hamilton County Area

- 75. Next, let us examine the Cincinnati area. Again, it is useful to get the lay of the land by viewing a precinct-level map of partisanship, superimposing the Commission's districts. It is also useful to understand the arrangement of race, which is highly correlated with voting behavior in metro Cincinnati. Figure 5 demonstrates that there is a north-south swath of Black voters in the middle of Hamilton County. These communities vote in large numbers for Democratic candidates. However, there are also Democratic-leaning suburban communities on the east side of Cincinnati that are not predominantly Black.
- 76. On the west side of Hamilton County, a majority-white, Republican-leaning district will emerge in the outer-ring suburbs and exurbs of Cincinnati in almost any configuration. However, the Commission has crafted a *second* majority-Republican district by keeping both districts as small as possible (within the 5 percent population deviation constraint) and reaching into Forest Park City—a majority-Black and overwhelmingly Democratic area, and surrounding precincts, in order to assemble sufficient population to produce an additional majority-Republican district. As discussed further below, this maneuver led to the creation of a relatively non-compact set of Hamilton County districts.
- 77. Moreover, by carefully avoiding Democratic neighborhoods, the Commission's plan also extracted a Republican-leaning district in Cincinnati's eastern suburbs (District 27). In addition, in the northern suburbs, District 28 in the Commission's plan, while Democratic leaning, is within reach for Republican candidates, with an average Democratic vote share of around 52 percent.

Figure 5: Hamilton County and Surroundings; Partisanship, Race, and the Commission's House Boundaries



Partisanship

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78. Next, let us examine the alternative plans. Like the Commission's map, each of the alternative maps avoided splitting Hamilton County, which wholly contains 7 districts in each map. The Commission's map produced 3 Republican districts and 4 Democratic districts, 1 of which was relatively competitive. My plan, along with the Citizens' plan, produced a 6-1 breakdown, and the Sykes plan produced a 5-2 breakdown, both in favor of the Democrats.

Figure 6: Hamilton County and Surroundings; Party Majorities Associated with House Boundaries of Four Redistricting Plans



Sykes 9/15

Citizens' Commission



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- 79. What accounts for these differences? Above all, these alternative plans made no efforts to craft a second Republican district in the suburbs by cracking Black neighborhoods in the northern part of the county, leaving them with only a single exurban Republican-leaning district. Second, by adopting an east-west rather than north-south orientation for the boundaries on the east side of the county, my plan, along with the Citizens' plan, did not craft an eastern Republican-leaning district.
- 80. Finally, as with Franklin County, the plans that exhibited greater statewide partisan proportionality were also the most compact in Hamilton County. My plan and the Citizens' Commission plan, both with 6-1 Democratic margins, were the most compact plans in Hamilton County. The average Polsby-Popper score for the Citizens' plan was .31, and for my plan it was .26. The Commission's plan and the Sykes plan each had scores of .17. The story is similar for the Reock score. The average for my plan was .43, and for the Citizens' plan it was .41, while for the two more Republican-leaning plans (the Commission's plan and the Sykes plan), the scores were .32 and .34 respectively.

Montgomery County Area

- 81. Next, let us move a few miles to the north and examine the Dayton area. In the Commission's House plan, only 1 of 5 Montgomery-based seats (number 38) has a clear Democratic majority, while an additional seat (number 36) was essentially a tie, with an average Democratic vote share of 50.03 percent. The other 3 seats had comfortable Republican majorities.
- 82. In my plan, there were 3 majority-Democratic seats, although 1 of them was a marginal seat, with an average Democratic vote share of 51.5 percent. Likewise, both the Sykes and Citizens' Commission plans produced 3 majority-Democratic seats. In order to see how the Commission's plan produced such a surprisingly pro-Republican outcome, let us once again examine how the Commission's districts interact with the partisan and racial geography of the county.
- 83. In Figure 7, the Commission's House district boundaries are superimposed on maps of partisanship and race in the Montgomery County area. The Commission's plan takes the relatively compact Black community of metropolitan Dayton, which votes overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates, and scatters it across 4 separate districts. The district with the largest Black community—number 38—is a majority-Democratic district. In fact, it is a super-majority Democratic district, where on average, Democrats win 69 percent of the vote. However, all of the other fragments of Dayton's Black community are combined with sufficient numbers of surrounding white, suburban populations in the 4 other Montgomery districts to generate 1 true toss-up (District 36) and 3 districts with comfortable Republican majorities.
- 84. A key part of this approach was to extract the Black community of Trotwood and other areas on the west side of Dayton and combine them with far-flung, rural Preble County to the west. Considerable care and craft seem to have gone into this effort to break up Black areas of metropolitan Dayton in a way that prevents the emergence of majority-Democratic districts.

Figure 7: Montgomery County and Surroundings; Partisanship, Race, and the Commission's House Boundaries



Partisanship

Race



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Figure 8: Montgomery County and Surroundings; Party Majorities Associated with House Boundaries of Four Redistricting Plans





Citizens' Commission



85. Again, in order to appreciate the partisan impact of the Commission's approach to scattering the Dayton Black community across multiple districts, it is useful to examine the alternative maps. Following the same format as above, Figure 8 provides maps that facilitate comparison of the Commission's plan with the alternative plans.

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- 86. Simply by keeping Dayton-area communities together, my map produced a relatively compact, very Democratic central Dayton district, as well as a Democratic-leaning northern suburban district, and a competitive but Democratic-leaning suburban district to the south. My plan also includes a Republican-leaning exurban district to the South, and a western exurban district that, like the Commission's district, combines with Preble County. A notable difference, however, is that my plan does not extract western Dayton-area Black communities in order to place them in a predominantly rural district. The configuration is different, but the same overall structure is present in the Citizens' plan. The Sykes plan has some similarities, but it is less compact, and combines parts of the Southern and western suburbs.
- 87. Once again, my plan and the plan produced by the Citizens' Commission, were substantially more compact according to the Polsby-Popper score, with average scores of .27 and .29 respectively for the Montgomery districts. The average score of the Commission's plan was .15, and the Sykes plan was .13. The four plans were less distinctive, however, according to the Reock score—all were bunched together with scores ranging from .37 to .39.

Northeast Ohio

- 88. Next, let us examine Northeast Ohio. As described above, all of the mapmakers faced difficult constraints associated with the strict rules for the construction of Senate districts, and these rules had implications for House districts as well. Each of the redistricting plans considered here ended up with the same basic solution: they drew consistently underpopulated districts in Cuyahoga County, and indeed throughout the northeastern part of the state, and included a district that combines parts of several counties. Also, in each plan, it was necessary to create a district that kept Canton, Ohio whole.
- 89. In spite of these constraints, the Commission's plan ended up with a very different partisan outcome than the alternative plans. If we consider Northeast Ohio to be the area contained in Figure 9, the Commission's House plan includes 14 districts with average Democratic vote shares above 52 percent, and an additional 4 districts with very slim Democratic majorities, for a total of 18 majority-Democratic districts. As mentioned above, the Commission's House plan does not include any bare-majority Republican districts, in Northeast Ohio or anywhere else. Under the Commission's plan, 18 is perhaps the upper limit of districts that might be competitive for Democratic candidates.
- 90. In my plan, there are 17 districts with an average Democratic vote share above 52 percent, and 2 additional districts with Democratic vote shares between 50 and 52 percent, so that overall, there are 19 Democratic-leaning districts. The Sykes plan includes 17 districts with average Democratic majorities greater than 52 percent, 2 districts with slim Democratic-leaning districts, and 2 districts with slim Republican majorities, for a total of 19 Democratic-leaning districts, and 21 districts that could be at least competitive for Democratic candidates. The House plan produced by the Citizens' Commission produced 19 districts with average Democratic vote shares greater than 52 percent, and 2 additional districts with slim Republican majorities, again producing 21 districts that could be competitive for Democratic candidates.

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91. To understand the sources of these differences, let us proceed through the region, guided by the image of the Commission's district boundaries superimposed on precinct-level election results (Figure 9), and images capturing the partisan outcomes produced by the Commission's maps and the alternative maps (Figure 10).

Figure 9: Northeast Ohio; Partisanship and the Commission's House Boundaries



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Figure 10a: Northeast Ohio; Party Majorities Associated with House Boundaries of the Commission's Plan and the Rodden Alternative Plan



Rodden Alternative Map



Huffman 9/15

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Figure 10b: Northeast Ohio; Party Majorities Associated with House Boundaries of the Sykes 9/15 and Citizens' Commission Plans



Citizens' Commission



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- 92. I begin with the county of Lorain. There are long-standing Democratic strongholds in each of the old industrial towns along the lake between the Sandusky Bay and Cleveland, including Lorain and Elyria, both of which are in Lorain County. Slightly to the southwest of Elyria is the small Democratic stronghold of Oberlin. Combined with their Republican suburban and rural surroundings, these towns make Erie and Lorain extremely competitive. Democrat Richard Cordray won Lorain County in the 2018 gubernatorial election by 6,578 votes, and all other statewide Democrats also won Lorain County that year, but Donald Trump won Lorain County by 3,853 votes in the 2020 presidential election. In Erie County, while Trump won by over 4,000 votes in 2020, Republican Governor DeWine received only 83 more votes than Cordray.
- 93. In this region, the Commission's plan produced only a single, very Democratic seat, with an average Democratic vote share of 63 percent, surrounded by comfortably Republican seats. This was achieved by combining the cities of Lorain and Elyria into a single district, numbered 51. When drawing districts in Lorain County, I avoided this packing strategy. Rather, I drew separate Lorain (50) and Elyria (51) districts. The Sykes map also created separate Lorain (53) and Elyria-based (52) districts. In both my map and the Sykes map, the Lorain-based district ends up comfortably Democratic, while the Elyria seat is Democratic-leaning but quite competitive. The Sykes approach also creates a competitive Republican-leaning district that includes Sandusky and Oberlin. In general, the Sykes plan makes this section of the Lake Erie coastline quite competitive relative to the Commission's plan. The Citizens' Commission plan produces 2 comfortably Democratic seats, by creating a Lorain-centric district, numbered 53, as well as an elongated coastal district that pulls together Elyria, Oberlin, and Sandusky.
- 94. Next, in Cuyahoga County, the Commission's plan carved out a comfortable Republican district along the southern border of the county, numbered 17, as well as a competitive Parma-based district, numbered 15. Looking at Figure 9, one can see that district 17 was drawn so as to pull together Republican-leaning communities in the outer suburbs. Using all of the elections since 2016, District 15 has an average Democratic vote share of 51.7 percent, but it should be noted that Donald Trump won majorities in this district in both 2016 and 2020. In addition, the district that combines Cuyahoga, Geauga, and Summit counties is essentially a toss-up, with an average Democratic vote share of 50.1 percent. In short, this plan creates 3 districts that are either comfortable or quite competitive for Republican candidates.
- 95. As described above, my approach to Cuyahoga County was to pay no attention to partisanship, but rather, to focus on generating a House plan that would enable a valid Senate plan. This required careful efforts to avoid splitting municipalities, while creating districts that were as close as possible to the 5 percent population deviation threshold. Those efforts did not yield a majority-Republican district in southern Cuyahoga County. The same was true of the Citizens' plan, but the Sykes 9/15 plan did produce one such district.
- 96. As in other metro areas examined above, an important part of the reason for the difference between the Commission's plan and the alternative plans in Cuyahoga County is that the Commission produces 6 districts with Democratic majorities higher than 70 percent, while each of the alternative plans produces only 4 such highly packed districts.

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- 97. Next, let us turn to Summit County. The Commission's plan produces 3 comfortable Democratic districts and 1 comfortable Republican district. My plan divided most of the county into 4 relatively compact quadrants, which generated 4 Democratic-leaning districts. The Sykes plan and Citizens' Commission plans also produced 3 majority-Democratic districts and 1 majority-Republican district, but 1 of the majority-Democratic districts in the Sykes plan—number 32—is extremely competitive, with an average Democratic vote share of only 50.7 percent.
- 98. Next, each redistricting plan had a different approach to the city of Canton. In the Commission's plan, the Canton district, number 49, is quite competitive for Republican candidates, with an average Democratic vote share of 51 percent. In my plan, and in both the Sykes and Citizens' Commission plans, a more compact Canton-based district (numbered 47 in the Rodden plan and 49 in the others), produced more comfortable Democratic majorities (53.9 percent in the Rodden plan, 54.5 in the Sykes plan, and 54.1 percent in the Citizens' plan).
- 99. Finally, Mahoning County is evenly divided, with 1 majority-Democratic districts and 1 majority-Republican district in the Commission's plan, in the Rodden plan, and in the Sykes plan. The population of Mahoning County makes it possible to draw 2 House districts that fall completely within Mahoning County. My plan, as well as the Citizens' Commission plan, were able to achieve this. Note that the configuration adopted by the Citizens' Commission plan led to the creation of 2 majority-Democratic districts rather than only 1.
- 100. As with the other metro areas examined above, in Northeast Ohio, my alternative plan, as well as the plans introduced by Senator Sykes and the Citizens' Commission produced a larger number of majority-Democratic districts than did the Commission's plan—thus pushing the overall plan in the direction of statewide partisan proportionality. This was not achieved by abandoning the application of traditional redistricting principles. By avoiding a split of Mahoning County, my plan and the Citizens' Commission plan contained 1 fewer county split in Northeast Ohio than did the Commission's plan. There is no evidence that the specific county splits and mergers selected in the Sykes or Citizens' Commission plans did greater violence to specific communities of interest than did the Commission's plan. As in the other parts of Ohio explored above, my alternative map was more compact on average than the Commission's map. The average Polsby-Popper score for my map, as well as the Citizens' map, in the districts of Northeast Ohio was .35. The score for the Commission's plan was .30, and that for the Sykes plan was .27. The average Reock scores were closer together. The average score for my plan was .41, the Citizens' Commission and the Ohio Redistricting Commission were both .39, and Sykes plan was .37.

Summary of Case Studies

101. This tour around Ohio's metropolitan areas helps explain how the Commission managed to produce so many Republican-majority districts relative to the statewide vote share. For the most part, they followed the strategy of packing and cracking the supporters of their opponents. In each metropolitan area discussed above, the Commission generated a set of extremely Democratic districts in urban core areas, leaving fewer Democrats to contribute to potential Democratic majorities in other districts. As demonstrated by the alternative maps,

it was always possible to abide by traditional redistricting principles and draw compact districts that did not produce nearly as many extremely Democratic districts. Packing occurred not just in dense neighborhoods in large cities. Another example of packing is in Lorain County, where two Democratic cities were stuffed into the same district.

- 102. Second, when possible, the Commission's maps attempted to prevent geographically proximate groups of Democrats from joining together to form a district. In the Cincinnati and Dayton metro areas, for instance, this involved splitting proximate suburban Black communities and scattering them across majority-Republican districts that were largely exurban and even rural. As demonstrated by the alternative plans, these choices were not driven by constitutional rules, traditional redistricting principles, or geographic constraints. Rather, they were driven by discretionary choices.
- 103. Third, while keeping proximate groups of Democrats apart, when possible, the Commission's plans always attempted to string together groups of proximate Republicans to carve out majority-Republican districts within urban counties. Often, this involved a configuration based on long, narrow strips hugging the county boundary in sparsely populated exurban areas. Examples include District 10 in southwest Franklin County, District 27 in eastern Hamilton County, District 39 outside of Dayton, and District 17 in southern Cuyahoga County. District 31 in Summit County follows the Republican-leaning exurbs almost all the way around Akron.
- 104. Additionally, the Commission was careful in its use of county splits near cities. In Franklin County, for example, the Commission created a series of under-populated but extremely Democratic districts, freeing up voters to combine with a neighboring rural, Republican county, thus minimizing the Democratic seats produced in the Columbus area.
- 105. These case studies demonstrated that it is not always necessary to draw bizarre-shaped districts in order to pursue the cracking and packing maneuvers that produce surprisingly pro-Republican outcomes. However, it is telling that in each metro area my maps were, on average, more compact than those produced by the Commission according to the Polsby-Popper measure, and in most cases, according to the Reock measure as well. The same was true of the maps produced by the Citizens' Commission. Recall from Tables 2 and 3 above that when considered as a whole, my maps and those produced by the Citizens' Commission were more compact by every measure than those produced by the Ohio Redistricting Commission.
- 106. Overall, the contrast between the Commission's map and the alternative maps allows us to rule out the claim that the surprisingly large number of anticipated Republican seats associated with the Commission's plan were somehow driven by the confluence of Ohio's political geography, the requirements of the Ohio Constitution, and a focus on traditional redistricting principles. Indeed, we have seen that three very different alternative plans came very close to overall partisan proportionality, while abiding by the rules of the Ohio Constitution and often hewing more closely to traditional redistricting principles.

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VII. CONCLUSION

- 107. Under no reasonable statistical method or definition do the Ohio State House of Representatives and Senate maps adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission achieve partisan proportionality.
- 108. The Commission's plan favors Republicans for reasons other than compliance with traditional redistricting principles and the Ohio Constitution's other requirements, as demonstrated by maps that I have prepared myself, as well as alternative maps presented to the Commission. These alternative maps achieve far greater partisan proportionality and are relatively similar, indeed in many cases better, according to traditional redistricting principles.

Jonathan Andrew Rodden

Jonathan Rodden

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF Duval Sworn to before me this <u>22nd</u> day of October 2021. _{by Jonathan Andrew Rodden}

10 1ch

Notary Public Richard T Schnell Notarized online using audio-video communication

Provided Identification: Passport



RICHARD T SCHNELL Notary Public - State of Florida

Commission # HH 29895 Expires on August 9, 2024

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Derek Clinger, hereby certify that a copy of Evidence of Bennett Relators (Expert Affidavit of Dr. Jonathan Rodden) was served via email this 22nd day of October, 2021, upon the counsel listed below:

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AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN – APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS

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С	September 2, 2021 Ohio Senate Democratic Update	RODDEN_0007 - 0009
D	September 9, 2021 Ohio Senate President	RODDEN_0010 - 0012
Е	Ohio Citizens' Redistricting Commission Plan	RODDEN_0013 - 0015
F	Article XI, Sec 8(C)(2) Statement	RODDEN_0016 - 0018
G	Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Jonathan Rodden	RODDEN_0019 - 0027
Н	September 15, 2021 House& Senate Dem Caucus	RODDEN_0028 - 0030
Ι	Rodden Alternative Plan	RODDEN_0031 - 0033

Exhibit A

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Exhibit B

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Exhibit C




Exhibit D





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Exhibit E





Exhibit F

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Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement

Pursuant to Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Redistricting Commission issues the following statement:

The Commission determined that the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio predominately favor Republican candidates.

The Commission considered statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years. There were sixteen such contests. When considering the results of each of those elections, the Commission determined that Republican candidates won thirteen out of sixteen of those elections resulting in a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates of 81% and a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates of 19%. When considering the number of votes cast in each of those elections for Republican and Democratic candidates, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is 54% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is 46%. Thus, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is between 54% and 81% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is between 19% and 46%. The Commission obtained publicly available geographic data for statewide partisan elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020. Publicly available geographic data for those elections was not available for elections in 2012 and 2014. Using this data, the Commission adopted the final general assembly district plan, which contains 85 districts (64.4%) favoring Republican candidates and 47 districts (35.6%) favoring Democratic candidates out of a total of 132 districts. Accordingly, the statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each political party corresponds closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

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The final general assembly district plan adopted by the Commission complies with all of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution. The Commission's attempt to meet the aspirational standards of Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution did not result in any violation of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution.

Exhibit G

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Ph.D. Political Science, Yale University, 2000.Fulbright Scholar, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993–1994.B.A., Political Science, University of Michigan, 1993.

Academic Positions

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2020-present.

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2012-present.

Director, Spatial Social Science Lab, Stanford University, 2012-present.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2010–2012.

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2007–2012.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, CA, 2006–2007.

Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT, 2003-2006.

Visiting Scholar, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 2004.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT, 1999–2003.

Instructor, Department of Political Science and School of Management, Yale University, 1997–1999.

Publications

Books

Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Divide. Basic Books, 2019.

Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming. Co-edited with Erik Wibbels, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

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John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2021.

Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations," 2021.

National Institutes of Health, funding for "Relationship between lawful handgun ownership and risk of homicide victimization in the home," 2021.

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Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant, 2015.

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Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association, 2016.

Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.

General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.

Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.

Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, beginning Fall 2010.

Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 2009.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2008.

United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.

Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections, public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).

MIT Dean's Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.

Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize the conference, "European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective," held at Harvard University, November 4, 2000.

Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.

Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.

Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the University of Michigan, 1993.

W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan, 1993.

Other Professional Activities

Selection committee, best paper award, American Journal of Political Science.

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.

Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.

Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.

Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.

Courses

Undergraduate

Politics, Economics, and Democracy Introduction to Comparative Politics Introduction to Political Science

Political Science Scope and Methods

Institutional Economics

Spatial Approaches to Social Science

Graduate

Political Economy Political Economy of Institutions Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization Politics and Geography

Consulting

2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.

2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID, Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).

2019: Written expert testimony in *McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann,* United States District Court, Mississippi.

2019: Expert witness in Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* No. 4:18-cv-002510, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

2017: Expert witness in *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

2017: Expert witness in *Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al.*, No. 2:16-CV-01065, United States District Court for Arizona.

2016: Expert witness in *Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.

2016: Expert witness in *Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.

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2014-2015: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al.,* 2012-CA-002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).

2013-2014: Expert witness in *Romo v Detzner*, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County (Florida Congressional redistricting case).

2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.

2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.

2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.

2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank decentralization and safety net programs.

2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.

1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for *World Development Report*, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentralization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator on review of subnational adjustment lending.

Last updated: September 23, 2021

Exhibit H



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Exhibit I

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Rodden Alternative House Plan

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Rodden Alternative Senate Plan

Rodden Decl. Ex. D

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, <i>et al.</i> ,	
Petitioners,	Case No. 2021-1198
	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio
v.	Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S. Ct. Prac. R. 14.03]
Respondents.	

EXHIBITS TO BENNETT PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS – VOLUME 3 (Affidavit of Dr. Jonathan Rodden & Exhibits)

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Counsel for Respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, <i>et al</i> .,	
Petitioners,	Case No. 2021-1198
V.	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S. Ct. $P_{rac} = P_{14} = 14.031$
Respondents.	17ac. K. 14.05j

EXPERT AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN

I, Jonathan Rodden, having been duly sworn and cautioned according to law, hereby state that I am over the age of eighteen years and am competent to testify to the facts set forth below based on my personal knowledge and having personally examined all records referenced in this affidavit, and further state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- 1. For the purpose of this report, I have been asked to examine whether and how the revised redistricting plan for the Ohio State House of Representatives and Ohio Senate, adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on January 22, 2022, (attached as Exhibits A and B) ("Revised Plan"), addresses the standard set forth in Article XI, Section 6(B), namely, that "[t]he statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio."
- 2. As this Court stated in its January 12, 2022 opinion declaring invalid the General Assembly plan adopted by the Commission on September 16, 2021, "[i]f it is possible for a district plan to comply with Section 6 and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, the commission must adopt a plan that does so." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 88.
- 3. I demonstrate that this "partisan proportionality" standard was once again clearly not met by the map adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission. In short, it was possible to draw General Assembly maps that both complied with the line-drawing requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of Article XI of the Ohio Constitution and closely corresponded to the statewide preference of Ohio voters. Despite this fact, the Commission adopted a plan that does not closely correspond to such preferences.
- 4. In order to ascertain whether it was possible for the Commission to comply with both Section 6(B) and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution, I submit my own alternative

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maps (attached as Exhibits C and D). These maps are largely identical to the maps submitted to this Court as an attachment to my previous report in this case, dated October 22, 2021. I have made amendments to these maps to correct a few minor line-drawing issues (described in paragraph 27-28 below). I also renumbered the districts in the Senate map to ensure compliance with Article XI, Section 5; that is, I numbered the districts as if the Commission were ready to adopt this plan without revisions. Neither change impacted the partisan seat count of the map or led to a violation of another provision of Article XI.

- 5. I understand that, prior to the Commission's adoption of the Revised Plan, maps were submitted to the Commission that were identical to the ones I submit today (with the exception of the numbering of Senate districts, which I have now finalized).
- 6. The alternative maps attached as Exhibits C and D comply with each of the requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. They also produce a partisan breakdown that closely corresponds to the preferences of Ohio voters, with precise proportionality in the Senate, and a closer correspondence with partisan proportionality in the House than the Revised Plan. These maps also draw, on a plan-wide basis, more compact districts than those in the Revised Plan and split fewer counties.
- 7. Additionally, during my examination of the Revised Plan, I discovered that the plan contains multiple House districts that split more than one township or municipal corporation, in contravention of Article XI, Section 3(D)(3).
- 8. I also discovered that many of the purportedly Democratic districts in the Revised Plan's House map are actually toss-up districts in which the forecasted Democratic vote share is between 50 and 52 percent. For most of these districts, the vote share falls within the very close 50 to 51 percent range, likely making the seats up for grabs in any given election and highly responsive to changes in electoral conditions from cycle to cycle. By contrast, none of the Republican-leaning districts in the Revised Plan's House map fall within the 50 to 52 percent Republican range. This creates a false impression as to the parties' respective seat shares, since the Republican seat share is the minimum number of seats Republicans are likely to win, while the Democratic seat share is that party's likely maximum. This issue is compounded by the fact that almost all of these toss-up districts are held by Republican incumbents.
- 9. I was also asked to conduct a careful examination of the key geographic regions where the likely partisan outcomes associated with the Revised Plan were notably different from those associated with my map and the other alternative maps considered in my initial report. In most respects, my alternative plan is more respectful of traditional redistricting criteria than the Revised Plan. Above all, it produces districts with higher compactness scores and fewer county splits, while also producing a number of Democratic-leaning districts that is consistent with the partisan proportionality standard of Article XI, Section 6(B). Moreover, in and around metro areas, the Revised Plan still uses non-compact districts likely to elect Democratic candidates, opting instead to generate a series of districts with Democratic vote shares very slightly above 50 percent, almost all of which include Republican candidates who enjoy the advantages of incumbency.

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II. QUALIFICATIONS

- 10. I am currently a tenured Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the founder and director of the Stanford Spatial Social Science Lab—a center for research and teaching with a focus on the analysis of geo-spatial data in the social sciences. I am engaged in a variety of research projects involving large, fine-grained geo-spatial data sets including ballots and election results at the level of polling places, individual records of registered voters, census data, and survey responses. I am also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Hoover Institution. Prior to my employment at Stanford, I was the Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I received my Ph.D. from Yale University and my B.A. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, both in political science. A copy of my current C.V. is included as Exhibit E.
- 11. In my current academic work, I conduct research on the relationship between the patterns of political representation, geographic location of demographic and partisan groups, and the drawing of electoral districts. I have published papers using statistical methods to assess political geography, balloting, and representation in a variety of academic journals including Statistics and Public Policy, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Virginia Law Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, the Annual Review of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics. One of these papers was selected by the American Political Science Association as the winner of the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best paper on political economy published in the last year, and another received an award from the American Political Science Association section on social networks. In 2021, I received a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, and received the Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations."
- 12. I have recently written a series of papers, along with my co-authors, using automated redistricting algorithms to assess partisan gerrymandering. This work has been published in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Election Law Journal*, and *Political Analysis*, and it has been featured in more popular publications like the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and *Boston Review*. I have recently completed a book, published by *Basic Books* in June of 2019, on the relationship between political districts, the residential geography of social groups, and their political representation in the United States and other countries that use winner-take-all electoral districts. The book was reviewed in *The New York Times*, *The New York Review of Books*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, and *The Atlantic*, among others.
- 13. I have expertise in the use of large data sets and geographic information systems (GIS), and I conduct research and teaching in the area of applied statistics related to elections. My PhD students frequently take academic and private sector jobs as statisticians and data scientists. I frequently work with geo-coded voter files and other large administrative data sets, including in recent papers published in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* and *The New England Journal of Medicine*. I have developed a national data set of geo-coded precinct-level election

results that has been used extensively in policy-oriented research related to redistricting and representation.

14. I have been accepted and testified as an expert witness in several election law and redistricting cases: *Romo v. Detzner*, No. 2012-CA-000412 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2012); *Mo. State Conference of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist.*, No. 4:2014-CV-02077 (E.D. Mo. 2014); *Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, No. 3:15-CV-00357 (E.D. Va. 2015); *Democratic Nat'l Committee et al. v. Hobbs et al.*, No. 16-1065-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz. 2016); *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-cv-00852-REP-AWA-BMK (E.D. Va. 2014); and *Jacobson et al. v. Lee*, No. 4:18-cv-00262 (N.D. Fla. 2018). I also worked with a coalition of academics to file Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court in *Gill v. Whitford*, No. 16-1161, and *Rucho v. Common Cause*, No. 18-422. Much of the testimony in these cases had to do with geography, electoral districts, voting, ballots, and election administration. I recently worked as a consultant for the Maryland Redistricting Commission. I am being compensated at the rate of \$550/hour for my work in this case. My compensation is not dependent upon my conclusions in any way.

III. DATA SOURCES

15. I have collected statewide election data for 2012 to 2020 from the Ohio Secretary of State. I also accessed precinct-level election results from the Ohio Secretary of State for statewide elections from 2016 to 2020 that were matched to 2020 Ohio vote tabulation districts by a team at Harvard University called the Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology Project.¹ Additionally, I accessed the Revised Plan approved by the Commission and uploaded to the web page of the Ohio Redistricting Commission, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits A and B.² For the analysis conducted in this report, I use three software packages: Stata, Maptitude for Redistricting, and ArcGIS Pro. In creating my maps, I used the same U.S. Census redistricting data used by the Ohio Redistricting Database."³

IV. MEASURING PARTISAN PROPORTIONALITY

- 16. The Ohio Constitution instructs the Commission to use "statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years" to ascertain the "statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio" and attempt to draw a map in which the "statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each party . . . correspond[s] closely" to those "statewide preferences."
- 17. As this Court explained in its January 12, 2022 opinion in this case:

As used in Article XI, Section 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the term "statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio" means the percentages of votes received by the candidates of each political party based on the total votes cast in statewide state and federal

¹ https://alarm-redist.github.io/posts/2021-08-10-census-2020/

² https://redistricting.ohio.gov/maps

³ https://www.redistricting.ohio.gov/resources

partisan elections during the preceding ten years. In this case, there is no dispute that under this methodology, which looks at votes cast in statewide elections over the relevant period, about 54 percent of Ohio voters preferred Republican candidates and about 46 percent of Ohio voters preferred Democratic candidates.

League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 108. Thus, the Commission must attempt to draw a plan with a seat share that "closely corresponds" to a breakdown of 54 percent in favor of Republicans and 46 percent in favor of Democrats.

- 18. Determining the proportion of districts that favor each party, based on consideration of the relevant elections identified in Article XI, Section 6, requires an aggregation of the precinct-level results of these past elections to the boundaries of a map's proposed districts. However, precinct-level election results linked with geo-spatial boundaries were not available for the 2012 and 2014 elections, as the Commission itself acknowledged in its initial Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement (accompanying the since-struck down September 16, 2021 General Assembly plan), attached as Exhibit H. As discussed in my previous report to this Court, using the full statewide election results from 2012 to 2020, the statewide preferences of Ohio voters must be translated into state legislative maps in which 45.9 percent of seats favor Democrats and 54.1 percent of seats favor Republicans. Since there are 99 seats in the Ohio House of Representatives, a statewide vote share of 45.9 percent would be associated with 45.44 Democratic seats, which rounds down to 45 seats. Similarly, a 45.9 percent vote share would be associated with about 15.15 Democratic seats in the 33-member Ohio Senate, which rounds down to 15 seats.
- 19. As was the case in my previous report, I opted to use the Commission's precise methodology for ascertaining each party's seat count under the Revised Plan. I do so not as an endorsement of the methods used by the Commission, but rather, in order to facilitate apples-to-apples comparison. Accordingly, I aggregated the precinct-level results of each election from 2016 to 2020 to the level of the districts in the Revised Plan. For each district, I calculate the average Democratic share of the votes received by the candidates of the two major parties across each of these elections. I then ascertain the number of districts in which this quantity is greater than 50 percent. Using this technique, I determine that the Revised Plan produced 42 majority-Democratic House seats and 57 majority-Republican House seats, as shown in Table 1 below. In the Senate, the Revised Plan produced 13 majority-Democratic Senate seats and 20 majority-Republican seats, as shown in Table 2 below. Both of these maps fall short of partisan proportionality, by two seats in the Senate and three seats in the House.
- 20. In addition to this examination of seats above and below the 50 percent cut-point, it is also useful to examine how many of the Democratic- and Republican-leaning seats are razor-thin majorities, and how many are more comfortable majorities. I count the number of seats where the average Democratic share of the vote for the two major parties was less than 48 percent—let us call these "expected Republican seats." And I count the number of seats where the average Democratic share of the vote for the two major parties was greater than 52 percent—let us call these "expected Democratic seats." Finally, I count the number of seats that we

might call "toss-ups," where the average Democratic vote share was between 48 percent and 52 percent.

- 21. As set forth in Table 1 below, in the Revised Plan, all of the majority-Republican House seats are greater than 52 percent Republican. Of the 42 majority-Democratic seats, only 29 are greater than 52 percent Democratic. The main difference between the invalidated plan and the Revised Plan is the creation of an additional set of toss-up seats that are nominally Democratic. All 13 of the toss-up seats are slim Democratic majorities. As set forth in Table 2, in the Commission's Senate plan, there are 19 expected Republican seats, 9 expected Democratic seats, and 5 toss-ups, of which 4 have a slim Democratic majority and 1 has a slim Republican majority.
- 22. Indeed, a large number of nominally Democratic-leaning seats (as identified using the Commission's methodology) reflect razor-thin margins. Figure 1 provides a discrete histogram of the average Democratic vote share in the House districts of the Revised Plan. Each vertical line corresponds to a district. I display the range of districts with an average Democratic vote share between 45 percent and 55 percent.

Figure 1: Discrete Histogram of District-Level Average Democratic Vote Share, Revised House Plan⁴



⁴ Note that this chart does not include very safe seats, which have partisan indices of lower than 45 or greater than 55 percent.

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- 23. Figure 1 demonstrates a remarkable "bunching" of 10 districts between 50 percent and 51 percent, with an additional 3 districts with a Democratic vote share a little over 51 percent. In contrast, there are no Republican-leaning districts in this range.
- 24. As explained further below, by generating a large number of seats with comfortable Republican majorities and a set of toss-up seats with very slim Democratic majorities, the Commission has generated plans that would provide the Republican Party with a majority of seats even in the event of a very comfortable Democratic statewide victory.
- 25. This discrepancy in the allocation of toss-up seats is more severe than the previous plan approved by the Commission on September 16, 2021 (the "Invalidated Plan"). In that plan, all of the majority-Republican seats in the House were similarly greater than 52 percent Republican, while the 5 toss-up seats were Democratic-leaning.

V. COMPARING THE REVISED PLAN TO MY ALTERNATIVE PLAN

- 26. On October 22, 2021, I produced to this court my own redistricting plan for the Ohio House and Senate ("Rodden I"). As described in my previous report, the plan created 43 Democratic seats in the House and 15 Democratic seats in the Senate.
- 27. Following the Court's January 12, 2022 order striking down the Invalidated Plan, I conducted another review of the Rodden I plan in conjunction with its potential submission to the Commission for consideration in the remedial process. In doing so, I discovered that my proposed plan contained a few technical line-drawing issues.
- 28. The technical issues I discovered consisted of the following:
 - A few small sets of largely unpopulated census tracks being separated from their townships and municipalities;
 - Certain district lines being drawn to follow township boundaries instead of municipal boundaries.
- 29. After discovery of these issues, I promptly revised the plan to correct each of the items described above. These revisions did not impact the plan's partisan seat count or its compliance with any other provision of Article XI. They were not difficult to make.
- 30. I understand that a revised version of my initial plan was submitted to the Commission by Petitioners Bria Bennett and the League of Women Voters on January 20, 2022.
- 31. Section 5 of Article XI requires that, for incumbent Senators not running for office in the election following a redistricting (here, the 2022 election), the number that corresponds to the district each such Senator represents must be assigned to a district containing the largest portion of the population of the candidate's previous district. Thus, once a Senate plan is finalized, incumbents are assigned to specific districts, and those districts are numbered accordingly.

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The map I submitted did not assign incumbents to specific districts, as it was not clear whether the Commission would consider the plan at all or, if it did, make further changes to it that required renumbering districts.

- 32. In my submission to this court ("Rodden II"), attached as Exhibits C and D, I have renumbered the Senate districts in compliance with Section 5 and present this Court with a map that is in adoption-ready form. The renumbering of the map in no way impacted any district boundaries nor the partisan seat share of the map. Aside from this renumbering of Senate districts, the maps attached as Exhibits C and D are identical to the maps submitted by Petitioners Bennett and League of Women Voters to the Commission on January 20.
- 33. Rodden II fully complies with each of Article XI's provisions, including the subdivision split provisions of Sections 3 and 4, and the district-numbering provisions of Section 5.
- 34. Rodden II also performs better than the Revised Plan in terms of the number of county splits. The total subdivision splits from each county are set forth in Tables 1 and 2 below. In total, Rodden II splits 32 counties on the House side and 15 on the Senate side. By contrast, the Revised plan splits 37 counties on the House side and 17 on the Senate side. For both the House and the Senate, the Revised Plan splits a greater number of counties than the Invalidated Plan.
- 35. In compliance with Article XI, Section 3(D)(3), Rodden II does not split more than one municipal corporation or township in any House district.
- 36. The Revised Plan, on the other hand, violates Section 3(D)(3) in its House map in several instances. First, the Revised Plan's House map splits both Akron and Copley between Districts 31 and 33, as can be seen in Figure 2 below. Figure 2a shows a place along the border between Districts 31 and 33 where Copley Township is split, and Figure 2b displays a place along the same border where the City of Akron is split.



Figure 2a: Split of Copley Township between Districts 31 and 33, Summit County

Figure 2b: Split of Akron between Districts 31 and 33, Summit County


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37. Second, the Revised Plan's House map splits *three* cities and townships between Districts 10 and 5: the city of Columbus (see Figure 3a below), Grove City (Figure 3b), and Jackson Township in several different places (see Figures 3c, d, and e).⁵



Figure 3a: Split of Columbus between Districts 10 and 5, Franklin County

⁵ The above analysis does not include instances where the Revised Plan splits more than one municipal corporation or township in a district and only one such split contains populated areas of a municipal corporation or township on both sides of the district line. For example, the Revised Plan splits Columbus and New Albany between Districts 4 and 9. Howevever, only Columbus has populated areas in both districts. New Albany, on the other hand, has populated. My discussion of splits in this report is limited only to those instances where the Revised Plan splits the populated regions of more than one municipal corporation or township between two districts.



Figure 3b: Split of Grove City between Districts 10 and 5, Franklin County

Figure 3c: First Split of Jackson Township between Districts 10 and 5, Franklin County



Figure 3d: Second Split of Jackson Township between Districts 10 and 5, Franklin County



Figure 3e: Third and Fourth Splits of Jackson Township between Districts 10 and 5, Franklin County



38. Although my understanding is that Section 3(E)(1)(a) of Article XI allows the Commission to create a district that splits "two municipal corporations or townships whose contiguous portions do not contain a population of more than fifty per cent, but less than one hundred precent, of one ratio of representation"—provided that it is not possible to comply with Section 3(D)(3)—this section does not apply to the splits described above. First, the municipal and township splits between Districts 10 and 5 are not justifiable under Section 3(E)(1)(a) because those split *three* cities and townships, while that provision allows for only

two such splits. Second, my understanding is that the Commission did not provide an explanation of those splits together with its approved plan, as set out in Section 3(E)(1)(d).

- 39. Rodden II also performs better than the Revised Plan on plan-wide compactness under Reock, Polsby-Popper, and Area/Convex Hull scores. The scores for the two plans are reproduced in Table 1 below for the House and Table 2 for the Senate.
- 40. As discussed, the revisions to Rodden I reflected in Rodden II did not impact the new plan's seat share. As a result, Rodden II again contains 43 Democratic seats in the House and 15 Democratic Seats in the Senate. This achieves proportionality in the Senate while coming within two seats of proportionality in the House.
- 41. The Revised Plan, by contrast, falls short of proportionality in both houses, containing 42 seats with average Democratic vote shares above 50 percent in the House and 13 such seats in the Senate (again, using the Commission's methodology), as set forth in Tables 1 and 2 below.
- 42. As noted above, the Revised House Plan also creates a large number of Democratic-leaning "toss-up" districts, while creating no such districts for Republicans. Particularly with regard to the 10 Democratic House seats between 50 and 51%, this razor-thin Democratic margin could be easily overcome by specific circumstances such as incumbency advantage or even a mildly favorable electoral environment. In fact, as discussed further below, almost all of the new "toss-up" districts created in the Revised Plan have Republican incumbents, who are more likely to outperform partisan indices in a given election as compared to other candidates.
- 43. Thus, the concessions the Revised Plan does make in the direction of proportionality come exclusively in the form of highly competitive toss-up districts, which only fall in the Democratic category because they contain a forecasted Democratic vote share just slightly above 50%. As demonstrated with Figure 1 above, many of the purportedly Democratic districts under the Revised Plan are, in truth, up for grabs in any given election, while the Republican districts are quite safe. In other words, the Republican seat share of 58 percent in the House set forth in Table 1 operates as a likely floor for Republicans: even in a Democratic wave election in which Republicans lose every toss-up district, Republicans will nonetheless likely win the seats forecasted under the Commission's methodology. At the same time, the Democratic seat share of 42 percent in the House is a likely ceiling: if they win *every* toss-up seat, they will likely only achieve the number of forecasted Democratic seats.

Table 1: House Maps Comparison Between Rodden II and the Commission's Revised Plan

	Commission Revised Plan	Rodden II Plan
Average compactness scores		
(Higher scores = more compact)		
Reock	0.40	0.41
Polsby-Popper	0.30	0.36
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.79
Number of split counties	37	32
# of seats with average two-party		
<i>Democratic</i> vote share >.5	42	43
Expressed as percentage of seats	42.4%	43.4%
# of seats with average two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5	57	56
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	56.6%
Distance from proportional seat allocation (seats)	3	2
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	2.0%
# of seats with average two-party		
Democratic vote share >.52	29	39
Expressed as a percentage of seats	29.3%	39.4%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share <.48	57	56
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	56.6%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .52	13	4
Expressed as percentage of seats	13.1%	4.0%

Table 2: Senate Maps – Comparison Between Rodden II and the Commission's Revised Plan

	Commission Revised Plan	Rodden II Plan
Average compactness scores		
(Higher scores = more compact)		
Reock	0.41	0.44
Polsby-Popper	0.30	0.37
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.78
Number of split counties	17	15
# of seats with average two-party	13	15
Expressed as percentage of seats	39.4%	45.5%
# of seats with average two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5	20	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	60.6%	54.5%
Distance from proportional seat allocation (seats)	2	0
Expressed as percentage of seats	6.1%	0
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share >.52	9	12
Expressed as a percentage of seats	9.1%	12.1%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share <.48	19	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.5%
# of seats with average two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .52	5	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	5.1%	3.0%

44. Even if toss-ups are not considered in this analysis, and one takes the Commission's approach whereby any seat with a Democratic seat share of over 50% is classified as Democratic-leaning, the Revised Plan falls short of proportionality. As described above, the Revised Plan deviates from a proportional seat share by three seats in the House and two seats in the

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Senate. Its failure to achieve proportionality is not due to a need to comply with other provisions of Article XI. This is made clear by Rodden II, which, of particular note, achieves perfect proportionality in the Senate, without violating any other Article XI rules. In fact, Rodden II achieves this with districts that are substantially more compact, split fewer counties, and are more attentive to traditional redistricting principles.

VI. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC REGIONS WITHIN THE REVISED COMMISSION PLAN

- 45. The above makes clear that the Revised Plan falls short of partisan proportionality, despite the fact that it was possible to draw a map that closely corresponds to the statewide preferences of Ohio voters without violating any of Article XI's other provisions. As described above, the Revised Plan differs from the invalidated plan in that it produces a handful of additional toss-up districts. This was achieved in part by taking voters from existing majority-Democratic districts—in some cases turning comfortable Democratic districts into toss-up districts. It was also achieved by taking comfortable Republican districts with Republican incumbents and moving some Democratic voters in, thereby turning them into toss-up districts.
- 46. In this section, I will take a closer look at specific districting choices made by the drawers of the Revised Plan in various regions of the state. This exercise will help to further demonstrate that the disproportionality of the Revised Plan is not required to achieve compliance with Article XI, but rather reflects deliberate partian choices.

Franklin County

47. Figure 4 uses unique colors to display the districts of the Revised Plan in Franklin County. It also includes the invalidated boundaries in red. In my earlier expert report, I described a long, non-compact North-South district on the West side of Franklin County that carved out a comfortable Republican district. It has been removed. In its place, however, is a highly non-compact District 5 that traverses the entire Southern boundary of the Franklin County, also grabbing exurbs to the East and West. This district has an average Democratic vote share of around 52 percent. The Revised Plan also creates a rather non-compact District 10 around a Republican incumbent who won with 58 percent of the vote in 2018 and 55.5 percent in 2020. District 10 has an average Democratic vote share of 50.5 percent. And, like the Invalidated Plan, the Revised Plan reflects the unnecessary effort to extract Dublin from Franklin County and attach it with rural Union County

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Figure 4: Franklin County

48. The Franklin County districts in the Revised Plan are still unnecessarily non-compact. The average Polsby-Popper score for the Franklin County districts is .22, in contrast with .37 in Rodden II. Recall that higher scores indicate greater compactness. The average Reock score for the Franklin County districts of the revised plan is .38, while for Rodden II it is .47. Moreover, Rodden II does not split Franklin County.

Hamilton County

49. In my earlier report, I described a Hamilton County arrangement in the Invalidated Plan that made some moves that split communities of interest in order to produce two comfortable Republican seats in the Western suburbs of Cincinnati. In particular, District 29 combined a largely white exurban and rural area with a suburban community with a large Black population, Forest Park. The Revised Plan removes Forest Park from District 29, but simply

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replaces it with another metro Cincinnati community with a large minority population—this time North College Hill. There are other small changes in the Western suburbs as well, but the configuration with two comfortable Republican suburban districts, 29 and 30, is retained. District 28 is also altered, but it remains a tossup district, as in the Invalidated Plan.





- 50. A somewhat more consequential change was made on the Eastern side of the county. There is still a long, non-compact North-South district, numbered 27, on the Eastern border of the county built around the incumbent Republican, Representative Brinkman. This district has been redrawn to become even less compact, reaching into Cincinnati in order to extract just enough Democratic voters to reach the 50 percent threshold. It has an average Democratic vote share of 50.2 percent.
- 51. The Cincinnati districts are unnecessarily non-compact. The average Polsby-Popper Score for the Hamilton County districts is .175, in contrast with .26 for the Rodden II Plan. The average Reock score for the Revised Plan is .33, while for the Rodden II Plan it is .43.

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Montgomery County



Figure 6: Montgomery County

52. In my earlier report, I pointed out that the Commission's plan took the relatively compact Black community of metropolitan Dayton and scattered it across 4 separate districts. Fragments of Dayton's Black community are combined with various suburban, majoritywhite districts in order to generate 3 districts with comfortable Republican majorities. A key part of this approach was to extract the Black community of Trotwood and other areas on the West side of Dayton and combine them with rural Preble County to the West. As can be seen in Figure 6, this structure has not changed. In fact, the entirety of the Invalidated Plan remains the same in Montgomery County.

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Lorain County



Figure 7: Lorain County

53. My previous report pointed out that the invalidated plan combined the cities of Elyria and Lorain into a very Democratic district with a 5 percent population deviation, which had the effect of creating two comfortable Republican districts in the remainder of the county. The Revised Plan now separates the two cities. The reconfigured Elyria-based district is drawn

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to include a Republican incumbent, Gayle Manning, who received 56 percent of the vote in 2020, and 55 percent in 2018, though the district has an average statewide Democratic vote share of 50.3 percent, making it nominally Democratic-leaning. Note that this razor's edge vote share was obtained by carefully extracting the highly-Democratic city of Oberlin from the district (see Figure 7).

Cuyahoga



Figure 8: Cuyahoga County

54. In Cuyahoga County, the version of District 17 in the invalidated map traversed the Southern tier of Cuyahoga County, and it was solidly Republican. The previous version of Parmabased District 15 was slightly over 50 percent Democratic. A substantial reconfiguration has taken place in order to produce an additional toss-up district. The reconfigured version of District 17 is a highly non-compact district based in the suburbs of Southwestern Cuyahoga County, reaching up via a very narrow corridor around Cleveland Hopkins International

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Airport to extract a narrow sliver of Democratic communities near the lake, ultimately turning District 17 into a tossup, with a 50.5 percent Democratic vote share. As with most of the other newly crafted toss-up districts, District 17 contains a successful Republican incumbent—in this case, one who received 61 percent of the vote in 2018 and 58 percent in 2020.

Summit

- 55. In the invalidated configuration of Summit County, Districts 32, 33, and 34 were Democratic-leaning districts that contained parts of Akron, but a safely Republican District 31 was built to snake around the Western and Northern border of the county. District 31 is still a highly non-compact district that reaches all the way from the Northern border to the Southern border of the county, but some voters have been extracted from Akron to make District 31 a toss-up, with a Democratic vote share of 50.5 percent. This was also achieved by removing some Democratic voters from District 32, moving it from an expected Democratic district to a tossup, at 50.8 percent. In keeping with the pattern described above, both of these districts contain Republican incumbents. In other words, while the Invalidated Plan had three expected Democratic districts and one expected Republican district, the revised configuration includes two expected Democratic districts and two toss-ups.
- 56. The Revised plan achieves this by using a non-compact configuration. Its average Polsby-Popper score is .19, with a Reock score of .33. The Summit County configuration in Rodden II, which included four expected Democratic seats, was far more compact, with an average Polsby-Popper score of .32, and a Reock score of .44.

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Figure 9: Summit County

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VII. CONCLUSION

57. It is possible to draw a plan that more closely corresponds with Ohioans' statewide voting preferences than the Revised Plan while complying with Article XI's other provisions, and the Revised Plan's remaining deviations from proportionality can only be understood as an attempt to secure partisan advantage for Republicans. Rodden II demonstrates that it was possible to comply with Section 6(B)'s proportionality requirement, while at the same time complying with Article XI's other requirements. Additionally, the Revised Plan creates an inordinate number of Democratic-leaning toss-up seats, many of which have a razor-thin margin of between 50 and 51 percent, giving the false impression that these districts are likely to go to Democrats when, in actuality, they are up for grabs. The problem with this is not competitive seats per se-which the political science literature indicates can be good for voters and enhance democratic accountability—but rather the disproportionate number of competitive seats that slightly lean in the Democrats' favor. Such a distribution may indicate an intent to favor one party over the other, and may not result in actual proportional partisan representation given the disparity across the two major parties. This problem is compounded by the fact that most of these tossups have Republican incumbents, who are likely to perform better than an index based on past statewide elections might project. Finally, a localized analysis of specific redistricting decisions within the Revised Plan further confirms that the Revised Plan's lack of proportionality was not the result of a need to comply with other Article XI provisions, but rather, the consequence of a deliberate choice on the part of mapmakers to benefit Republican legislative candidates.

Jonsthan Rodden

Jonathan Rodden

Sworn to before me this <u>25th</u> day of January 2022.

Notary Public



My commission expires 04/22/2024

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Exhibit A



Exhibit B



Exhibit C

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Exhibit D

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Exhibit E

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Academic Positions

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2012-present.

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Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2012-present.

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Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2007–2012.

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Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT, 2003-2006.

Visiting Scholar, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University, 2004.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT, 1999–2003.

Instructor, Department of Political Science and School of Management, Yale University, 1997–1999.

Publications

Books

Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Divide. Basic Books, 2019.

Decentralized Governance and Accountability: Academic Research and the Future of Donor Programming. Coedited with Erik Wibbels, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

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Book Review of The Government of Money by Peter Johnson, Comparative Political Studies 32,7: 897-900.

Fellowships, Honors, and Grants

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2021.

Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations," 2021.

National Institutes of Health, funding for "Relationship between lawful handgun ownership and risk of homicide victimization in the home," 2021.

National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research, funding for "Cohort Study Of Firearm-Related Mortality Among Cohabitants Of Handgun Owners." 2020.

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT), GA004696, 2017-2018.

Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant, 2015.

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Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association, 2016.

Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.

General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.

Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.

Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, beginning Fall 2010.

Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 2009.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2008.

United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.

Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections, public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).

MIT Dean's Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.

Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize the conference, "European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective," held at Harvard University, November 4, 2000.

Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.

Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.

Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the University of Michigan, 1993.

W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan, 1993.

Other Professional Activities

Selection committee, best paper award, American Journal of Political Science.

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.

Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.

Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.

Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.

Courses

Undergraduate

Politics, Economics, and Democracy Introduction to Comparative Politics Introduction to Political Science

Political Science Scope and Methods

Institutional Economics

Spatial Approaches to Social Science

Graduate

Political Economy Political Economy of Institutions Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization Politics and Geography

Consulting

2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.

2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID, Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).

2019: Written expert testimony in *McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann,* United States District Court, Mississippi.

2019: Expert witness in *Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner*, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* No. 4:18-cv-002510, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

2017: Expert witness in *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

2017: Expert witness in *Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al.*, No. 2:16-CV-01065, United States District Court for Arizona.

2016: Expert witness in *Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.

2016: Expert witness in *Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.

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2014-2015: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al.,* 2012-CA-002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).

2013-2014: Expert witness in *Romo v Detzner*, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County (Florida Congressional redistricting case).

2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.

2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.

2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.

2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank decentralization and safety net programs.

2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.

1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for *World Development Report*, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentralization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator on review of subnational adjustment lending.

Last updated: September 23, 2021

Exhibit F



Exhibit G
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Exhibit H

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Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement

Pursuant to Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Redistricting Commission issues the following statement:

The Commission determined that the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio predominately favor Republican candidates.

The Commission considered statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years. There were sixteen such contests. When considering the results of each of those elections, the Commission determined that Republican candidates won thirteen out of sixteen of those elections resulting in a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates of 81% and a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates of 19%. When considering the number of votes cast in each of those elections for Republican and Democratic candidates, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is 54% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is 46%. Thus, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is between 54% and 81% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is between 19% and 46%. The Commission obtained publicly available geographic data for statewide partisan elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020. Publicly available geographic data for those elections was not available for elections in 2012 and 2014. Using this data, the Commission adopted the final general assembly district plan, which contains 85 districts (64.4%) favoring Republican candidates and 47 districts (35.6%) favoring Democratic candidates out of a total of 132 districts. Accordingly, the statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each political party corresponds closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

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The final general assembly district plan adopted by the Commission complies with all of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution. The Commission's attempt to meet the aspirational standards of Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution did not result in any violation of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing was sent via email this 25th day of January, 2022 to the following:

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Counsel for Respondents Governor Mike DeWine, Secretary of State Frank LaRose, and Auditor Keith Faber

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Rodden Decl. Ex. E

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, <i>et al.</i> ,	
	Case No. 2021-1198
Petitioners,	
	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio
V.	Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S.
	<i>Ct. Prac. R. 14.03]</i>
Respondents.	

EXHIBITS TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISTRICT PLAN ADOPTED ON FEBRUARY 24, 2022 – VOLUME 2 (Affidavit of Dr. Jonathan Rodden and Exhibits)

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Counsel for Respondents Senator Vernon Sykes and House Minority Leader Allison Russo

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing was sent via email this 28th day of February, 2022 to the following:

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House Speaker Robert Cupp

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Counsel for Respondents Senator Vernon Sykes and House Minority Leader Allison Russo

> /s/ Derek S. Clinger Derek S. Clinger (0092075)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, et al.,		
Petitioners,	Case No. 2021-1198	
v.	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)	
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S. C. Prac R 14 031	
Respondents.		

EXPERT AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN

I, Jonathan Rodden, having been duly sworn and cautioned according to law, hereby state that I am over the age of eighteen years and am competent to testify to the facts set forth below based on my personal knowledge and having personally examined all records referenced in this affidavit, and further state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- 1. For the purpose of this report, I have been asked to examine whether and how the second revised redistricting plan for the Ohio State House of Representatives and Ohio Senate, adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on February 24, 2022 (attached as Exhibits A and B) ("Second Revised Plan"), addresses the standards set forth in Article XI, Section 6, namely, that (A) "No general assembly district plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party," (B) "The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio," and (C) "General assembly districts shall be compact."
- 2. As this Court stated in its January 12, 2022 opinion declaring invalid the General Assembly plan adopted by the Commission on September 16, 2021, "[i]f it is possible for a district plan to comply with Section 6 and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, the commission must adopt a plan that does so." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 88.
- 3. In this report, I demonstrate that the distribution of support for the two parties across districts in the Second Revised Plan is extremely unusual, indicating that Commissioners attempted to achieve nominal statewide partisan proportionality by generating as many districts as possible with very slim Democratic majorities, while creating zero districts with similarly slim Republican majorities. Under the Second Revised Plan, virtually all the majority-Republican seats are quite safe: 52 of 54 seats with Republican majorities in the Ohio House of Representatives would have Republican vote shares above 55 percent, and the same is true

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for 16 of 18 seats with Republican majorities in the Senate. The situation is starkly different for the Democrats. Of 45 seats with nominal Democratic majorities, less than half—only 22—would have Democratic vote shares above 55 percent in the House, and the same would be true of only 7 of 15 "Democratic" seats in the Senate. This striking asymmetry in the distribution of competitive and non-competitive seats has the effect of creating what is likely to be a very hard ceiling on the number of seats that can possibly be won by Democratic candidates, preserving a comfortable Republican legislative majority even in the event of an exceedingly strong statewide performance by Democrats.

- 4. In my previous reports submitted in this matter, I have discussed and analyzed "toss-up" districts; those seats where the expected vote share for a party is between 48-52 percent. The same asymmetry in the Second Revised Plan is obvious even when looking at only the narrowest toss-up districts for each party. Under the Second Revised Plan, every majority-Republican House seat would have a Republican vote share above 52 percent: all 54 seats in the House and all 18 seats in the Senate. On the other hand, only 26 of 45 majority-Democratic seats in the House, and only 8 majority-Democratic seats in the Senate have Democratic vote shares above 52 percent. As a result, there are a large number of ultracompetitive districts, which monolithically "lean" Democrat.
- 5. Using the Ohio Supreme Court's latest guidance on proportionality, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342 at ¶ 62. Accordingly, the Second Revised Plan is far from proportional. Under either of the Court's methodologies for assessing the distribution of competitive seats, the Second Revised Plan reflects a significantly larger Republican advantage than a 54/46 split.
- 6. If these toss-up seats are excluded, the Second Revised Plan reflects a 54/26 advantage in the House, or an advantage of approximately 67.5 percent to 32.5 percent of allocated seats for Republicans. In the Senate, it reflects a 18/8 advantage, which is 69/31 percent.
- 7. If the "tossup" seats are allocated according to each party in proportion to the statewide vote shares, the Second Revised Plan reflects a 64/35 advantage in the House, which is 65/35 percent. In the Senate, it reflects a 22/11 advantage, which is 67/33 percent. All of these projected partisan seat shares are far from the 54/46 split that the Commission purports to achieve.
- 8. Moreover, the Second Revised Plan produces an unusually large number of districts with Democratic vote shares of around 51 percent, indicating the application of a specific target. This is to say, it appears that the map drawers were instructed to draw as many of the Democratic-leaning districts as possible to be as close as possible to 51 percent.
- 9. In order to ascertain whether it was possible for the Commission to comply with both Section 6 and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution, I submit my own alternative maps (with images attached as Exhibits C and D and submitted as native files to the Court on February 18, 2022). This plan is nearly identical to the plans submitted to this Court previously, with a few minor changes to address purported constitutional concerns raised in

Respondents' filings in the previous round of objections, as well as corrections for consistency to instances where lines were drawn to follow township, rather than municipal, boundaries. These had a de minimis impact on the population of districts and did not change the partisanship of the plan.

- 10. The alternative maps attached as Exhibits C and D comply with each of the requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. They also produce a partisan breakdown that closely corresponds to the preferences of Ohio voters. Using plan-wide averages, compactness scores reveal that these maps draw far more compact districts than those in the Revised Plan. They also split fewer counties and vote tabulation districts and are far more reflective of communities of interest. Moreover, these maps reveal that there is nothing about the political geography of Ohio that might explain an unusual bunching of districts with Democratic vote shares between 50 and 52 percent, or right at the 51 percent mark in particular, while simultaneously resulting in all Republican districts exceeding 52 percent.
- 11. Moreover, in and around metro areas, like its predecessors, the Second Revised Plan still uses non-compact districts and splits urban communities in unnecessary ways in order to avoid the creation of districts likely to elect Democratic candidates, opting instead to generate a series of districts with Democratic vote shares very close to 51 percent, most of which include Republican candidates who enjoy the advantages of incumbency.
- 12. The highly unusual distribution of partisanship across districts in the Second Revised Plan provides clear evidence that the plan was drawn to favor the Republican Party, and it is clear that efforts to generate a large number of bare-majority Democratic districts, while creating the maximum number of safe Republican districts, came at a cost in terms of compactness and the preservation of communities of interest.

II. QUALIFICATIONS

- 13. I am currently a tenured Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the founder and director of the Stanford Spatial Social Science Lab—a center for research and teaching with a focus on the analysis of geo-spatial data in the social sciences. I am engaged in a variety of research projects involving large, fine-grained geo-spatial data sets including ballots and election results at the level of polling places, individual records of registered voters, census data, and survey responses. I am also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Hoover Institution. Prior to my employment at Stanford, I was the Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I received my Ph.D. from Yale University and my B.A. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, both in political science. A copy of my current C.V. is included as Exhibit E.
- 14. In my current academic work, I conduct research on the relationship between the patterns of political representation, geographic location of demographic and partisan groups, and the drawing of electoral districts. I have published papers using statistical methods to assess political geography, balloting, and representation in a variety of academic journals including *Statistics and Public Policy, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, the *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, the

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Virginia Law Review, the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, the *Annual Review of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Politics*. One of these papers was selected by the American Political Science Association as the winner of the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best paper on political economy published in the last year, and another received an award from the American Political Science Association section on social networks. In 2021, I received a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, and received the Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations."

- 15. I have recently written a series of papers, along with my co-authors, using automated redistricting algorithms to assess partisan gerrymandering. This work has been published in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Election Law Journal*, and *Political Analysis*, and it has been featured in more popular publications like the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and *Boston Review*. I have recently completed a book, published by *Basic Books* in June of 2019, on the relationship between political districts, the residential geography of social groups, and their political representation in the United States and other countries that use winner-take-all electoral districts. The book was reviewed in *The New York Times*, *The New York Review of Books*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, and *The Atlantic*, among others.
- 16. I have expertise in the use of large data sets and geographic information systems (GIS), and I conduct research and teaching in the area of applied statistics related to elections. My PhD students frequently take academic and private sector jobs as statisticians and data scientists. I frequently work with geo-coded voter files and other large administrative data sets, including in recent papers published in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* and *The New England Journal of Medicine*. I have developed a national data set of geo-coded precinct-level election results that has been used extensively in policy-oriented research related to redistricting and representation.
- 17. I have been accepted and testified as an expert witness in several election law and redistricting cases: Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-000412 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2012); Mo. State Conference of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., No. 4:2014-CV-02077 (E.D. Mo. 2014); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:15-CV-00357 (E.D. Va. 2015); Democratic Nat'l Committee et al. v. Hobbs et al., No. 16-1065-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz. 2016); Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, No. 3:14-cv-00852-REP-AWA-BMK (E.D. Va. 2014); and Jacobson et al. v. Lee, No. 4:18-cv-00262 (N.D. Fla. 2018). I also worked with a coalition of academics to file Amicus Briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, and Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422. Much of the testimony in these cases had to do with geography, electoral districts, voting, ballots, and election administration. I recently worked as a consultant for the Maryland Redistricting Commission, and I drew a Pennsylvania Congressional redistricting plan, known as the "Carter Plan," that was chosen by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for implementation. Carter v. Chapman, No. 7 MM 2022, 2022 WL 549106 (Pa. Feb. 23, 2022). I am being compensated at the rate of \$550/hour for my work in this case. My compensation is not dependent upon my conclusions in any way.

III. DATA SOURCES

18. I have collected statewide election data for 2012 to 2020 from the Ohio Secretary of State. I also accessed precinct-level election results from the Ohio Secretary of State for statewide elections from 2016 to 2020 that were matched to 2020 Ohio vote tabulation districts by a team at Harvard University called the Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology Project.¹ Additionally, I accessed the Second Revised Plan approved by the Commission and uploaded to the web page of the Ohio Redistricting Commission, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits A and B.² For the analysis conducted in this report, I use three software packages: Stata, Maptitude for Redistricting, and ArcGIS Pro. In creating my maps, I used the same U.S. Census redistricting data used by the Ohio Redistricting Commission, as archived in the "Ohio University Common and Unified Redistricting Database."³

IV. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTISAN SUPPORT ACROSS DISTRICTS: CONTRASTING THE REVISED PLANS AND THE RODDEN III PLAN

- 19. According to *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 108, the Commission must attempt to draw a plan with a seat share that "closely corresponds" to a breakdown of 54 percent in favor of Republicans and 46 percent in favor of Democrats.
- 20. Determining the proportion of districts that favor each party, based on consideration of the relevant elections identified in Article XI, Section 6, requires an aggregation of the precinct-level results of these past elections to the boundaries of a map's proposed districts. However, precinct-level election results linked with geo-spatial boundaries were not available for the 2012 and 2014 elections, as the Commission itself acknowledged in its initial Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement (accompanying the since-struck down September 16, 2021 General Assembly plan), attached as Exhibit F. As discussed in my previous reports to this Court, using the full statewide election results from 2012 to 2020, the statewide preferences of Ohio voters must be translated into state legislative maps in which 45.9 percent of seats favor Democrats and 54.1 percent of seats favor Republicans. Since there are 99 seats in the Ohio House of Representatives, a statewide vote share of 45.9 percent would be associated with 45.44 Democratic seats, which rounds down to 45 seats. Similarly, a 45.9 percent vote share would be associated with about 15.15 Democratic seats in the 33-member Ohio Senate, which rounds down to 15 seats.
- 21. It is my understanding that the Commission's approach to evaluating the partisanship of each district was to add up all the votes cast for each of the two major parties in each statewide election and divide by the total number of votes cast for both of the two major parties, summing over all of those elections.⁴ I have calculated this measure of district-level

¹ https://alarm-redist.github.io/posts/2021-08-10-census-2020/

² https://redistricting.ohio.gov/maps

³ https://www.redistricting.ohio.gov/resources

⁴ In my previous reports, I calculated vote shares of the two major parties in each election in each district, and then took an average across all 9 statewide elections. This approach gives equal weight

partisanship for each district in the Second Revised Plan. In Table 1, I include these metrics for the Commission's First Revised Plan, the Second Revised Plan, and the plan that I have submitted to the Commission and the Court⁵ (the "Rodden Plan" or "Rodden III Plan").

a. The Second Revised Plan's House Map

- 22. As can be seen in Table 1, the number of House districts with a Democratic vote share above 50 percent has increased from 42 to 45, creating the illusion of proportionality. However, as with the First Revised Plan, this has been achieved by generating an unusually large number of districts with very slim Democratic majorities. In fact, the number of districts with a Democratic vote share above 52 percent has actually *fallen* relative to the First Revised Plan, from 28 to 26. The appearance of proportionality was enhanced by bringing the number of bare-majority Democratic districts—those between 50 percent and 52 percent Democratic—from 14 to 19.
- 23. It is remarkable that 19 of the 45 Democratic-leaning districts are essentially toss-ups, while not a single one of the 54 Republican-leaning districts are in the range of 50 to 52 percent Republican vote share. Moreover, the majority of the toss-up districts with a nominal Democratic lean have *Republican* incumbents. A well-known feature of American elections is that incumbents often outperform their statewide co-partisans in their districts—sometimes by several percentage points. If we take incumbency into consideration, Republican candidates likely have the edge in many of these nominally Democratic districts.
- 24. It is also useful to explore alternative notions of district competitiveness. As demonstrated in Table 1, of the 45 Democratic-leaning districts, 23 are in the range of 50 percent to 55 percent—more than half. Of the 54 Republican-leaning districts, only 2—around 4 percent—are in the range between 50 and 55 percent Republican.

to each election, regardless of turnout, whereas the approach taken by the Commission, and reproduced here for purposes of comparability, gives greater weight to presidential election years with higher turnout. The two approaches yield very similar results, and lead to very similar inferences, but exact numbers of seats above and below certain thresholds can sometimes vary by a single seat.

⁵ The latest Rodden Plan was submitted to the Commission on February 15, 2022 and filed with this Court along with the Bennett Petitioners' motion to require respondents to explain their failure to comply with the Court's February 7, 2022 order, filed on February 18, 2022. *See* Second Clinger Aff. at ¶ 2-3. This version is nearly identical to the plan submitted to this Court along with the Bennett Petitioners' objections to the First Remedial Plan, with the only changes being (1) the elimination of certain zero-population splits identified by Mr. Raymond DiRossi in his affidavit submitted on January 28, 2022; (2) for consistency, the correction of instances where district lines were drawn to follow township instead of municipal boundaries. These lines had only a de minimis impact on district population and did not alter the partisan lean of the districts.

Commission Commission Rodden First Revised Second Plan Plan Revised Plan Average compactness scores (Higher scores = more compact) 0.40 0.39 0.41 Reock Polsby-Popper 0.30 0.31 0.36 Area/Convex Hull 0.74 0.75 0.79 Number of split counties 37 38 32 Number of split VTDs 112 135 96 # of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.5 42 45 42 42.4% 45.45% 42.4% Expressed as percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Republican vote share >.5 57 54 57 57.6% 54.5% 57.6% Expressed as percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Democratic 28 26 40 vote share >.52 Expressed as a percentage of seats 28.3% 26.3% 40.4% # of seats with two-party Democratic 57 54 56 vote share <.48 57.6% 54.55% 56.6% Expressed as percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Democratic 0 0 1 vote share between .48 and .5 Expressed as percentage of seats 0.0% 0.00% 1.0% # of seats with two-party Democratic 19 14 2 vote share between .5 and .52 14.1% 19.19% 2.0% Expressed as percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Democratic 24 22 29 vote share >.55 24.2% 22.22% 29.3% Expressed as a percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Democratic 54 51 52 vote share <.45

Table 1: Plan Statistics, Ohio House of Representatives

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Expressed as percentage of seats	54.5%	52.53%	51.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5 and .55	18	23	13
Expressed as percentage of seats	18.2%	23.23%	13.1%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .45 and .5	3	2	6
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	2.02%	6.1%

- 25. This is a remarkable asymmetry. Imagine a massive uniform swing across all districts of 5 percentage points in favor of the Republican Party. Assuming that the partisanship score being considered here is a perfect predictor of legislative victories, this would yield an additional 23 seats, providing the Republican Party with 78 percent of the seats. However, a similar swing toward the Democratic Party—providing it with a statewide majority of votes—would yield a pickup of only 2 seats. That is to say, a vote share of around 51 percent in favor of Democrats would generate a seat share of only 47 percent, and that is only if we make the very unrealistic assumption that Democratic candidates win *every single one* of the 19 districts with a Democratic vote share between 50 and 52 percent. This striking asymmetry in the treatment of the two parties emerges from an effort to create a large number of bare-majority Democratic seats while taking care to avoid the creation of competitive Republican-leaning seats, ensuring that Republican-leaning seats are very comfortable.
- 26. Table 1 helps us obtain an initial understanding of the distribution of partisanship in the Second Revised Plan using the cut-points of 52 percent and 55 percent for each party, but it is also useful to visualize the entire distribution. The top panel of Figure 1 provides a histogram of the Democratic vote share across districts in the Second Revised Plan. The idea behind the histogram is to divide the entire range of possible Democratic vote shares into bins, where the height of the bin corresponds to the number of districts that fit within it. So, for example, if six districts have a Democratic vote share of .52, the line above .52 on the horizontal axis will reach up to 6 on the vertical axis.
- 27. Note the large density of districts bunched between .5 and .52 in both the First and Second Revised Plans. Figure 1 reveals that one of the main differences between the First and Second Revised Plans is that the Second Revised Plan has produced a very large density around 51 percent. It appears that the plan was drawn with an intentional effort to produce districts with a Democratic vote share of 51 percent. Note that the Rodden III Plan does not include nearly as many districts just over the 50 percent threshold and does not include a large peak at 51 percent, indicating that there is nothing about the political geography of Ohio that requires this type of distribution. In fact, in my experience with redistricting plans, I do not believe I have seen a distribution of partisanship quite like that displayed in the second panel of Figure 1. It clearly reflects an effort to create a large number of districts with a vote share in a very narrow range just above 50 percent.

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28. Another noteworthy aspect of Figure 1 is the sparsity of districts just to the left of the 50 percent line in the First and Second Revised Plans. Almost all the Republican-leaning districts are quite far from the line. In fact, this part of the distribution is even more empty than in the First Revised Plan. There are only 3 districts in the range between 43 percent Democratic and 50 percent Democratic, and only 5 in the range between 42 percent and 50 percent. This indicates that a truly historic 7 percentage point uniform swing in favor of the Democrats, such that the statewide vote share was 53 percent, would only yield an additional 3 seats beyond the number we would expect based on a statewide vote share of 46 percent, as calculated from past elections. In this scenario, 53 percent of the vote would correspond to around 48 percent of the seats. It would take a truly remarkable 8 percentage point swing to give the Democratic Party a 1-seat majority. Again, keep in mind that all these scenarios assume that Democratic candidates would win every single one of the 19 districts where Democratic vote share falls between .50 and .52.



Figure 1: Histograms of Democratic Vote Share, House Plans

29. Considering the Ohio Supreme Court's latest guidance on proportionality, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." Accordingly, the Second Revised Plan is far from proportional. When excluding the 19 competitive seats altogether, 32.5 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 67.5 percent of the seats leaning Republican. When allocating the 19 competitive seats proportionally to each party (i.e., allocating 54 percent, or 10, of the competitive seats to Republicans and 46 percent, or 9, of

the competitive seats to Democrats), 35 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 65 percent of the seats leaning Republican.

30. The Rodden III Plan, on the other hand, gets much closer to proportionality under either definition. When excluding the 3 competitive seats altogether, 42 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 58 percent of the seats leaning Republican. When allocating the three competitive seats proportionally to each party (i.e., allocating 54 percent, or 2, of the competitive seats to Republicans and 46 percent, or 1, of the competitive seats to Democrats), 41 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 59 percent of the seats leaning Republican. Although, admittedly, the Rodden III Plan does not achieve the perfect 54/46 split, it gets closer than the Second Revised Plan by anywhere from 6 to 9 percent.

b. The Second Revised Plan's Senate Map

31. Let us now consider the Ohio Senate. Table 2 provides the same information as Table 1, but for the Senate. And Figure 2 provides a similar histogram. Again, the Commission's newest plan achieves nominal proportionality, producing 15 seats with Democratic vote shares above 50 percent. Again, this was achieved by increasing the number of Democratic-leaning "toss-up" seats in the range of 50 to 52 percent, in this case from 5 to 7, and again, avoiding creating any Republican-leaning toss-up seats. This produces the same type of asymmetry described above. For instance, a two-percentage point uniform swing toward the Republican Party would, if our partisan index is a perfect predictor of victories, yield 7 additional seats. But a two percentage-point swing toward the Democratic Party would yield nothing.

	Commission First Revised Plan	Commission Second Revised Plan	Rodden Plan
Average compactness scores			
(Higher scores = more compact)			
Reock	0.41	0.38	0.44
Polsby-Popper	0.3	0.28	0.37
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.73	0.78
Number of split counties	17	15	15
Number of split VTDs	41	57	22
# of seats with two-party <i>Democratic</i> vote share >.5	13	15	15
Expressed as percentage of seats	39.4%	45.45%	45.5%
# of seats with two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5	20	18	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	60.6%	54.5%	54.5%

Table 2: Plan Statistics, Ohio Senate

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# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.52	8	8	12
Expressed as a percentage of seats	24.2%	24.2%	36.4%
# of seats with two-party Democratic			
vote share <.48	19	18	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.55%	54.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic			
vote share between .48 and .5	1	0	0
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	0.00%	0.0%
# of seats with two-party Democratic			
vote share between .5 and .52	5	7	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	15.2%	21.21%	9.1%
# of seats with two-party Democratic	_	_	
vote share >.55	7	7	11
Expressed as a percentage of seats	21.2%	21.21%	33.3%
# of seats with two-party Democratic	10	16	17
vote share <.45	18	16	17
Expressed as percentage of seats	54.5%	48.48%	51.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic			
	(0	4
vote share between .5 and .55	6	8	4
vote share between .5 and .55 Expressed as percentage of seats	6 18.2%	8 24.24%	4 12.1%
vote share between .5 and .55 Expressed as percentage of seats	6 18.2%	8 24.24%	4 12.1%
 vote share between .5 and .55 Expressed as percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Democratic 	6 18.2%	8 24.24%	4
vote share between .5 and .55 Expressed as percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .45 and .5	6 18.2% 2	8 24.24% 2	4 12.1% 1
 vote share between .5 and .55 Expressed as percentage of seats # of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .45 and .5 Expressed as percentage of seats 	6 18.2% 2 6.1%	8 24.24% 2 6.06%	4 12.1% 1 3.0%



Figure 2: Histograms of Democratic Vote Share, Senate Plans

- 32. It is remarkable that of the 7 tossup districts with a nominal Democratic lean, 6 have Republican incumbents, and the seventh is an open seat. In District 13 in Lorain County, for example, which shares much of the territory of its previous manifestation, the Democratic vote share based on past statewide elections is 50.03 percent, but the incumbent Republican won the seat with 54.4 percent of the votes for the two major parties in November of 2018. In District 27 in suburban Akron, where the statewide Democratic vote share was 51 percent, Republican Kristina Roegner received 58.5 percent of the vote in November of 2018. In District 6, in Montgomery County, where the statewide Democratic vote share was 50.5 percent, in November of 2020, Republican Niraj Antani won the seat with 53.2 percent of the vote. In short, nearly all of the toss-up, nominally Democrat-leaning Senate seats are in fact seats that Republican candidates are very likely to win.
- 33. Again considering the Ohio Supreme Court's latest guidance on proportionality, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." Accordingly, the Second Revised Plan is far from proportional. When excluding the 7 competitive seats altogether, 31 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 69 percent of the seats leaning Republican. When allocating the 7 competitive seats proportionally to each party (i.e., allocating 54 percent, or 4, of the competitive seats to Republicans and 46 percent, or 3, of the competitive seats to Democrats), 33 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 67 percent of the seats leaning Republican.

34. The Rodden III Plan, on the other hand, gets much closer to proportionality under either definition. When excluding the 3 competitive seats altogether, 40 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 60 percent of the seats leaning Republican. When allocating the three competitive seats proportionally to each party (i.e., allocating 54 percent, or 2, of the competitive seats to Republicans and 46 percent, or 1, of the competitive seats to Democrats), 39 percent of the seats lean Democratic, compared to 61 percent of the seats leaning Republican. Although, admittedly, the Rodden III Plan does not achieve the perfect 54-46 split, it gets closer than the Second Revised Plan by anywhere from 6 to 9 percent. That is to say, the Rodden III Plan is much more proportional than the Second Revised Plan, even though its districts are more compact.

V. The Second Revised Plan's Treatment of Urban Areas

- 35. My previous report went into detail on the previous plan's treatment of several urban regions in Ohio, demonstrating that the House districts proposed by the Commission split up a variety of communities, often with relatively non-compact districts. While the configuration of districts has changed in some metro areas in the Second Revised Plan, this basic feature remains. As Table 1 demonstrates, the average compactness of the House districts is relatively similar to the First Revised Plan on each of three measures of compactness. However, in drawing the Second Revised Plan, the Commission increased the number of county splits in the House Plan. While reducing the number of county splits in the Senate Plan, the Commission ended up drawing a Senate Plan that is substantially less compact than its previous version. These decreases in compactness are detailed in Table 2.
- 36. In my previous reports, I have described the technique I used for drawing an alternative, constitutionally compliant plan. Above all, I avoided strategic splits that prevented geographically proximate urban areas from joining together to form a district, and I eschewed intentionally breaking off fragments of urban areas and subsuming them in surrounding exurban and rural areas. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, this led to redistricting plans with far more districts with Democratic vote shares above 52 percent than in the Second Revised Plan, and far fewer Democratic-leaning toss-up districts.
- 37. By keeping urban communities together and avoiding strategic splits, I also ended up with districts that are substantially more compact than those produced by the Commission, especially in the Senate Plan. I also split fewer counties in my House Plan than in the Second Revised Plan.
- 38. As with earlier plans produced by the Commission, some of the ways in which the noncompact districts in the Second Revised Plan disrupt communities of interest are obvious from a quick visual inspection. It appears that some of the most non-compact districts in the Second Revised Plan were created in the pursuit of drawing districts with a Democratic vote share very close to 51 percent. For instance, Figure 3 displays the districts of the Second Revised Plan in the Toledo area.

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Figure 3: House Districts in Second Revised Plan, Toledo Area

- 39. Note the odd arrangement of District 44, which grabs part of urban Toledo and combines it with exurban and rural areas in a different county. District 41, which circumvents Toledo and produces a highly non-compact district stretching from the Eastern suburbs to the rural areas far to the West of Toledo, has a Democratic vote share of 51.2 percent, while also double-bunking two Democratic incumbents. District 42 to the Southwest also has a Democratic vote share of 51.2 percent.
- 40. Figure 4 then displays the manifestation of this districting strategy in the Senate. Urban parts of Toledo with relatively large Black population are extracted from the rest of the city and combined with overwhelmingly white rural areas to the South in Wood and Ottawa Counties to generate a Senate district with a Democratic vote share of 51.3 percent, but where the incumbent is a Republican.

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Figure 4: Senate Districts in Second Revised Plan, Toledo Area

- 41. Figures 5 and 6 examine Franklin County. District 5 in the House was drawn to carve out a narrow slice of the most Republican exurbs in Franklin County, ranging from the far East to the far West of the County. This district has a Democratic vote share of 51.5 percent. In the Senate, the pattern continues all the way around the rest of Franklin County, such that District 3 is a highly non-compact donut-like district that follows the most Republican exurbs all the way from Westerville, clockwise around the outer fringes of the county, to Lake Darby, creating a district with a Democratic vote share of 52 percent.
- 42. In the House Plan, note that District 10 is another 51 percent Democratic district using statewide races, but it has a Republican incumbent, Laura Lanese, who won in November of 2020 with 55.5 percent of the vote.



Figure 5: House Districts in Second Revised Plan, Columbus Area

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Figure 6: Senate Districts in Second Revised Plan, Columbus Area

43. Next, let us examine the Cleveland area districts. Figure 7 displays the House districts, and Figure 8 displays the Senate districts. District 15 in the House is a non-compact district in Cuyahoga County, connecting central parts of Cleveland to the Southern boundary of the County to produce a district with a Democratic vote share of 51.2 percent. District 17 reaches from the lakeshore to the Southern border of Strongsville to produce a district with a Democratic vote share of 50.8 percent.

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Figure 7: House Districts in Second Revised Plan, Cleveland Area

Figure 8: Senate Districts in Second Revised Plan, Cleveland Area



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44. In the Senate, we see the same strategy as in Columbus. District 18 snakes around the city to grab exurban areas to produce a district with a Democratic vote share of 51.2 percent, but with a Republican incumbent. And District 24 does the same thing to the West, creating a district with a Democratic vote share of 51.6 percent.



Figure 9: House Districts in Second Revised Plan, Akron Area

- 45. Figures 9 examines Akron's House districts. Again we see a similar pattern. District 31 extends from North to South on the West side of Summit County, creating a largely exurban district, but also including some urban neighborhoods, with a Democratic vote share of 50.4 percent and a Republican incumbent. Highly non-compact District 32 includes parts of central Akron, including Black neighborhoods, and extends through a narrow corridor to Stark County, creating a district with a Democratic vote share of 51.1 percent, again with a Republican incumbent.
- 46. Figure 10 shows the corresponding Senate districts. Just as Toledo was extracted from its surroundings, District 28 extracts urban Akron from its surroundings and combines it with rural parts of Portage County. A rather non-compact District 27 then gathers the rest of Summit County to produce a Senate district with a Democratic vote share of 51 percent and a Republican incumbent.

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Figure 10: Senate Districts in Second Revised Plan, Akron Area

- 47. Figure 11 displays the Senate districts in the Cincinnati and Dayton areas. In Cincinnati, we see a "packing" strategy in action. The most exurban and rural Republican areas are assembled to produce District 8, while the most Republican areas on the Eastern side of the county are extracted and connected with Warren County in order to produce comfortable Republican districts, creating a single, overwhelmingly Democratic urban district.
- 48. Finally, Figure 11 also displays the Senate districts in the Dayton area. As in previous versions of the map, Black communities on the West side of Dayton are split and combined with more rural areas to produce District 5, which has a very comfortable Republican majority. By splitting metro Dayton in this way, however, it is possible to avoid the emergence of a reliable Democratic district, instead creating a District 6 with a Democratic vote share of 50.5 percent and a Republican incumbent.



Figure 11: Senate Districts in Second Revised Plan, Cincinnati/Dayton Area

- 49. While not exhaustive given the time constraints, this quick tour around metro areas of Ohio helps demonstrate how, by carefully crafting both House and Senate districts through careful city extractions and the creation of highly non-compact districts in suburbs and exurbs, it was possible to prevent the emergence of clear Democratic districts, producing instead a set of toss-up districts with Democratic vote shares right around 51 percent—usually with Republican incumbents, and in the case of the Senate, almost always with Republican incumbents.
- 50. It is also worthwhile to examine split vote tabulation districts (VTDs). In general, when drawing a districting plan, it is valuable to avoid splitting VTDs, even if this is not a legal requirement. Local election administrators must make sure that voters receive the correct ballot for state and federal legislative races, along with various local races, and split VTDs can create headaches, mistakes, and litigation after close races. Unfortunately, the very strict rules outlined in the Ohio Constitution sometimes require split VTDs, for instance in order to avoid a split municipality or city. However, as set forth in Tables 1 and 2, the Commission's plans split far more VTDs than the Rodden III Plan. The Commission's Senate plan splits more than twice as many VTDs as the Rodden III Plan. Perhaps as a byproduct of

the Commission's efforts to carry out the maneuvers displayed above, the Commission split far more VTDs in its Second Revised Plan than in its First Revised Plan.⁶

V. CONCLUSION

51. Like its predecessor, the Second Revised Plan disparately allocates competitive districts between the two major parties. In what seems to be an attempt to secure superficial proportionality, mapmakers appear to have adopted a target of 51 percent average vote share for Democratic-leaning districts and divided Ohio's urban areas in unusual ways unexplainable by any traditional redistricting criteria to meet that target. In total, the Second Revised Plan creates more Democratic "toss-up districts" than the First Revised Plan and manages at the same time to create even safer Republican districts. The result of this deliberate skewing of districts is that Democrats cannot under virtually any circumstances hope to gain seats beyond their proportional share, as calculated from past election results, in either House, while Republicans are nearly guaranteed to win more House and Senate districts than their proportional share of seats, and likely many more than their proportional share.

⁶ Additionally, during my examination of the Second Revised Plan, I discovered that the plan once again contains certain "zero population splits" that (if one accepts that such divisions constitute splits for purposes of Article XI) violate the municipality and township split requirements of Section 3(D)(3) of Article XI. Again, zero population splits are splits of a subdivision where a populated region of a subdivision only exists on one side of the subdivision split. In the case of the Second Revised Plan, New Albany, Plain Township, and Columbus are split between House Districts 4 and 9. However, for both New Albany and Plain Township, populated regions of those subdivisions fall on only one side of the split. I note these splits here in case the Court agrees with the view adopted by Mr. Ray DiRossi in his affidavit filed with this Court on January 28, 2022, in which he posits that similar zero population splits in a previous version of my plan violated Section 3(D)(3). See Affidavit of Ray DiRossi at ¶ 27, Appx.247 (Jan. 28, 2022). I have removed all zero population splits from the latest Rodden Plan filed with this Court. See Second Affidavit of Derek Clinger at ¶ 2-4 (Feb. 18, 2022).

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Jonathan Rodden

Jonathan Rodden

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF PASCO

Sworn to before me this _____ day of February 2022. Jonathan Andrew Rodden Provided California Driver's License

1 in

Notary Public Crystal Chillura Online Notary



CRYSTAL CHILLURA
Notary Public - State of Florida
Commission # HH51131
Expires on October 6, 2024

My commission expires ____ 10/06/2024

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Exhibit A


Exhibit B



Exhibit C

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Exhibit D

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Exhibit E

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Economic Geography and Economic Voting: Evidence from the U.S. States, 2006, *British Journal of Political Science* 36, 3: 527–47 (with Michael Ebeid).

Distributive Politics in a Federation: Electoral Strategies, Legislative Bargaining, and Government Coalitions, 2004, *Dados* 47, 3 (with Marta Arretche, in Portuguese).

Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement, 2004, *Comparative Politics* 36, 4: 481-500. (Portuguese version, 2005, in *Revista de Sociologia e Politica* 25).

Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government, 2003, *International Organization* 57 (Fall), 695–729.

Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-tiered Systems, 2003, *World Politics* 54, 4 (July): 494–531 (with Erik Wibbels).

The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World, 2002, *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 670–687.

Strength in Numbers: Representation and Redistribution in the European Union, 2002, *European Union Politics* 3, 2: 151–175.

Does Federalism Preserve Markets? *Virginia Law Review* 83, 7 (with Susan Rose-Ackerman). Spanish version, 1999, in *Quorum* 68.

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Working Papers

Elections, Political Polarization, and Economic Uncertainty, NBER Working Paper 27961 (with Scott Baker, Aniket Baksy, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven Davis).

Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Working Paper 2009/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations, Working Paper 2010/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (with Tiberiu Dragu).

Chapters in Books

Political Geography and Representation: A Case Study of Districting in Pennsylvania (with Thomas Weighill), in *Political Geometry*, edited by Moon Duchin and Olivia Walch, forthcoming 2021, Springer.

Keeping Your Enemies Close: Electoral Rules and Partisan Polarization, in *The New Politics of Insecurity*, edited by Frances Rosenbluth and Margaret Weir, forthcoming 2021, Cambridge University Press.

Decentralized Rule and Revenue, 2019, in Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, eds., *Decentralized Governance and Accountability*, Cambridge University Press.

Geography and Gridlock in the United States, 2014, in Nathaniel Persily, ed. *Solutions to Political Polarization in America*, Cambridge University Press.

Can Market Discipline Survive in the U.S. Federation?, 2013, in Daniel Nadler and Paul Peterson, eds, *The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U.S. and European Federalism*, Brookings Press.

Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, 2012, in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel, Jr., eds, *When States Go Broke: The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis,* Cambridge University Press.

Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution, 2010, in Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa, and Albert Sole Olle, eds., *The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows*, Edward Elgar.

Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics, 2009, in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press.

The Political Economy of Federalism, 2006, in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford University Press.

Fiscal Discipline in Federations: Germany and the EMU, 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

The Political Economy of Pro-cyclical Decentralised Finance (with Erik Wibbels), 2006, in Peter Wierts, Servaas Deroose, Elena Flores and Alessandro Turrini, eds., *Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan.

Globalization and Fiscal Decentralization, (with Geoffrey Garrett), 2003, in Miles Kahler and David Lake, eds., *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition*, Princeton University Press: 87-109. (Updated version, 2007, in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis, and Annalisa Zinn, eds., *Globalization and Self-Determination: Is the Nation-State under Siege?* Routledge.)

Introduction and Overview (Chapter 1), 2003, in Rodden et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

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Soft Budget Constraints and German Federalism (Chapter 5), 2003, in Rodden, et al, *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil (Chapter 7), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Lessons and Conclusions (Chapter 13), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Online Interactive Visualization

Stanford Election Atlas, 2012 (collaboration with Stephen Ansolabehere at Harvard and Jim Herries at ESRI)

Other Publications

Supporting Advanced Manufacturing in Alabama, Report to the Alabama Innovation Commission, Hoover Institution, 2021.

How America's Urban-Rural Divide has Shaped the Pandemic, 2020, Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.

An Evolutionary Path for the European Monetary Fund? A Comparative Perspective, 2017, Briefing paper for the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations: A Research Report, 2009, in *World Report on Fiscal Federalism*, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

On the Migration of Fiscal Sovereignty, 2004, PS: Political Science and Politics July, 2004: 427-431.

Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, *PREM Note* 41, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C. (July).

Decentralization and Hard Budget Constraints, *APSA-CP* (Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association) 11:1 (with Jennie Litvack).

Book Review of The Government of Money by Peter Johnson, Comparative Political Studies 32,7: 897-900.

Fellowships, Honors, and Grants

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2021.

Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations," 2021.

National Institutes of Health, funding for "Relationship between lawful handgun ownership and risk of homicide victimization in the home," 2021.

National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research, funding for "Cohort Study Of Firearm-Related Mortality Among Cohabitants Of Handgun Owners." 2020.

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT), GA004696, 2017-2018.

Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant, 2015.

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Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association, 2016.

Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.

General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.

Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.

Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, beginning Fall 2010.

Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 2009.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2008.

United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.

Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections, public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).

MIT Dean's Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.

Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize the conference, "European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective," held at Harvard University, November 4, 2000.

Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.

Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.

Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the University of Michigan, 1993.

W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan, 1993.

Other Professional Activities

Selection committee, best paper award, American Journal of Political Science.

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.

Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.

Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.

Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.

Courses

Undergraduate

Politics, Economics, and Democracy Introduction to Comparative Politics Introduction to Political Science

Political Science Scope and Methods

Institutional Economics

Spatial Approaches to Social Science

Graduate

Political Economy Political Economy of Institutions Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization Politics and Geography

Consulting

2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.

2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID, Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).

2019: Written expert testimony in *McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann,* United States District Court, Mississippi.

2019: Expert witness in Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* No. 4:18-cv-002510, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

2017: Expert witness in *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

2017: Expert witness in *Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al.*, No. 2:16-CV-01065, United States District Court for Arizona.

2016: Expert witness in *Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.

2016: Expert witness in *Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.

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2014-2015: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al.,* 2012-CA-002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).

2013-2014: Expert witness in *Romo v Detzner*, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County (Florida Congressional redistricting case).

2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.

2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.

2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.

2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank decentralization and safety net programs.

2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.

1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for *World Development Report*, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentralization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator on review of subnational adjustment lending.

Last updated: September 23, 2021

Exhibit F

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Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement

Pursuant to Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Redistricting Commission issues the following statement:

The Commission determined that the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio predominately favor Republican candidates.

The Commission considered statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years. There were sixteen such contests. When considering the results of each of those elections, the Commission determined that Republican candidates won thirteen out of sixteen of those elections resulting in a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates of 81% and a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates of 19%. When considering the number of votes cast in each of those elections for Republican and Democratic candidates, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is 54% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is 46%. Thus, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is between 54% and 81% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is between 19% and 46%. The Commission obtained publicly available geographic data for statewide partisan elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020. Publicly available geographic data for those elections was not available for elections in 2012 and 2014. Using this data, the Commission adopted the final general assembly district plan, which contains 85 districts (64.4%) favoring Republican candidates and 47 districts (35.6%) favoring Democratic candidates out of a total of 132 districts. Accordingly, the statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each political party corresponds closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

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The final general assembly district plan adopted by the Commission complies with all of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution. The Commission's attempt to meet the aspirational standards of Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution did not result in any violation of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution.

Rodden Decl. Ex. F

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, <i>et al.</i> ,	
	Case No. 2021-1198
Petitioners,	
	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio
V.	Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S.
	<i>Ct. Prac. R. 14.03</i>
Respondents.	

EXHIBITS TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISTRICT PLAN ADOPTED ON MARCH 28, 2022 – VOLUME II (Expert Affidavit of Dr. Jonathan Rodden)

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Counsel for Respondents Ohio Governor Mike DeWine, Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose, and Ohio Auditor Keith Faber

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Counsel for Respondents Senate President Matt Huffman and House Speaker Robert Cupp

C. Benjamin Cooper (0093103) Charles H. Cooper, Jr. (0037295) Chelsea C. Weaver (0096850) Cooper & Elliott, LLC 305 West Nationwide Boulevard Columbus, Ohio 43215 T: (614) 481-6000 benc@cooperelliott.com chipc@cooperelliott.com

Counsel for Respondents Senator Vernon Sykes and House Minority Leader Allison Russo

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Bria Bennett, <i>et al.</i> ,		
Petitioners,	Case No. 2021-1198	
v.	Original Action Filed Pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 9(A)	
Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al.,	[Apportionment Case Pursuant to S. Ci	
Respondents.	1700. IX. 17.05j	

EXPERT AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JONATHAN RODDEN

I, Jonathan Rodden, having been duly sworn and cautioned according to law, hereby state that I am over the age of eighteen years and am competent to testify to the facts set forth below based on my personal knowledge and having personally examined all records referenced in this affidavit, and further state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- 1. For the purpose of this report, I have been asked to examine the third revised redistricting plan for the Ohio State House of Representatives and Ohio Senate, adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on March 28, 2022 (attached as Exhibits A and B) ("Third Revised Plan"). In previous reports, I have addressed the standards set forth in Article XI, Section 6, namely, that (A) "No general assembly district plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party," (B) "The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio," and (C) "General assembly districts shall be compact."
- 2. Additionally, I have been asked to assess an additional redistricting plan created by the independent map drawers appointed by the Ohio Redistricting Commission and submitted to the Commission on March 28, 2022 ("Independent Map Drawers' Plan").
- 3. As this Court stated in its January 12, 2022 opinion declaring invalid the General Assembly plan adopted by the Commission on September 16, 2021, "[i]f it is possible for a district plan to comply with Section 6 and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, the commission must adopt a plan that does so." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 88.
- 4. The Third Revised Plan is nearly identical to the Second Revised Plan, with 99.7 percent of Ohio residents placed in the same district as in the Second Revised Plan. In total, the Third Revised Plan changes only 451 census blocks, accounting for 31,244 people out of the state's

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population of nearly 11.8 million, which amounts to a change affecting less than 0.3 percent of Ohio's population. As with the Second Revised Plan, the distribution of support for the two parties across districts in the Third Revised Plan is extremely unusual, indicating that Commissioners attempted to achieve nominal statewide partisan proportionality by generating a large number of districts with very slim Democratic majorities, while creating 0 districts with similarly slim Republican majorities. Under the Second Revised Plan, virtually all the majority-Republican seats are quite safe: 52 of 54 seats with Republican majorities in the Ohio House of Representatives would have Republican vote shares above 55 percent, and the same is true for 16 of 18 seats with Republican majorities in the Senate. The situation is starkly different for Democrats. Of 45 seats with nominal Democratic majorities, fewer than half-only 22-would have Democratic vote shares above 55 percent in the House, and the same would be true of only 7 of 15 "Democratic" seats in the Senate. These numbers are exactly the same as in the Second Revised Plan. This striking asymmetry in the distribution of competitive and non-competitive seats has the effect of creating what is likely to be a very hard ceiling on the number of seats that can possibly be won by Democratic candidates, preserving a comfortable Republican legislative majority even in the event of an exceedingly strong statewide performance by Democrats.

- 5. In my previous reports submitted in this matter, I discussed and analyzed "toss-up" districts: those seats where the expected vote share for a party is between 48 and 52 percent. The same asymmetry in the Third Revised Plan is obvious even when looking at only the narrowest toss-up districts for each party. Under the Third Revised Plan, every majority-Republican House seat would have a Republican vote share above 52 percent: all 54 seats in the House and all 18 seats in the Senate. On the other hand, only 28 of 45 majority-Democratic seats in the House (2 more than in the Second Revised Plan), and only 9 majority-Democratic seats (1 more than in the Second Revised Plan) in the Senate have Democratic vote shares above 52 percent. As a result, there are, as in the Second Revised Plan, a large number of ultracompetitive districts, which monolithically "lean" Democrat.
- 6. Using the Ohio Supreme Court's guidance on proportionality, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342 at ¶ 62. Accordingly, the Third Revised Plan is far from proportional.
- 7. If these toss-up seats are excluded, the Third Revised Plan reflects a 28D/54R advantage in the House, or an advantage of 34.1 percent to 65.9 percent of allocated seats in favor of Republicans. In the Senate, it reflects a 18R/9D advantage, which corresponds to a 33.3% percent to 66.7% percent advantage in Republicans' favor.
- 8. Moreover, like its predecessor, the Third Revised Plan produces an unusually large number of districts with Democratic vote shares of around 51 percent, indicating the application of a specific target. This is to say, it appears that the drawers of the Second Revised Plan were instructed to draw as many of the Democratic-leaning districts as possible to be as close as possible to 51 percent, and this unusual feature remains in the Third Revised Plan. Only 2 House districts and 1 Senate district have been altered in the Third Revised Plan so as to bump their Democratic vote share above 52 percent.

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- 9. In order to ascertain whether it was possible for the Commission to comply with both Section 6 and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution, I submit my own alternative maps (with images attached as Exhibits C and D and submitted as native files to the Court on February 18, 2022).
- 10. The alternative maps attached as Exhibits C and D comply with each of the requirements of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. They also produce a partisan breakdown that more closely corresponds to the preferences of Ohio voters. Using plan-wide averages, compactness scores reveal that these maps draw far more compact districts than those in the Third Revised Plan. They also split fewer counties and vote tabulation districts and are far more reflective of communities of interest. Moreover, these maps reveal that there is nothing about the political geography of Ohio that might explain an unusual bunching of districts with Democratic vote shares between 50 and 52 percent, or right at the 51 percent mark in particular, while simultaneously resulting in all Republican districts exceeding 52 percent.
- 11. I have not yet had the opportunity to assess whether the Independent Map Drawers' Plan meets all the criteria of the Ohio Constitution, specifically with respect to the issue of municipal splits. However, I have been asked to place this plan in comparative perspective with respect to compactness, splits of counties and vote tabulation districts, and the distribution of support for the two parties across districts. I conclude that the plan performs very well in reflecting the statewide preferences of Ohio voters. Like the Rodden Plan and Third Revised Plan, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan achieves nominal proportionality in both houses. It also allocates toss-up seats in a much more even-handed fashion than the Third Revised Plan. Excluding toss-up seats from the calculus, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan reflects a 42D/51R split in the House and a 13D/18R split in the Senate, corresponding to a 45.2 percent Democratic/54.8 percent Republican split in the House and 41.9 percent Democratic/58.1 percent Republican split in the Senate.
- 12. When it comes to traditional redistricting criteria, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan outperforms the Third Revised Plan on almost all dimensions. For example, the Independent Map Drawers' Plan has higher plan wide compactness scores than the Third Revised Plan in the House and Senate on every single measure, and splits the same number of counties and fewer Vote Tabulation Districts in the House; in the Senate, it splits fewer Vote Tabulation Districts as well, although it splits somewhat more counties. On traditional redistricting criteria, the plan I have submitted to the Court outperforms both the Third Revised Plan and the Independent Map Drawers' Plan.

II. QUALIFICATIONS

13. I am currently a tenured Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the founder and director of the Stanford Spatial Social Science Lab—a center for research and teaching with a focus on the analysis of geo-spatial data in the social sciences. I am engaged in a variety of research projects involving large, fine-grained geo-spatial data sets including ballots and election results at the level of polling places, individual records of registered voters, census data, and survey responses. I am also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Hoover Institution. Prior to my employment at Stanford, I was the Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of

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Technology. I received my Ph.D. from Yale University and my B.A. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, both in political science. A copy of my current C.V. is included as Exhibit E.

- In my current academic work, I conduct research on the relationship between the patterns of 14. political representation, geographic location of demographic and partisan groups, and the drawing of electoral districts. I have published papers using statistical methods to assess political geography, balloting, and representation in a variety of academic journals including Statistics and Public Policy, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Virginia Law Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, the Annual Review of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics. One of these papers was selected by the American Political Science Association as the winner of the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best paper on political economy published in the last year, and another received an award from the American Political Science Association section on social networks. In 2021, I received a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, and received the Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations."
- 15. I have recently written a series of papers, along with my co-authors, using automated redistricting algorithms to assess partisan gerrymandering. This work has been published in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Election Law Journal*, and *Political Analysis*, and it has been featured in more popular publications like the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, and *Boston Review*. I have recently completed a book, published by *Basic Books* in June of 2019, on the relationship between political districts, the residential geography of social groups, and their political representation in the United States and other countries that use winner-take-all electoral districts. The book was reviewed in *The New York Times*, *The New York Review of Books*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, and *The Atlantic*, among others.
- 16. I have expertise in the use of large data sets and geographic information systems (GIS), and I conduct research and teaching in the area of applied statistics related to elections. My PhD students frequently take academic and private sector jobs as statisticians and data scientists. I frequently work with geo-coded voter files and other large administrative data sets, including in recent papers published in the *Annals of Internal Medicine* and *The New England Journal of Medicine*. I have developed a national data set of geo-coded precinct-level election results that has been used extensively in policy-oriented research related to redistricting and representation.
- I have been accepted and testified as an expert witness in several election law and redistricting cases: *Romo v. Detzner*, No. 2012-CA-000412 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2012); *Mo. State Conference of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist.*, No. 4:2014-CV-02077 (E.D. Mo. 2014); *Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, No. 3:15-CV-00357 (E.D. Va. 2015); *Democratic Nat'l Committee et al. v. Hobbs et al.*, No. 16-1065-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz. 2016); *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-cv-00852-REP-AWA-BMK (E.D. Va. 2014); and *Jacobson et al. v. Lee*, No. 4:18-cv-00262 (N.D. Fla. 2018). I also worked with a coalition of academics to file Amicus Briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court in *Gill v. Whitford*, No. 16-1161, and *Rucho v. Common Cause*, No. 18-422. Much of the testimony

in these cases had to do with geography, electoral districts, voting, ballots, and election administration. I recently drew a Pennsylvania Congressional redistricting plan, known as the "Carter Plan," that was chosen by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for implementation. *Carter v. Chapman*, No. 7 MM 2022, 2022 WL 549106 (Pa. Feb. 23, 2022).

III. DATA SOURCES

18. I have collected statewide election data for 2012 to 2020 from the Ohio Secretary of State. I also accessed precinct-level election results from the Ohio Secretary of State for statewide elections from 2016 to 2020 that were matched to 2020 Ohio vote tabulation districts by a team at Harvard University called the Algorithm-Assisted Redistricting Methodology Project.¹ Additionally, I accessed the Third Revised Plan approved by the Commission and uploaded to the web page of the Ohio Redistricting Commission, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits A and B, as well as the Independent Map Drawers' Plan, true copies of which are attached as Exhibits G and H.² For the analysis conducted in this report, I use two software packages: Stata and Maptitude for Redistricting. In creating my maps, I used the same U.S. Census redistricting data used by the Ohio Redistricting Database."³

IV. WHAT HAS CHANGED IN THE THIRD REVISED PLAN?

- 19. The first thing to notice about the Third Revised Plan is that it is virtually identical to the Second Revised Plan. I have added up the block-level population that falls into the same district in both plans, as well as the population that has been moved to a different district. For the Ohio House of Representatives, 99.74 percent of the population remains in the same district in the two plans. The boundaries for the House districts in the Third Revised Plan are exactly the same as in the Second Revised Plan throughout the state, with two very small exceptions. Figure 1 below provides a map of the boundaries of the Second Revised Plan in red, and the Third Revised Plan in black. When looking at the entire state, it is very difficult to appreciate any differences. To see the slight changes, it is necessary to zoom in on the northern part of Franklin County (Figure 2) and on the Canton area (Figure 3).
- 20. First, there has been a very minor movement of a boundary in the area of Worthington and Upper Arlington in Northern Franklin County. In Figure 2 also, the boundaries of the Second Revised Plan are shown in red, and the boundaries of the Third Revised Plan are shown in black. Only a handful of census blocks are involved in this change. This small change did not alter any of the partisan metrics discussed in this report for the House—both Districts 7 and 8 are extremely Democratic districts. However, for the Senate, this small maneuver brought Senate District 16 from an average Democratic vote share of 51.1 percent in the Second Revised Plan to 52.1 percent in the Third Revised Plan.
- 21. Figure 3 shows that some small changes were also made near Canton. First, District 49 gained a very small sliver of urban population and shed a small number of rural voters. This

¹ https://alarm-redist.github.io/posts/2021-08-10-census-2020/

² https://redistricting.ohio.gov/maps

³ https://www.redistricting.ohio.gov/resources

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maneuver brough District 49 from an average Democratic vote share of 51.6 percent to 52.2 percent. Additionally, District 59, which combines Youngstown with surrounding rural areas, simply shed a few rural voters, bringing the average Democratic vote share from 51.9 percent to 52.8 percent. These changes did not have any implications for the Senate districts. Other than these very small changes, the Second and Third Revised Plans are identical.



Figure 1: Boundaries of Second and Third Revised Plans

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Figure 2: Northern Franklin County

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Figure 3: Canton Area

V. CONTRASTING THE REVISED PLANS, THE RODDEN III PLAN, AND THE INDEPENDENT MAP DRAWERS' PLAN

22. According to *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-65 at ¶ 108, the Commission must attempt to draw a plan with a seat share that "closely corresponds" to a breakdown of 54 percent in favor of Republicans and 46 percent in favor of Democrats. As this Court has held in interpretating Section 6(B)'s proportionality requirement, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." *League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.*, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342 at ¶ 62.

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- 23. Determining the proportion of districts that favor each party, based on consideration of the relevant elections identified in Article XI, Section 6, requires an aggregation of the precinct-level results of these past elections to the boundaries of a map's proposed districts. However, precinct-level election results linked with geo-spatial boundaries were not available for the 2012 and 2014 elections, as the Commission itself acknowledged in its initial Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement (accompanying the since-struck down September 16, 2021 General Assembly plan), attached as Exhibit F. As discussed in my previous reports to this Court, using the full statewide election results from 2012 to 2020, the statewide preferences of Ohio voters must be translated into state legislative maps in which 45.9 percent of seats favor Democrats and 54.1 percent of seats favor Republicans. Since there are 99 seats in the Ohio House of Representatives, a statewide vote share of 45.9 percent would be associated with 45.44 Democratic seats, which rounds down to 45 seats. Similarly, a 45.9 percent vote share would be associated with about 15.15 Democratic seats in the 33-member Ohio Senate, which rounds down to 15 seats.
- 24. It is my understanding that the Commission's approach to evaluating the partisanship of each district was to add up all the votes cast for each of the two major parties in each statewide election and divide by the total number of votes cast for both of the two major parties, summing over all of those elections.⁴ I have calculated this measure of district-level partisanship for each district in the Third Revised Plan. In Table 1, I include these metrics for the Commission's First Revised Plan, the Second Revised Plan, the Third Revised Plan, the plan that I have submitted to the Commission and the Court (the "Rodden Plan"), and the Independent Map Drawers' Plan. Table 2 provides the same information for the Ohio Senate.
- 25. For each plan, Figure 4 also provide histograms that allow one to visualize the distribution of support for the two parties across the House districts in each proposed plan. That is, the districts are divided into bins according to a specific narrow range of average Democratic vote share, and the height of the bin corresponds to the number of districts that fall into that bin. Figure 5 displays the same information for the Ohio Senate.

⁴ In my reports concerning the first two plans approved by the Commission, I calculated vote shares of the two major parties in each election in each district, and then took an average across all 9 statewide elections. This approach gives equal weight to each election, regardless of turnout, whereas the approach taken by the Commission, and reproduced here for purposes of comparability, gives greater weight to presidential election years with higher turnout. The two approaches yield very similar results, and lead to very similar inferences, but exact numbers of seats above and below certain thresholds can sometimes vary by a single seat.

	Commission First Revised Plan	Commission Second Revised Plan	Commission Third Revised Plan	Rodden Plan	Independent Map Drawers' Plan
Average compactness scores					
(Higher scores = more compact)					
Reock	0.40 0.30	0.39 0.31	0.39 0.31	0.41 0.36	0.41 0.33
Polsby-Popper					
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.79	0.77
Number of split counties	37	38	38	32	38
Number of split VTDs	112	135	135	96	118
# of seats with two-party	42	45	45	42	45
Expressed as percentage of seats	42.4%	45.45%	45.45%	42.4%	45.45%
# of seats with two-party Republican vote share >.5	57	54	54	57	54
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.5%	54.5%	57.6%	54.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.52	28	26	28	40	42
Expressed as a percentage of seats	20.370	20.5%	20.2070	40.4%	42.4%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.48	57	54	54	56	51
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.55%	54.55%	56.6%	51.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .5	0	0	0	1	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	3.0%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5 and .52	14	19	17	2	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	14.1%	19.19%	17.17%	2.0%	3.0%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.55	24	22	22	29	24
Expressed as a percentage of seats	24.2%	22.22%	22.22%	29.3%	24.2%

Table 1: Plan Statistics, Ohio House of Representatives

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# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.45	54	52	52	51	48
Expressed as percentage of seats	54.5%	52.53%	52.53%	51.5%	48.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5					
and .55	18	23	23	13	21
Expressed as percentage of seats	18.2%	23.23%	23.23%	13.1%	21.2%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .45					
and .5	3	2	2	6	6
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	2.02%	2.02%	6.1%	6.1%

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Figure 4: Histograms of Democratic Vote Share, House Plans

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	Commission First Revised Plan	Commission Second Revised Plan	Commission Third Revised Plan	Rodden Plan	Independent Map Drawers' Plan
Average compactness scores					
(Higher scores = more compact)					
Reock	0.41	0.38	0.38	0.44	0.42
Polsby-Popper	0.3	0.28	0.28	0.37	0.31
Area/Convex Hull	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.78	0.76
Number of split counties	17	15	15	15	22
Number of split VTDs	41	57	58	22	46
# of seats with two-party	13	15	15	15	15
Expressed as percentage of seats	39.4%	45.45%	45.45%	45.5%	45.5%
# of seats with two-party <i>Republican</i> vote share >.5 Expressed as percentage of seats	20 60.6%	18 54.5%	18 54.5%	18 54.5%	18 54.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.52	8	8	9	12	13
Expressed as a percentage of seats	24.2%	24.2%	27.3%	36.4%	39.4%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.48	19	18	18	18	18
Expressed as percentage of seats	57.6%	54.55%	54.55%	54.5%	54.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .48 and .5	1	0	0	0	0
Expressed as percentage of seats	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5 and .52	5	7	6	3	2
Expressed as percentage of seats	15.2%	21.21%	18.18%	9.1%	6.1%

Table 2: Plan Statistics, Ohio Senate

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# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share >.55	7	7	7	11	6
Expressed as a percentage of seats	21.2%	21.21%	21.21%	33.3%	18.2%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share <.45	18	16	16	17	15
Expressed as percentage of seats	54.5%	48.48%	48.48%	51.5%	45.5%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .5 and .55 Expressed as percentage of seats	6 18.2%	8 24.24%	8 24.24%	4 12.1%	9 27.3%
# of seats with two-party Democratic vote share between .45 and .5	2	2	2	1	3
Expressed as percentage of seats	6.1%	6.06%	6.06%	3.0%	9.1%


Figure 5: Histograms of Democratic Vote Share, Senate Plans

- 26. Reviewing the data above, a few things are immediately apparent. Since the Second and Third Revised Plans are, again, virtually identical, with only the small changes mentioned above, the number of seats in each vote share range (e.g., 50-52 percent Democratic, greater than 52% Democratic) remains the same with the exceptions of only the two seats in the House mentioned above (49 and 59), and the one in the Senate (16). In each case, the seats were moved from around 51 percent Democratic to just above 52 percent.
- 27. The similarity between the Second and Third Revised Plans is also clear from the histograms representing the number of seats at each level of Democratic vote share, which shows that the Third Revised Plan continues the Second Revised Plan's strategy of bunching Democratic seats very close to the 50% line. Once again, this reflects a conscious attempt to

achieve the appearance of partisan proportionality, while in actuality ensuring disproportionate Republican majorities.

- 28. Both the Rodden Plan and the Independent Map Drawers' Plan help to confirm that this bunching of Democratic seats in the toss-up range was not the result of Article XI's requirements or Ohio's political geography. In both alternative plans, in both the House and Senate, there is a much more even distribution of seats across the histogram.
- 29. As this Court has held in interpretating Section 6(B)'s proportionality requirement, "competitive districts . . . must either be excluded from the proportionality assessment or be allocated to each party in close proportion to its statewide vote share." League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342 at ¶ 62. Under either approach, the Third Revised Plan, like its predecessor, is highly disproportionate. If competitive districts are excluded (i.e., if any seats between 48 and 52 percent Democratic vote share are excluded from the analysis), the Third Revised Plan produces a breakdown of 9D/18R in the Senate (or 33.3 percent Democratic/66.7 percent Republican) and 28D/54R in the House (or 34.1 percent Democratic/65.9 percent Republican). Nor are competitive seats allocated to each party in proportion to their vote share. The Third Revised Plan contains 17 Democratic-leaning toss-ups and no Republican leaning toss-ups in the House, and 6 Democratic-leaning toss-ups and no Republican-leaning toss-ups in the Senate. In both houses, the Third Revised Plan contains more Democratic-leaning toss-up districts than the First Revised Plan, which was struck down by this Court for its disparate allocation of tossup seats.
- 30. The Rodden Plan and Independent Map Drawers' Plan, by contrast, distribute toss-up districts more evenly. In the House, the Rodden Plan contains fewer toss-up districts overall, with 1 Republican-leaning toss-up district and 2 Democratic-leaning toss-up district in the House and 0 Republican-leaning and 3 Democratic-leaning toss-up districts in the Senate. The Independent Map Drawers Plan contains 3 Republican-leaning toss-ups and 3 Democratic-leaning toss-ups in the House and 0 Republican-leaning toss-ups in the Senate. Excluding these toss-up districts, both come much closer to proportionality. For the Rodden Plan, the non-toss-up seat count amounts to a 41.7%/58.3% split in the House and a 40%/60% split in the Senate. For the Independent Map Drawers' Plan, this comes to a 45.2%/54.8% split in the House and a 41.9%/58.1% split in the Senate.
- 31. As discussed in my previous submissions to this Court, the disparity in the allocation of tossup districts between Democrats and Republicans in the Third Remedial Plan (similar to its predecessors), ensures Republicans will attain disproportionate success in General Assembly elections. Imagine a massive uniform swing across all districts of 5 percentage points in favor of the Republican Party. Assuming that the partisanship score being considered here is a perfect predictor of legislative victories, this would yield an additional 23 House seats, providing the Republican Party with 78 percent of the seats. However, a similar swing toward the Democratic Party—providing it with a statewide majority of votes—would yield a pickup of only 2 seats. That is to say, a vote share of around 51 percent in favor of Democrats would generate a seat share of only 47 percent, and that is only if we make the very unrealistic assumption that Democratic candidates win *every single one* of the 17 House districts with a

Democratic vote share between 50 and 52 percent. This striking asymmetry in the treatment of the two parties emerges from an effort to create a large number of bare majority Democratic seats while taking care to avoid the creation of competitive Republican-leaning seats, ensuring that Republican-leaning seats are very comfortable.

- 32. Thus, just like its predecessors, the purported Democratic seat count in the Third Remedial Plan constitutes a ceiling for Democrats, while the purported Republican seat count constitutes a floor. Even in the best electoral environments, Democrats cannot hope to win more than their proportional seat count, while Republicans are nearly guaranteed to exceed their proportional seat count across almost all electoral environments.
- 33. Tables 2 and 3 also include information about traditional redistricting criteria, including splits of counties and voting tabulation districts (VTDs) as well as average planwide compactness metrics. The Rodden Plan outperforms the Third Revised Plan on every single traditional redistricting criterion, while the Independent Map Drawers' Plan outperforms the Third Revised Plan on most. On compactness, the Rodden Plan is superior to both the Third Revised Plan and Independent Map Drawers' Plan in both the House and Senate under all three measures I analyzed (Reock, Polsby-Popper and Area/Convex Hull). The Independent Map Drawers' Plan also outperforms the Third Revised Plan on all three measures in both houses.
- 34. Another relevant redistricting criterion is the number of split counties or voting tabulation districts. As in my previous submissions to the Court, I do not consider a county to be split if multiple districts are entirely contained within the county such that no district crosses the county boundary. Out of the three plans, the Rodden Plan splits fewer counties and Vote Tabulation Districts in the House than any of the other plans. In the Senate, the Rodden Plan ties the Third Revised Plan on county splits, but splits substantially fewer Voter Tabulation Districts. The Independent Map Drawers' Plan splits the same numbers of counties in the House as the Third Revised Plan, but a few more counties in the Senate. It splits fewer Vote Tabulation Districts than the Third Revised Plan in both houses.

V. CONCLUSION

35. The Third Revised Plan is nearly identical to the Second Revised Plan, already invalidated by this Court in *LWV III*. With the exception of moving a very small number of voters in order to move a total of three seats in the entire General Assembly from around 51 percent to just above 52 percent Democratic vote share, the Second and Third Revised Plans are in fact the same. Like the Second Revised Plan, the Third Revised Plan disparately allocates toss-up seats between Democrats and Republicans, thereby ensuring Republicans a disproportionate share of the seats in almost all foreseeable electoral environments. The Third Revised Plan therefore contains nearly precisely the same features as those identified by this Court as reasons it invalidated the Second Revised Plan in *LWV III*.

State of Texas

Jonathan Rodden

County of <u>Travis</u>

Jonathan Rodden

Sworn to before me this ______ day of March 2022.

Notary Public



My commission expires _____11/23/2024

Notary Public, State of Texas

Notarized online using audio-video communication

Exhibit A

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Exhibit B



Exhibit C

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Exhibit D

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Exhibit E

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Introduction and Overview (Chapter 1), 2003, in Rodden et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

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Soft Budget Constraints and German Federalism (Chapter 5), 2003, in Rodden, et al, *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil (Chapter 7), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Lessons and Conclusions (Chapter 13), 2003, in Rodden, et al., *Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints* (see above).

Online Interactive Visualization

Stanford Election Atlas, 2012 (collaboration with Stephen Ansolabehere at Harvard and Jim Herries at ESRI)

Other Publications

Supporting Advanced Manufacturing in Alabama, Report to the Alabama Innovation Commission, Hoover Institution, 2021.

How America's Urban-Rural Divide has Shaped the Pandemic, 2020, Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.

An Evolutionary Path for the European Monetary Fund? A Comparative Perspective, 2017, Briefing paper for the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

Representation and Regional Redistribution in Federations: A Research Report, 2009, in *World Report on Fiscal Federalism*, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.

On the Migration of Fiscal Sovereignty, 2004, PS: Political Science and Politics July, 2004: 427–431.

Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, *PREM Note* 41, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, World Bank, Washington, D.C. (July).

Decentralization and Hard Budget Constraints, *APSA-CP* (Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics, American Political Science Association) 11:1 (with Jennie Litvack).

Book Review of The Government of Money by Peter Johnson, Comparative Political Studies 32,7: 897-900.

Fellowships, Honors, and Grants

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2021.

Martha Derthick Award of the American Political Science Association for "the best book published at least ten years ago that has made a lasting contribution to the study of federalism and intergovernmental relations," 2021.

National Institutes of Health, funding for "Relationship between lawful handgun ownership and risk of homicide victimization in the home," 2021.

National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research, funding for "Cohort Study Of Firearm-Related Mortality Among Cohabitants Of Handgun Owners." 2020.

Fund for a Safer Future, Longitudinal Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT), GA004696, 2017-2018.

Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, Innovation and Entrepreneurship research grant, 2015.

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Michael Wallerstein Award for best paper in political economy, American Political Science Association, 2016.

Common Cause Gerrymandering Standard Writing Competition, 2015.

General support grant from the Hewlett Foundation for Spatial Social Science Lab, 2014.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2012.

Sloan Foundation, grant for assembly of geo-referenced precinct-level electoral data set (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder), 2009-2011.

Hoagland Award Fund for Innovations in Undergraduate Teaching, Stanford University, 2009.

W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, beginning Fall 2010.

Research Grant on Fiscal Federalism, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, 2009.

Fellow, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 2008.

United Postal Service Foundation grant for study of the spatial distribution of income in cities, 2008.

Gregory Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics, 2007.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 2006-2007.

National Science Foundation grant for assembly of cross-national provincial-level dataset on elections, public finance, and government composition, 2003-2004 (with Erik Wibbels).

MIT Dean's Fund and School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Research Funds.

Funding from DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), MIT, and Harvard EU Center to organize the conference, "European Fiscal Federalism in Comparative Perspective," held at Harvard University, November 4, 2000.

Canadian Studies Fellowship (Canadian Federal Government), 1996-1997.

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale University, 1998-1999.

Fulbright Grant, University of Leipzig, Germany, 1993-1994.

Michigan Association of Governing Boards Award, one of two top graduating students at the University of Michigan, 1993.

W. J. Bryan Prize, top graduating senior in political science department at the University of Michigan, 1993.

Other Professional Activities

Selection committee, best paper award, American Journal of Political Science.

International Advisory Committee, Center for Metropolitan Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2006–2010.

Selection committee, Mancur Olson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section for the best dissertation in the field of political economy.

Selection committee, Gregory Luebbert Best Book Award.

Selection committee, William Anderson Prize, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the field of federalism and intergovernmental relations.

Courses

Undergraduate

Politics, Economics, and Democracy Introduction to Comparative Politics Introduction to Political Science

Political Science Scope and Methods

Institutional Economics

Spatial Approaches to Social Science

Graduate

Political Economy Political Economy of Institutions Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization Politics and Geography

Consulting

2017. Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

2016. Briefing paper for the World Bank on fiscal federalism in Brazil.

2013-2018: Principal Investigator, SMS for Better Governance (a collaborative project involving USAID, Social Impact, and UNICEF in Arua, Uganda).

2019: Written expert testimony in *McLemore, Holmes, Robinson, and Woullard v. Hosemann,* United States District Court, Mississippi.

2019: Expert witness in *Nancy Corola Jacobson v. Detzner*, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner* No. 4:18-cv-002510, United States District Court, Florida.

2018: Written expert testimony in *College Democrats of the University of Michigan, et al. v. Johnson, et al.,* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

2017: Expert witness in *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, No. 3:14-CV-00852, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

2017: Expert witness in *Arizona Democratic Party, et al. v. Reagan, et al.*, No. 2:16-CV-01065, United States District Court for Arizona.

2016: Expert witness in *Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections*, 3:15-cv-357, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.

2016: Expert witness in *Missouri NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant School District*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.

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2014-2015: Written expert testimony in *League of Women Voters of Florida et al. v. Detzner, et al.,* 2012-CA-002842 in Florida Circuit Court, Leon County (Florida Senate redistricting case).

2013-2014: Expert witness in *Romo v Detzner*, 2012-CA-000412 in Florida Curcuit Court, Leon County (Florida Congressional redistricting case).

2011-2014: Consultation with investment groups and hedge funds on European debt crisis.

2011-2014: Lead Outcome Expert, Democracy and Governance, USAID and Social Impact.

2010: USAID, Review of USAID analysis of decentralization in Africa.

2006–2009: World Bank, Independent Evaluations Group. Undertook evaluations of World Bank decentralization and safety net programs.

2008–2011: International Monetary Fund Institute. Designed and taught course on fiscal federalism.

1998–2003: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Consultant for *World Development Report*, lecturer for training courses, participant in working group for assembly of decentralization data, director of multi-country study of fiscal discipline in decentralized countries, collaborator on review of subnational adjustment lending.

Last updated: September 23, 2021

Exhibit F

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Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) Statement

Pursuant to Article XI, Section 8(C)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Redistricting Commission issues the following statement:

The Commission determined that the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio predominately favor Republican candidates.

The Commission considered statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years. There were sixteen such contests. When considering the results of each of those elections, the Commission determined that Republican candidates won thirteen out of sixteen of those elections resulting in a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates of 81% and a statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates of 19%. When considering the number of votes cast in each of those elections for Republican and Democratic candidates, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is 54% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is 46%. Thus, the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Republican candidates is between 54% and 81% and the statewide proportion of voters favoring statewide Democratic candidates is between 19% and 46%. The Commission obtained publicly available geographic data for statewide partisan elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020. Publicly available geographic data for those elections was not available for elections in 2012 and 2014. Using this data, the Commission adopted the final general assembly district plan, which contains 85 districts (64.4%) favoring Republican candidates and 47 districts (35.6%) favoring Democratic candidates out of a total of 132 districts. Accordingly, the statewide proportion of districts whose voters favor each political party corresponds closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.

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The final general assembly district plan adopted by the Commission complies with all of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution. The Commission's attempt to meet the aspirational standards of Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution did not result in any violation of the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution.

Exhibit G

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Exhibit H

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was served via email on April 1, 2022

upon the following:

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Phillip J. Strach (PHV 25444-2021) Thomas A. Farr (PHV 25461-2021) John E. Branch, III (PHV 25460-2021) Alyssa M. Riggins (PHV 25441-2021) NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP 4140 Parklake Ave., Suite 200 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 phil.strach@nelsonmullins.com tom.farr@nelsonmullins.com john.branch@nelsonmullins.com alyssa.riggins@nelsonmullins.com T: (919) 329-3812

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Counsel for Respondents Senate President Matt Huffman and House Speaker Robert Cupp

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Counsel for Respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission

C. Benjamin Cooper (0093103) Charles H. Cooper, Jr. (0037295) Chelsea C. Weaver (0096850) Cooper & Elliott, LLC 305 West Nationwide Boulevard Columbus, Ohio 43215 T: (614) 481-6000 benc@cooperelliott.com chipc@cooperelliott.com

Counsel for Respondents Senator Vernon Sykes and House Minority Leader Allison Russo

> /s/ Derek S. Clinger Derek S. Clinger (0092075)

Rodden Decl. Ex. G

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Rodden Decl. Ex. H

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February 15, 2022

To the Ohio Redistricting Commission:

The *Bennett* and *League of Women Voters* Petitioners hereby submit the attached, updated version of the state legislative plan created by Dr. Jonathan Rodden (the "Rodden III Plan").

Dr. Rodden made very slight changes to his earlier plan in order to address "zero-population splits," meaning instances in which a district technically divides a township or municipality, but only by splitting a completely unpopulated area from the populated area of a township or municipality. Because a zero-population split does not affect population, it can be "remedied" simply by reallocating the unpopulated area from one side of the "split" to another. Notably, no voters were reassigned to a different district as a result of these changes.

As explained in their objections to the state legislative plan adopted by the Commission on January 22, 2022 (the "Remedial Plan"), the *Bennett* Petitioners do not understand zero-population splits to pose a concern under Article XI, Section 3(D)(3). *See* Bennett Pet'rs' Objections at 20 n.6. For that reason, while the *Bennett* Petitioners objected to the Remedial Plan on the basis of certain other political subdivision splits, they did not challenge the Remedial Plan on the basis of the multiple instances in which Census blocks with a population of zero were separated from their municipal corporations and townships. *See id.* at 15-20 & n.6; Affidavit of Jonathan Rodden (Jan. 25, 2022) ¶ 37 & n.5. And although Mr. Raymond DiRossi alleged that the "zero-population splits" in Dr. Rodden's plan were constitutional violations, he did not similarly count (or even mention) his own zero-population splits in the list of technical violations committed by the Commission in the Remedial Plan. *See* Affidavit of Raymond DiRossi (Jan. 28, 2022) ¶ 27-28. Nonetheless, in an effort to avoid any unnecessary disputes as to the significance of zero-population splits, the Rodden III Plan makes minor, technical adjustments to address and eliminate such splits.

For consistency, the Rodden III Plan also corrects certain instances where district lines had been drawn to follow township boundaries instead of municipal boundaries.

The Rodden III Plan fully complies with Article XI, Section 3's line-drawing requirements. It also fully complies with Article XI, Section 5's requirements for the numbering of state Senate districts. Furthermore, as required by Article XI, Section 6(B), the Rodden III Plan more closely corresponds to statewide proportionality than the state legislative plans adopted by the Commission in September 2021 or January 2022.

If the Commission believes the enclosed plan has any technical violations, we welcome the Commission's feedback and invite the Commission to use the map as a starting point and make any further adjustments it believes are constitutionally required.

Sincerely,

Ben Stiffed

Ben Stafford Counsel for *Bennett* Petitioners

Freda Levenson Counsel for *League of Women Voters* Petitioners
Rodden Decl. Ex. I



Rodden Decl. Ex. J

House	2020 Population	Ideal Population	Deviation	% Deviation
1	116 894	119 186	-2 292	-1 92%
2	124 936	119,186	5 750	4 82%
3	132 748	119,186	13.062	10.96%
4	102,216	119,186	-16 980	-14 25%
5	102,200	119,186	-17 309	-14 52%
6	123 329	119,186	4 143	3 48%
7	119 562	119,186	376	0.32%
8	116,600	119,186	-2,586	-2.17%
9	116,195	119,186	-2.991	-2.51%
10	112,385	119,186	-6.801	-5.71%
11	106.341	119,186	-12.845	-10.78%
12	114.399	119,186	-4,787	-4.02%
13	111.364	119,186	-7.822	-6.56%
14	111.504	119,186	-7.682	-6.45%
15	111.375	119,186	-7.811	-6.55%
16	121.763	119,186	2,577	2.16%
17	116.012	119.186	-3,174	-2.66%
18	136.039	119.186	16.853	14.14%
19	133,846	119,186	14,660	12.30%
20	139,823	119,186	20,637	17.32%
21	139,857	119,186	20,671	17.34%
22	133,768	119,186	14,582	12.23%
23	136,182	119,186	16,996	14.26%
24	126,074	119,186	6,888	5.78%
25	131,643	119,186	12,457	10.45%
26	130,563	119,186	11,377	9.55%
27	116,574	119,186	-2,612	-2.19%
28	125,471	119,186	6,285	5.27%
29	118,485	119,186	-701	-0.59%
30	113,456	119,186	-5,730	-4.81%
31	117,263	119,186	-1,923	-1.61%
32	125,392	119,186	6,206	5.21%
33	113,998	119,186	-5,188	-4.35%
34	108,211	119,186	-10,975	-9.21%
35	108,971	119,186	-10,215	-8.57%
36	118,727	119,186	-459	-0.39%
37	122,719	119,186	3,533	2.96%
38	113,686	119,186	-5,500	-4.61%
39	107,022	119,186	-12,164	-10.21%
40	119,235	119,186	49	0.04%

2020 Population of 2011 Ohio State House Districts

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41	118,659	119,186	-527	-0.44%
42	117,850	119,186	-1,336	-1.12%
43	115,542	119,186	-3,644	-3.06%
44	108,500	119,186	-10,686	-8.97%
45	113,664	119,186	-5,522	-4.63%
46	115,705	119,186	-3,481	-2.92%
47	121,689	119,186	2,503	2.10%
48	114,569	119,186	-4,617	-3.87%
49	116,839	119,186	-2,347	-1.97%
50	111,559	119,186	-7,627	-6.40%
51	117,607	119,186	-1,579	-1.32%
52	130,619	119,186	11,433	9.59%
53	123,220	119,186	4,034	3.38%
54	131,917	119,186	12,731	10.68%
55	122,869	119,186	3,683	3.09%
56	121,855	119,186	2,669	2.24%
57	126,805	119,186	7,619	6.39%
58	112,969	119,186	-6,217	-5.22%
59	115,645	119,186	-3,541	-2.97%
60	113,457	119,186	-5,729	-4.81%
61	119,146	119,186	-40	-0.03%
62	129,331	119,186	10,145	8.51%
63	107,384	119,186	-11,802	-9.90%
64	106,108	119,186	-13,078	-10.97%
65	129,051	119,186	9,865	8.28%
66	123,226	119,186	4,040	3.39%
67	142,650	119,186	23,464	19.69%
68	134,195	119,186	15,009	12.59%
69	126,098	119,186	6,912	5.80%
70	121,919	119,186	2,733	2.29%
71	127,215	119,186	8,029	6.74%
72	123,324	119,186	4,138	3.47%
73	117,889	119,186	-1,297	-1.09%
74	113,207	119,186	-5,979	-5.02%
75	118,689	119,186	-497	-0.42%
76	117,739	119,186	-1,447	-1.21%
77	125,790	119,186	6,604	5.54%
78	121,777	119,186	2,591	2.17%
79	116,695	119,186	-2,491	-2.09%
80	127,554	119,186	8,368	7.02%
81	113,649	119,186	-5,537	-4.65%
82	109,580	119,186	-9,606	-8.06%
83	111,822	119,186	-7,364	-6.18%

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84	116,562	119,186	-2,624	-2.20%
85	108,820	119,186	-10,366	-8.70%
86	121,437	119,186	2,251	1.89%
87	109,504	119,186	-9,682	-8.12%
88	110,042	119,186	-9,144	-7.67%
89	115,986	119,186	-3,200	-2.68%
90	114,761	119,186	-4,425	-3.71%
91	119,931	119,186	745	0.63%
92	122,375	119,186	3,189	2.68%
93	115,108	119,186	-4,078	-3.42%
94	116,478	119,186	-2,708	-2.27%
95	115,360	119,186	-3,826	-3.21%
96	113,512	119,186	-5,674	-4.76%
97	116,795	119,186	-2,391	-2.01%
98	124,386	119,186	5,200	4.36%
99	106,819	119,186	-12,367	-10.38%

Rodden Decl. Ex. K

Senate District	2020 Population	Ideal Population	Deviation	% Deviation
1	335,051	357,559	-22,508	-6.29%
2	369,923	357,559	12,364	3.46%
3	389,681	357,559	32,122	8.98%
4	371,446	357,559	13,887	3.88%
5	350,118	357,559	-7,441	-2.08%
6	355,744	357,559	-1,815	-0.51%
7	377,822	357,559	20,263	5.67%
8	357,412	357,559	-147	-0.04%
9	356,653	357,559	-906	-0.25%
10	347,791	357,559	-9,768	-2.73%
11	337,869	357,559	-19,690	-5.51%
12	327,588	357,559	-29,971	-8.38%
13	371,529	357,559	13,970	3.91%
14	367,038	357,559	9,479	2.65%
15	398,245	357,559	40,686	11.38%
16	402,113	357,559	44,554	12.46%
17	357,414	357,559	-145	-0.04%
18	355,574	357,559	-1,985	-0.56%
19	410,613	357,559	53,054	14.84%
20	364,362	357,559	6,803	1.90%
21	334,921	357,559	-22,638	-6.33%
22	372,953	357,559	15,394	4.31%
23	334,243	357,559	-23,316	-6.52%
24	364,654	357,559	7,095	1.98%
25	344,456	357,559	-13,103	-3.66%
26	340,983	357,559	-16,576	-4.64%
27	353,299	357,559	-4,260	-1.19%
28	335,909	357,559	-21,650	-6.05%
29	342,967	357,559	-14,592	-4.08%
30	345,350	357,559	-12,209	-3.41%
31	374,925	357,559	17,366	4.86%
32	320,311	357,559	-37,248	-10.42%
33	330,491	357,559	-27,068	-7.57%

2020 Population of 2011 Ohio State Senate Districts